A TIME'S MEMORY

11/20/2009

United Kingdom, Wales. Tamiflu-resistant swine flu strain spreading

Resistant strain discovered in Cardiff hospital, prompting concern among health officials

Doctors in Wales have discovered a Tamiflu-resistant strain of swine flu that has been spreading from patient to patient in a Cardiff hospital.

The emergence of an easily transmissible, resistant strain is a worrying development for health officials and appears to be the first documented case in Europe.

Five patients at University Hospital Wales, in Cardiff, were infected and isolated for treatment. All had severe underlying conditions that left them with weakened immune systems. At least three had acquired the infection in hospital.

There have been a handful of reported cases from around the world of Tamiflu-resistant strains of the H1N1 virus. Only one previous case, at a US summer camp, however, involved person-to-person transmission.

The Cardiff patients have been treated with an alternative anti-viral drug. Two have recovered and been discharged and three others remain in hospital, one in intensive care.

Dr Roland Salmon, the director of the communicable disease surveillance centre in Wales, said: "The emergence of [H1N1] viruses that are resistant to Tamiflu is not unexpected in patients with serious underlying conditions and suppressed immune systems, who still test positive for the virus despite treatment.

"In this case, the resistant strain of swine flu does not appear to be any more severe than the swine flu virus that has been circulating since April.

"For the vast majority of people, Tamiflu has proved effective in reducing the severity of illness. Vaccination remains the most effective tool we have in preventing swine flu so I urge people identified as being at risk to look out for their invitation to be vaccinated by their GP surgery."

Any spread of a Tamiflu-resistant strain of the virus into the community would constitute a serious public health concern. The government recently reminded those who caught swine flu to take Tamiflu as a first line of medical defence.

A Department of Health official in London said: "We take this development seriously, but the Health Protection Agency considers that the risk to the general healthy population is low. The Tamiflu-resistant virus has emerged in a group of particularly vulnerable individuals – this type of resistance is well documented.

"Our strategy to offer anti-virals to all patients with swine flu is the right one – to help prevent complications and reduce the severity of the illness. We are keeping the situation under review."


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Norway. H1N1 mutation found in some flu fatalities

Authorities said there is no reason to believe any mutation of the H1N1 virus had any implication for the effectiveness of the vaccine.Norwegian health authorities said Friday they have discovered a potentially significant mutation in the H1N1 influenza strain that could be responsible for causing the severest symptoms among those infected.



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USA: Tamiflu-resistant swine flu cluster reported in NC (AP)

Jessica Forde recieves her H1N1 shot at the Delany Medical Center on November 11, in the Bronx borough of New York City. US officials Friday said infections from A(H1N1) virus had slowed in the United States this week, raising hopes the early roll-out of vaccines may be bringing the disease under control.(AFP/Getty Images/File/Spencer Platt)AP - Four North Carolina patients at a single hospital tested positive for a type of swine flu that is resistant to Tamiflu, health officials said Friday. The cases reported at Duke University Medical Center over six weeks make up the biggest cluster seen so far in the U.S.


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United Kingdom. HPA - HPA statement on possible transmission (11/20/09, edited9

HPA statement on possible transmission

20 November 2009


The HPA is working with colleagues from the Public Health Service of Wales to investigate a number of possible cases of person to person transmission of oseltamivir resistant swine flu.

To date, a total of nine H1N1v confirmed cases have been reported amongst patients on a hospital ward in Wales. Five of these cases are known to be resistant to oseltamivir, one is sensitive and for three resistance status is presently unknown.

The virus has emerged in a group of particularly vulnerable individuals in whom the development of oseltamivir resistance is well documented. At present we believe the risk to the general healthy population is low. There is no evidence that the oseltamivir resistant virus is any more virulent than any other type of flu. The situation is being kept under review. Further follow-up of cases and their close contacts both on the ward and in the community is underway to ascertain if there is evidence of onward transmission. The virus remains sensitive to the other frontline drug Relenza® which is being used as an alternative antiviral and patients are responding well.

Although further epidemiological investigation is underway, it would seem likely that transmission of oseltamivir-resistant H1N1 virus has taken place.

The current cases of oseltamivir resistance under investigation have all occurred in patients with haematological problems which result in immuno-suppression either because of the disorder or the chemotherapy given to treat the disorder.

