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#Assessment of #risk associated with #influenza A(#H5N8) virus, 17 November 2016 (@WHO)

  Title : #Assessment of #risk associated with #influenza A(#H5N8) virus, 17 November 2016. Subject : Avian Influenza, H5N8 subtype, multi...

30 Nov 2016

#H5N8 HP #Avian #Influenza, #Global #situation #update - 29 November 2016 (#FAO, edited)

 

Title: #H5N8 HP #Avian #Influenza, #Global #situation #update - 29 November 2016.

Subject: Avian Influenza H5N8 Panzootics in poultry and wild birds, update.

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), full page: (LINK).

Code: [     ][     ]

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H5N8 HPAI GLOBAL situation update - 29 November 2016

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Disclaimer

Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last H7N9 situation update appears in red. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [OIE]) as well as peer-reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The designation employed and the presentation of material on the map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.

 

Overview

  • Situation:
    • H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) 2016 virus in Asia, Europe and Middle East with pandemic potential.
  • Confirmed countriesx:
    • Austria*,
    • Croatia,
    • Denmark*,
    • Germany*,
    • Hungary*,
    • India*,
    • Israel*,
    • the Netherlands*,
    • Poland,
    • Russian Federation*,
    • Switzerland,
    • Iran (Islamic Republic of)*,
    • Sweden,
    • Finland,
    • Romania and
    • France.
  • Animal/environmental findings
    • Domestic bird species affected:
      • Chicken (Gallus gallus domesticus),
      • Duck (Anas platyrhynchos domesticus),
      • Turkey (Meleagris gallopavo),
      • Goose (Anserinae sp.),
      • Guinea fowl (Numididae sp.).
    • Wild bird species affected:
      • Common Pochard (Aythya ferina),
      • Tufted Duck (Aythya fuligula),
      • Mute Swan (Cygnus olor),
      • Gull (Laridae),
      • Common Coot (Fulica atra),
      • wild duck (Aythyinae or Anatinae sp.),
      • stork (Ciconiidae sp.),
      • Grey Heron (Ardea cinerea),
      • Great Cested Grebe (Podiceps cristatus),
      • Black-headed Gull (Chroicocephalus ridibundus),
      • Common Tern (Sterna hirundo),
      • Great Cormorant (Phalacrocorax carbo),
      • Painted Stork (Mycteria leucocephala),
      • pelican (Pelecanus sp.),
      • munia (Lonchura sp.),
      • crow (Corvus sp.),
      • Common Buzzard (Buteo buteo),
      • Common Goldeneye (Bucephala clangula),
      • Little Grebe (Tachybaptus ruficollis),
      • Common Moorhen (Gallinula chloropus),
      • Yellow-legged Gull (Larus michahellis),
      • Peregrine Falcon (Falco peregrinus),
      • Been Goose (Anser fabalis),
      • Emu (Dromaius novaeollandiae).
  • Number of human cases:
    • None reported to date.

 

Map 1. H5N8 HPAI outbreaks officially reported in Asia and Europe by onset date, since 1 June 2016

H5N8 HPAI outbreaks officially reported in Asia and Europe by onset date

 

FAO's support to countries

Global level

  • A webinar titled Intercontinental spread of H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza – Analysis of the current situation and recommendations for preventive action, targeting national veterinary services and FAO regional and country teams, was conducted by FAO on 24 November 2016 [link]
  • A teleconference on H5N8 HPAI and wild birds has been held by the OFFLU wildlife group on 22 November 2016
  • An alert message, with emphasis on the heightened risk of H5N8 HPAI incursion faced by African countries, has been sent to CVOs on 15 November 2016
  • EMPRES Watch, September 2016: H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) of clade 2.3.4.4 detected through surveillance of wild migratory birds in the Tyva Republic, the Russian Federation – potential for international spread [link]
  • EMPRES news, 4 November 2016: H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza detected in Hungary and in the Republic of India H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza detected in Hungary and in the Republic of India [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting September 2016 [link]

 

Regional level

  • FAO Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia news, November 2016: Highly pathogenic avian influenza spreading in Europe, South Asia [link]
  • FAO Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia news, September 2016: Emergent Avian Influenza virus detected in surveillance of migratory birds in Russian Federation (FAO Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia news [link]

 