Oseltamivir resistance to influenza viruses is well documented in immunosuppressed individuals and can develop quickly. It is likely to be associated with the high viral load which may occur during infection in these patients. In addition, immunosuppressed people may be more susceptible to infection ie a smaller exposure may result in infection in these patients. Antiviral resistance monitoring has been in place in the UK for a number of years and this allows us to identify drug resistance early so that cases can be investigated and managed appropriately It still remains appropriate to use oseltamivir for the treatment and prophylaxis of influenza in the UK. Guidance is being developed to cover the particular instance where modifications to the current antiviral treatment policy may be required.


Background information

As of 20th November, WHO have reported 57 incidences of oseltamivir resistance worldwide.

There have been no documented episodes of person to person transmission of a oseltamivir resistant pandemic influenza virus. A small number of individual cases have been identified, however, in whom drug resistant virus has been isolated with no history of prior use of anti-virals.

In addition, on 19 November, WHO was notified by the US of four patients with infection with oseltamivir-resistant pandemic H1N1 2009 influenza virus among inpatients in the same unit at a hospital during October and November. The possibility that these viruses have been transmitted within this hospital unit is currently under investigation.

Generally, the pandemic H1N1 oseltamivir resistant viruses are not considered "fit" and transmission is poor.

Ends


For media enquiries only please contact the Health Protection Agency's Centre for Infections press office on:
020 8327 7080
020 8327 7097
020 8327 7098
020 8327 6690
020 8327 6647

Last reviewed: 20 November 2009
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USA. CDC - Seasonal Influenza (Flu) - Weekly Report: Influenza Summary Update (11/20/09, edited)

2009-2010 Influenza Season Week 45 ending November 14, 2009

All data are preliminary and may change as more reports are received. Please note that because of the upcoming Thanksgiving holiday, the week 46 report will be distributed on Monday, November 30, 2009.


Synopsis:

During week 45 (November 8-14, 2009), influenza activity decreased slightly in the U.S.
  • 3,106 (28.8%) specimens tested by U.S. World Health Organization (WHO) and National Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance System (NREVSS) collaborating laboratories and reported to CDC/Influenza Division were positive for influenza.
  • Over 99% of all subtyped influenza A viruses being reported to CDC were 2009 influenza A (H1N1) viruses.
  • The proportion of deaths attributed to pneumonia and influenza (P&I) was above the epidemic threshold for the seventh consecutive week.
  • Twenty-one influenza-associated pediatric deaths were reported. Fifteen of these deaths were associated with 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus infection, and six were associated with an influenza A virus for which the subtype was undetermined.
  • The proportion of outpatient visits for influenza-like illness (ILI) was 5.5% which is above the national baseline of 2.3%. All 10 regions reported ILI above region-specific baseline levels.
  • Forty-three states reported geographically widespread influenza activity, Puerto Rico and seven states reported regional influenza activity, the District of Columbia reported local influenza activity, and Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands reported sporadic influenza activity.

National and Regional Summary of Select Surveillance Components

[HHS Surveillance Regions* - Data for current week: Out-patient ILI† - % positive for flu‡ - Number of jurisdictions reporting regional or widespread activity§ / Data cumulative for the season since August 30, 2009 (Week 35):  A (H1) - A (H3) - 2009 A (H1N1) - A (unable to sub-type)¥ - A(Subtyping not performed) - B - Pediatric Deaths]
  • Nation - Elevated - 28.8 % - 51 of 54 / 20 - 36 - 46,920 - 371 - 16,847 - 142 - 138
  • Region 1 - Elevated - 38.0 % - 6 of 6 / 5 - 2 - 2,327 - 8 - 338 - 9 - 0
  • Region 2 - Elevated - 29.4 % - 3 of 4 / 1 - 5 - 623 - 0 - 766 - 3 - 4
  • Region 3 - Elevated - 51.8 % - 5 of 6 / 2 - 6 - 9,042 - 20 - 1,232 - 13 - 9
  • Region 4 - Elevated - 21.5 % - 8 of 8 / 0 - 3 - 4,080 - 82 - 3,658 - 24 - 28
  • Region 5 - Elevated - 41.9 % - 6 of 6 / 4 - 12 - 7,140 - 77 - 1,166 - 10 - 14
  • Region 6 - Elevated - 13.3 % - 5 of 5 / 0 - 3 - 2,181 - 4 - 4,237 - 26 - 48
  • Region 7 -  Elevated - 28.8 % - 4 of 4 / 4 - 1 - 3,049 - 145 - 885 - 3 - 2
  • Region 8 - Elevated - 29.5 % - 6 of 6 / 2 - 0 - 8,640 - 0 - 3,528 - 46 - 11
  • Region 9 - Elevated - 21.6 % - 4 of 5 / 0 - 3 - 6,011 - 25 - 865 - 4 - 14
  • Region 10 - Elevated - 41.7 % - 4 of 4 / 2 - 1 - 3,827 - 10 - 172 - 4 - 8
(*) Influenza season officially begins each year at week 40. This season data from week 35 will be included to show the trend of influenza activity before the official start of the 2009-10 influenza season.
(**) HHS regions (Region 1 CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT; Region 2: NJ, NY, Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands; Region 3: DE, DC, MD, PA, VA, WV; Region 4: AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC, SC, TN; Region 5: IL, IN, MI, MN, OH, WI; Region 6: AR, LA, NM, OK, TX; Region 7: IA, KS, MO, NE; Region 8: CO, MT, ND, SD, UT, WY; Region 9: AZ, CA, Guam, HI, NV; and Region 10: AK, ID, OR, WA).
(†) Elevated means the % of visits for ILI is at or above the national or region-specific baseline
(‡) National data are for current week; regional data are for the most recent three weeks
(§) Includes all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and U.S. Virgin Islands
(¥) The majority of influenza A viruses that cannot be sub-typed as seasonal influenza viruses are 2009 A (H1N1) influenza viruses upon further testing


U.S. Virologic Surveillance:

WHO and NREVSS collaborating laboratories located in all 50 states and Washington D.C., report to CDC the number of respiratory specimens tested for influenza and the number positive by influenza type and subtype. The results of tests performed during the current week are summarized in the table below.

Week 45
  • No. of specimens tested 10,803
  • No. of positive specimens (%) 3,106 (28.8%)
  • Positive specimens by type/subtype
    • Influenza A 3,103 (99.9%)
      • A (2009 H1N1) 2,468 (79.5%)
      • A (subtyping not performed) 624 (20.1%)
      • A (unable to subtype) 10 (0.3%)
      • A (H3) 0 (0.0%)
      • A (H1) 1 (0.1%)
    • Influenza B 3 (0.1%)

During week 45, seasonal influenza A (H1N1) and influenza B viruses co-circulated at low levels with 2009 influenza A (H1N1) viruses. Over 99% of all subtyped influenza A viruses reported to CDC this week were 2009 influenza A (H1N1) viruses. (...)


Pneumonia and Influenza Hospitalization and Death Tracking:

This new system was implemented on August 30, 2009, and replaces the weekly report of laboratory confirmed 2009 H1N1-related hospitalizations and deaths that began in April 2009. Jurisdictions can now report to CDC counts of hospitalizations and deaths resulting from all types or subtypes of influenza, not just those from 2009 H1N1 influenza virus. To allow jurisdictions to implement the new case definition, counts were reset to zero on August 30, 2009.

From August 30 – November 14, 2009, 26,315 laboratory-confirmed influenza-associated hospitalizations and 1,049 laboratory-confirmed influenza-associated deaths were reported to CDC. CDC will continue to use its traditional surveillance systems to track the progress of the 2009-10 influenza season. (...)


Antigenic Characterization:

CDC has antigenically characterized one seasonal influenza A (H1N1), three influenza A (H3N2), one influenza B, and 348 2009 influenza A (H1N1) viruses collected since September 1, 2009.

One seasonal influenza A (H1N1) virus was tested and is related to the influenza A (H1N1) component of the 2009-10 Northern Hemisphere influenza vaccine (A/Brisbane/59/2007).

The three influenza A (H3N2) viruses tested showed reduced titers with antisera produced against A/Brisbane/10/2007, the 2009-2010 Northern Hemisphere influenza A (H3N2) vaccine component, and were antigenically related to A/Perth/16/2009, the WHO recommended influenza A (H3N2) component of the 2010 Southern Hemisphere vaccine formulation.

Influenza B viruses currently circulating globally can be divided into two distinct lineages represented by the B/Yamagata/16/88 and B/Victoria/02/87 viruses. The influenza B component of the 2009-10 vaccine belongs to the B/Victoria lineage. The influenza B virus tested belongs to the B/Victoria lineage and is related to the influenza vaccine component for the 2009-10 Northern Hemisphere influenza vaccine (B/Brisbane/60/2008).

Three hundred forty-seven (99.7%) of 348 2009 influenza A (H1N1) viruses tested are related to the A/California/07/2009 (H1N1) reference virus selected by WHO as the 2009 H1N1 vaccine virus and one virus (0.3%) tested showed reduced titers with antisera produced against A/California/07/2009.