Recent publications

  • Lee DH, Sharshov K, Swayne DE, Kurskaya O, Sobolev I, Kabilov M, Alekseev A, Irza V, Shestopalov A. Novel Reassortant Clade 2.3.4.4 Avian Influenza A(H5N8) Virus in Wild Aquatic Birds, Russia, 2016. Emerg Infect Dis. 2017 Feb 15;23(2). doi: 10.3201/eid2302.161252. [Reference].
    • In June 2016, we collected samples from 13 dead and 30 hunter-harvested wild aquatic birds around Uvs-Nuur Lake (Tyva Republic) at the Russia–Mongolia border. We isolated a total of 11 subtype H5 influenza viruses from birds of various species: the black-headed gull (Larus ridibundus), gray heron (Ardea cinerea), common tern (Sterna hirundo), great crested grebe (Podiceps cristatus), and great cormorant (Phalacrocorax carbo). Phylogenetic analysis showed that the HA, NA, and NS genes of three isolates clustered with H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 group B HPAIV viruses identified in eastern China in 2014. The PB1, PB2, PA, NP, and M genes clustered with LPAIV identified in Mongolia, China, and Vietnam.
  • Globig A, Starick E, Homeier T, Pohlmann A, Grund C, Wolf P, Zimmermann A, Wolf C, Heim D, Schlößer H, Zander S, Beer M, Conraths FJ, Harder TC. Epidemiological and Molecular Analysis of an Outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 in a German Zoo: Effective Disease Control with Minimal Culling. Transbound Emerg Dis. (2016 Nov 15) [Reference].
    • Highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus (HPAIV) subtype H5N8, clade 2.3.4.4, caused five outbreaks in poultry holdings in Germany between autumn 2014 and February 2015. In addition, birds kept in a zoo in north-eastern Germany were affected. Only a few individual white storks (Ciconia ciconia) showed clinical symptoms and eventually died in the course of the infection, although subsequent in-depth diagnostic investigations showed that other birds kept in the same compound of the white storks were acutely positive for or had undergone asymptomatic infection with HPAIV H5N8. An exception from culling all of the 500 remaining zoo birds was granted by the competent authority. Restriction measures included grouping the zoo birds into eight epidemiological units in which 60 birds of each unit tested repeatedly negative for H5N8. This case demonstrates that alternatives to culling exist to rescue valuable avifaunistic collections after incursions of HPAIV.

 

Recommendations for affected countries and those at risk

  • FAO recommends intensified surveillance and awareness raising by national authorities.
  • There is no benefit to be gained in attempting to control the virus in wild birds through culling or habitat destruction. Spraying of birds or the environment with disinfectant – for example sodium hypochlorite or bleach – is considered potentially counter-productive, harmful to the environment and not effective from a disease control perspective.
  • There is also no justification for any pre-emptive culling of endangered species in zoological collections. Control measures for captive wild birds in places where virus is detected should be based on strict movement control, isolation and only when necessary limited culling of affected birds.

 

General recommendations

  • It is important to report sick or dead birds – both wild birds and poultry - to local authorities (veterinary services, public health officials, community leaders etc.). These should be tested for avian influenza viruses.
  • Wash hands properly and often. You should always do so after handling birds or other animals, when cooking or preparing animal products, and before eating.
  • Eat only well-cooked meat products, and refrain from collecting, consuming or selling animals found sick or dead.
  • Seek immediate advice from your physician if you show signs of fever after being in contact with poultry, farmed birds, wild birds or other animals.

 

Recommendations to poultry producers

  • Farmers and poultry producers should step up their biosecurity measures in order to prevent potential virus introduction from wild birds or their faeces.
  • It is important to keep poultry and other animals away from wild birds and their sub-products or droppings through screens, fencing or nets.
  • Commercial poultry operations and backyard poultry owners should avoid the introduction of pathogens through contaminated clothes, footwear, vehicles or equipment used in waterfowl hunting.

 

Recommendations to hunters

  • Hunting associations and wildlife authorities should be aware that H5N8 and other avian influenza viruses might be present in waterfowl hunted during fall migration 2016 and that hunting, handling and dressing of shot waterfowl carries the risk of spreading avian influenza viruses to susceptible poultry.
  • Avoid introduction of avian influenza viruses to poultry through fomites (clothing, boots, vehicles, etc.) and do not feed wild bird scraps to poultry.
  • Water bird scraps should not be fed to domestic animals (cats, dogs, or poultry).
  • Any waste from hunted birds should be treated as potentially contaminated and safely disposed of.

 

Recommendations to national authorities

  • Increase surveillance efforts for the early detection of H5N8 and other influenza viruses in poultry and dead wild birds.
  • Provide means for reporting sick or dead birds, e.g. hotlines and collection points.
  • Raise awareness of the general population, poultry producers or marketers and hunters both about the disease as well as the reporting mechanisms for sick or dead birds.
  • Collaborate with hunting associations for laboratory testing of hunted birds, especially in areas that are known to be affected.
  • Provide means for and ensure proper disposal of carcases after sample collection.
  • Ensure that the means for laboratory testing are in place to detect the currently circulating avian influenza viruses, especially those of clade 2.3.4.4.
  • Gene sequencing should be performed for all H5 viruses detected, and results shared with the global community in a timely manner. This will aid understanding of how the virus is spreading.
  • Action on wild birds not recommended.

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{x} Reports of H5N8 HPAI events in Taiwan, Province of China, are not included in this update since the virus belongs to a genetically different strain.

{*} Countries in which the virus was also detected in poultry.

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Keywords: Avian Influenza; H5N8; Poultry; Wild Birds; Updates; Worldwide; FAO.

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