Annual influenza vaccination is expected to provide the best protection against those virus strains that are related to the vaccine strains, but limited to no protection may be expected when the vaccine and circulating virus strains are so different as to be from different lineages. Antigenic characterization of 2009 influenza A(H1N1) viruses indicates that these viruses are only distantly related antigenically and genetically to seasonal influenza A(H1N1) viruses, suggesting that little to no protection would be expected from vaccination with seasonal influenza vaccine. It is too early in the influenza season to determine if seasonal influenza viruses will circulate widely or how well the seasonal vaccine and circulating strains will match.


Antiviral Resistance:

Since September 1, 2009, four influenza A (H3N2), one influenza B, and 353 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus isolates have been tested for resistance to the neuraminidase inhibitors (oseltamivir and zanamivir), and 856 2009 influenza A (H1N1) original clinical samples were tested for a single known mutation in the virus that confers oseltamivir resistance. In addition, one influenza A (H3N2) and 182 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus isolates have been tested for resistance to the adamantanes (amantadine and rimantadine). Additional laboratories perform antiviral testing and report their results to CDC.

The results of antiviral resistance testing performed on these viruses are summarized in the table below.


Antiviral Resistance Testing Results on Samples Collected Since September 1, 2009.


[Oseltamivir: Samples tested (n) - Resistant Viruses, Number (%) / Zanamivir: Samples tested (n) - Resistant Viruses, Number (%) / Adamantanes: Samples tested (n) - Resistant Viruses, Number (%)]
  • Seasonal Influenza A (H1N1) 0 - 0 (0) / 0 - 0 (0) / 0 - 0 (0)
  • Influenza A (H3N2) 4 - 0 (0) / 0 - 0 (0) / 1 - 1 (100)
  • Influenza B 1 - 0 (0) / 0 - 0 (0) / N/A* - N/A*
  • 2009 Influenza A (H1N1) 1,209 - 10†‡ (0.8) / 353 - 0 (0) / 182 - 181 (99.5)
(*) The adamantanes (amantadine and rimantadine) are not effective against influenza B viruses.
(†) Two screening tools were used to determine oseltamivir resistance: sequence analysis of viral genes or a neuraminidase inhibition assay.
(‡) Additional laboratories perform antiviral resistance testing and report their results to CDC. One additional oseltamivir resistant 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus has been identified by these laboratories since September 1, 2009, bringing the total number to 11.


Over 99% of all of the subtyped influenza A viruses reported during week 45 were 2009 influenza A (H1N1) viruses, and the majority of 2009 H1N1 viruses tested since April 2009 have been resistant to the adamantanes (amantadine and rimantadine).

Antiviral treatment with oseltamivir or zanamivir is recommended for all patients with confirmed or suspected influenza virus infection who are hospitalized or who are at higher risk for influenza complications. Additional information on antiviral recommendations for treatment and chemoprophylaxis of influenza virus infection is available at LINK.

2009 influenza A (H1N1) viruses were tested for oseltamivir resistance by a neuraminidase inhibition assay and/or detection of genetic sequence mutation, depending on the type of specimen tested. Original clinical samples were examined for a single known mutation in the virus that confers oseltamivir resistance in currently circulating seasonal influenza A (H1N1) viruses, while influenza virus isolates were tested using a neuraminidase inhibition assay that determines the presence or absence of neuraminidase inhibitor resistance, followed by the neuraminidase gene sequence analysis of resistant viruses.

The majority of 2009 influenza A (H1N1) viruses are susceptible to the neuraminidase inhibitor antiviral medication oseltamivir; however, rare sporadic cases of oseltamivir resistant 2009 influenza A (H1N1) viruses have been detected worldwide. A total of 21 cases of oseltamivir resistant 2009 influenza A (H1N1) viruses have been identified in the United States since April 2009. In specimens collected since September 1, 2009, 11 cases have been identified in the United States, including seven newly identified cases since last week and one case reported during a previous week that was reclassified. All tested viruses retain their sensitivity to the neuraminidase inhibitor zanamivir.

Of the 21 cases, 12 patients had documented exposure to oseltamivir through either treatment or chemoprophylaxis, eight patients are under investigation to determine exposure to oseltamivir, and one patient had no documented oseltamivir exposure.

Occasional development of oseltamivir resistance during treatment or prophylaxis is not unexpected. Enhanced surveillance and increased availability of testing performed at CDC are expected to detect additional cases of oseltamivir resistant 2009 influenza A (H1N1) viruses, and such cases will be investigated to assess the spread of resistant strains in the community.

To prevent the spread of antiviral resistant virus strains, CDC reminds clinicians and the public of the need to continue hand and cough hygiene measures for the duration of any symptoms of influenza, even while taking antiviral medications (LINK).


Pneumonia and Influenza (P&I) Mortality Surveillance

During week 45, 7.5% of all deaths reported through the 122-Cities Mortality Reporting System were due to P&I. This percentage was above the epidemic threshold of 6.9% for week 45. Including week 45, P&I mortality has been above threshold for seven consecutive weeks. (...)


Influenza-Associated Pediatric Mortality

Twenty-one influenza-associated pediatric deaths were reported to CDC during week 45 (Arizona [2], Colorado [3], Georgia [2], Louisiana [2], Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, New York City, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon [2], Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin). Fifteen of these deaths were associated with 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus infection, and six were associated with an influenza A virus for which the subtype is undetermined. The deaths reported during week 45 occurred between September 20 and November 14, 2009.

Since August 30, 2009, CDC has received 138 reports of influenza-associated pediatric deaths that occurred during the current influenza season (24 deaths in children less than 2 years old, 16 deaths in children 2-4 years old, 50 deaths in children 5-11 years old, and 48 deaths in children 12-17 years old). One hundred thirteen (82%) of the138 deaths were due to 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus infections, and the remaining 25 were associated with influenza A virus for which the subtype is undetermined. A total of 171 deaths in children associated with 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus infection have been reported to CDC.

Among the 138 deaths in children, 74 children had specimens collected for bacterial culture from normally sterile sites and 23 (31.1%) of the 74 were positive; Staphylococcus aureus was identified in eight (34.8%) of the 23 children. One S. aureus isolate was sensitive to methicillin, six were methicillin resistant, and one did not have sensitivity testing performed. Fifteen (65.2%) of the 23 children with bacterial coinfections were five years of age or older, and six (26.1%) of the 23 children were 12 years of age or older.

Laboratory-Confirmed Influenza-Associated Pediatric Deaths by Date and Type/Subtype of Influenza.

[Date - 2009 H1N1 Influenza -  Influenza A-Subtype Unknown - Seasonal Flu - Total]
  • Number of Deaths REPORTED for Current Week – Week 45 (Week ending November 14, 2009) -  15 - 6 - 0 - 21
  • Number of Deaths OCCURRED Since August 30, 2009 - 113 - 25 - 0 - 138
  • Number of Deaths OCCURRED since April 26, 2009 - 171 - 28 - 1 - 200 (...)

Influenza-Associated Hospitalizations

Laboratory-confirmed influenza-associated hospitalizations are monitored using a population-based surveillance network that includes the 10 Emerging Infections Program (EIP) sites (CA, CO, CT, GA, MD, MN, NM, NY, OR and TN) and 6 new sites (IA, ID, MI, ND, OK and SD).

During September 1, 2009 – November 14, 2009, the following preliminary laboratory-confirmed overall influenza associated hospitalization rates were reported by EIP and the new sites (rates include influenza A, influenza B, and 2009 influenza A (H1N1)):
  • Rates [EIP (new sites)] for children aged 0-4 years and 5-17 years were 4.6 (8.7) and 2.1 (3.4) per 10,000, respectively.
  • Rates [EIP (new sites)] for adults aged 18-49 years, 50-64 years, and ≥ 65 years were 1.7 (1.6), 2.1 (1.6) and 1.7 (1.4) per 10,000, respectively. (...)

Outpatient Illness Surveillance:

Nationwide during week 45, 5.5% of patient visits reported through the U.S. Outpatient Influenza-like Illness Surveillance Network (ILINet) were due to influenza-like illness (ILI). This percentage is above the national baseline of 2.3%. (...)

On a regional level, the percentage of outpatient visits for ILI ranged from 2.6% to 7.9% during week 45, and decreased in all 10 surveillance regions compared to the previous week. All 10 regions reported a proportion of outpatient visits for ILI above their region-specific baseline levels.


Geographic Spread of Influenza as Assessed by State and Territorial Epidemiologists:

The influenza activity reported by state and territorial epidemiologists indicates geographic spread of both seasonal influenza and 2009 influenza A (H1N1) viruses and does not measure the severity of influenza activity.
  • During week 45, the following influenza activity was reported:
    • Widespread influenza activity was reported by 43 states (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
    • Regional influenza activity was reported by Puerto Rico and seven states (Hawaii, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming).
    • Local influenza activity was reported by the District of Columbia.
    • Sporadic influenza activity was reported by the U.S. Virgin Islands and Guam.

A description of surveillance methods is available at: LINK
(...)
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CDC - Seasonal Influenza (Flu) - Weekly Report: Influenza Summary Update
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WHO - Public health significance of virus mutation detected in Norway

Public health significance of virus mutation detected in Norway - Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 briefing note 17

20 NOVEMBER 2009 | GENEVA


The Norwegian Institute of Public Health has informed WHO of a mutation detected in three H1N1 viruses.

The viruses were isolated from the first two fatal cases of pandemic influenza in the country and one patient with severe illness.

Norwegian scientists have analysed samples from more than 70 patients with clinical illness and no further instances of this mutation have been detected. This finding suggests that the mutation is not widespread in the country.

The virus with this mutation remains sensitive to the antiviral drugs, oseltamivir and zanamivir, and studies show that currently available pandemic vaccines confer protection.

Worldwide, laboratory monitoring of influenza viruses has detected a similar mutation in viruses from several other countries, with the earliest detection occurring in April. In addition to Norway, the mutation has been observed in Brazil, China, Japan, Mexico, Ukraine, and the US.

Although information on all these cases is incomplete, several viruses showing the same mutation were detected in fatal cases, and the mutation has also been detected in some mild cases. Worldwide, viruses from numerous fatal cases have not shown the mutation. The public health significance of this finding is thus unclear.

The mutations appear to occur sporadically and spontaneously. To date, no links between the small number of patients infected with the mutated virus have been found and the mutation does not appear to spread.

The significance of the mutation is being assessed by scientists in the WHO network of influenza laboratories. Changes in viruses at the genetic level need to be constantly monitored. However, the significance of these changes is difficult to assess.

Many mutations do not alter any important features of the virus or the illness it causes. For this reason, WHO also uses clinical and epidemiological data when making risk assessments.

Although further investigation is under way, no evidence currently suggests that these mutations are leading to an unusual increase in the number of H1N1 infections or a greater number of severe or fatal cases.

Laboratories in the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network closely monitor influenza viruses worldwide and will remain vigilant for any further changes in the virus that may have public health significance.
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WHO | Public health significance of virus mutation detected in Norway
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Descubierta en Noruega una mutación del H1N1

El Instituto de Salud Pública de Noruega ha informado hoy de que ha identificado una mutación del H1N1 asociada a una forma más grave de la enfermedad. El virus se ha aislado de muestras tomadas de tres pacientes, dos que han fallecido (de hecho, fueron las dos primeras víctimas mortales del país) y otro que ha estado muy grave. Esta variante, sin embargo, no ha sido localizada luego en los siguientes fallecidos (el país había informado al Centro Europeo de Control de Enfermedades, ECDC, el 18 de noviembre de que tenía 21 fallecidos asociados a la nueva gripe), lo que es una buena noticia.

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Canada. Batch of H1N1 vaccine recalled for severe reactions

A batch of swine flu vaccine is being pulled back for investigation after it appeared to cause higher rates of severe allergic reactions than other lots.

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Highly pathogenic avian influenza, Cote D'Ivoire (OIE, WAHID Interface, 11/20/09, edited)

[Source PDF Document: LINK. EDITED.]

Highly pathogenic avian influenza, Cote D'Ivoire

Information received on 20/11/2009 from Dr Kanga Kouame, Directeur des Services Vétérinaires et de la Qualité, -, Ministère de la Production Animale et des Ressources Halieutiques, Abidjan, Cote D'Ivoire

  • Summary
    • Report type Follow-up report No. 1 (Final report)
    • Start date 06/10/2009
    • Date of first confirmation of the event 10/10/2009
    • Report date 20/11/2009
    • Date submitted to OIE 20/11/2009
    • Date event resolved 30/10/2009
    • Reason for notification Reoccurrence of a listed disease
    • Date of previous occurrence 01/2007
    • Manifestation of disease Sub-clinical infection
    • Causal agent Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus
    • Serotype H5N1
    • Nature of diagnosis Laboratory (advanced)
    • This event pertains to a defined zone within the country
  • Outbreaks
    • There are no new outbreaks in this report
  • Epidemiology
    • Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection
      • Unknown or inconclusive
  • Epidemiological comments
    • The reoccurrence of highly pathogenic avian influenza serotype H5N1 is not confirmed and will be closed since the results obtained by the OIE Reference Laboratory in Padova were negative for avian influenza by RT-PCR, virus isolation in embryonated eggs, sequencing, intravenous pathogenicity index test and hemagglutination inhibition test. Further tests were carried out by the same laboratory for Newcastle disease and West Nile fever and they were negative.
    • Concerning the ravens that died in Abidjan, some people have revealed that they had spread a toxic product, mainly Gambaril; that could be the origin of the deaths reported. Toxicological tests gave negative results.
  • Control measures
    • Measures applied
      • Control of wildlife reservoirs
      • Screening
      • Disinfection of infected premises/establishment(s)
      • Dipping / Spraying
      • No vaccination
      • No treatment of affected animals
    • Measures to be applied
      • No other measures
  • Diagnostic test results
    • Laboratory name and type Laboratoire de référence de l'OIE pour la maladie de Newcastle et l'influenza aviaire à Padoue (OIE’s Reference Laboratory)
      • Tests and results: Species - Test - Test date - Result
        • Wild species - gene sequencing - 30/10/2009 - Negative
        • Wild species - haemagglutination inhibition test (HIT) - 30/10/2009 - Negative
        • Wild species - intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) test - 30/10/2009 - Negative
        • Wild species - reverse transcription - polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) - 30/10/2009 - Negative
        • Wild species - virus isolation - 30/10/2009 - Negative
  • Future Reporting
    • The event is resolved. No more reports will be submitted.
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Ukraine reports 354 flu deaths since start of October - 'RIA Novosti' newswire

Ukraine reports 354 flu deaths since start of October

KIEV, November 20 (RIA Novosti)


The death toll from the ongoing flu epidemic in Ukraine has reached 354 since the start of October, the country's health ministry said on Friday.

The ministry said over 1.54 million people have been infected since the outbreak began.

The number of officially confirmed swine flu deaths in the country has reached 17, with 255 people infected.

Earlier, 328 flu deaths were reported across the country, with a total of 1.46 million people infected. There were 15 swine flu deaths registered in the country as of November 18, with 166 people infected.

Ukrainian health officials say the situation has stabilized, and that quarantine measures imposed by the government in nine western provinces in late October in an attempt to curb the spread of flu may be lifted by the end of the week.

In early November, Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) chief, Raisa Bohatyryova, said there were "constitutional prerequisites" for a state of emergency amid the flu epidemic.

A state of emergency could delay the presidential election scheduled for January 17, 2010 until May.

Ukraine's Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko has said she sees no need for such measures.

The Ukrainian parliament has approved the allocation of 1 billion hryvnias ($125 million) for measures to fight swine and seasonal flu.

However, President Viktor Yushchenko, who earlier requested help from other countries to stem the flu outbreak, has not signed the allocation plan, saying it would accelerate inflation and cause a decline in Ukraine's standard of living.

Yulia Tymoshenko said the president's refusal to allocate money would impede governmental efforts to fight the epidemic.

Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, as well as Party of Regions leader and former premier Viktor Yanukovych, who lost the previous vote to Yushchenko following the 2004 "orange revolution" are among the 16 candidates to run in the Ukrainian presidential election.
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Ukraine reports 354 flu deaths since start of October | Top Russian news and analysis online | 'RIA Novosti' newswire
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Flu toll in the Netherlands rises to 28

Six people including one baby have died of AH1N1 influenza in the Netherlands over the past week.

The National Institute for Public Health, which announced the figures, adds that all six were affected by other ailments when they contracted the flu. The other victims were three children aged 7, 9 and 14, a 60-year-old woman and a man aged 72.

The institute says the flu epidemic is not spreading fast. The number of hospitalisations of flu sufferers with complications went up only very slightly last week from 291 the previous week to 359.

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Vietnam. Measles outbreak fueled by lack of vaccine

Ho Chi Minh City has reported at least 10 young measles cases every day this month due to an inadequate supply of shots for the disease, doctors said.

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Number of flu cases in Japan estimated at over 9 mil.

The number of people in Japan who have contracted influenza since early July, most of whom are believed to have been infected with the H1N1 virus, is estimated to have reached 9.02 million by last Sunday, the National Institute of Infectious Diseases said Friday. The total number of people suffering from influenza who visited hospitals across the country during the week through last Sunday was estimated at 1.64 million people, up 110,000 from the previous week.

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France. Grippe A (H1N1): fermetures d’écoles en rafales en Bretagne

SANTE - Depuis environ deux semaines, les fermetures d’établissements scolaires se multiplient en Bretagne (1) pour cause de suspicion de grippe A. En un seul jour, neuf établissements dont deux collèges ont été fermés à partir d’aujourd’hui et pour six...

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France. Grippe A : dix nouvelles écoles fermées en Aquitaine

La préfecture de la Gironde confirme l’existence de cas groupés de grippe A (H1-N1) dans quatre établissements scolaires du département.

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EuroFlu - Weekly Electronic Bulletin Week 46 : 09/11/2009-15/11/2009 - 20 November 2009, Issue N° 332 (edited)

EuroFlu - Weekly Electronic Bulletin Week 46 : 09/11/2009-15/11/2009 - 20 November 2009, Issue N° 332

Influenza activity remains high and is widespread across much of the European Region


Key points: week 46/2009
  • This report is based on material received from 43 of the 53 Member States in the WHO European Region and includes an update on the situation in Ukraine.
  • 42% of specimens collected from sentinel sources in the Region tested positive for influenza virus.
  • The incidence of clinical respiratory illness has increased in 13 countries over the past 3 weeks. For 10 of these, the proportion of sentinel specimens testing positive for influenza this week was 20% or greater.
  • Countries throughout the Region reported high or very high intensity of influenza.
  • Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was dominant in 36 countries and accounted for 99.2% of influenza A virus subtype detections.
  • From 13 to 20 November 2009, 21 countries reported a total of 181 deaths involving laboratory-confirmed cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection.

Ukraine

Preliminary analyses of samples taken from patients in Ukraine show that the virus is similar to that used for production of the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 vaccine. Although influenza activity in Ukraine remains high, the incidence of acute respiratory infection (ARI) is lower than that reported last week.


Current situation: week 46/2009

Thirteen countries have reported increases in influenza-like illness (ILI) and/or ARI consultations (defined as countries with increases in the previous three weeks). These increases are particularly notable in the groups aged 0–4 and 5–14 years. In 11 of these countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Moldova, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden), the positivity rate of sentinel swab specimens exceeded 20% (minimum number of tested sentinel specimens: 20).

The intensity of clinical activity was described as very high in Italy (for the first time this season), Norway, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation (Urals region) and Sweden. In addition, 14 countries reported high intensity. ILI and/or ARI was reported as geographically widespread in 24 countries. The impact on health services was described as severe in 2 countries (Albania, the Republic of Moldova), moderate in 11 and low in 16 others. For an overview of the season so far, see season tables.

While clinical influenza activity has increased over recent weeks in 13 countries, it has passed its peak in Belgium, Iceland, Ireland and parts of the United Kingdom (England and Northern Ireland). Five countries showed a decrease in clinical influenza activity during the past week: Bulgaria, Romania, the Russian Federation (in the central, far eastern and Urals regions), Serbia and Ukraine. Medium levels of influenza activity were reported in 22 countries, mainly in western and central Europe and the Baltic states. One country (Slovakia) reported low activity this week.

In the period 13–20 November, 21 countries reported 181 new deaths associated with laboratory-confirmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza, raising the total since April 2009 from 471 to 652. The deaths were reported in Belgium (4), Croatia (2), Finland (3), France (14), Germany (7), Greece (3), Ireland (1), Italy (24), Luxembourg (1), the Netherlands (5), Norway (5), Poland (2), Portugal (3), the Republic of Moldova (2), Serbia (6), Spain (34), Sweden (2), Switzerland (1), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, (1), Turkey (33) and the United Kingdom (28). Poland, Switzerland and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia reported their first laboratory-confirmed deaths during this week. Most pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases have resolved without complications.


Virological update: week 46/2009

Of the 31 countries testing 20 or more sentinel specimens this week, influenza-positive rates ranged from 3.1% (Azerbaijan) to 78.6% (Slovenia). Fifteen of these countries reported rates greater than 50%. Sentinel physicians in the Region collected 6179 respiratory specimens this week, of which 2602 (42.1%) were positive for influenza virus. Of these virus detections, 2591 were type A (2490 pandemic A(H1) and 90 not subtyped) and 11 were type B.

In addition, 16 794 non-sentinel-source specimens were reported positive for influenza virus in week 46/2009: 16 782 type A (15 468 pandemic A(H1), 65 A(H3), 76 seasonal A(H1), 1173 not subtyped) and 12 type B.

Of the total of 59 434 specimens that have tested positive for influenza virus since week 40/2009, 51 936 (87.4%) were pandemic influenza A(H1) and these accounted for 99% of all influenza A viruses that were subtyped. In addition, 291 were seasonal influenza A(H1); 191 were influenza A(H3); 6900 were influenza A not subtyped; and 116 were influenza B. The number of influenza detections has risen sharply each week, from about 1 600 in week 40/2009, with 18% of sentinel specimens testing positive, to over 19 000 in week 46/2009, when 45% of sentinel specimens tested positive.


Comment

The pandemic is affecting all countries in the Region, and the intensity is high in 18, especially in children up to the age of 15. In three countries in western Europe the epidemic has passed its peak. In some countries reporting reduced activity, this may have been associated with school closures. Increasing clinical incidence has been corroborated by increases in virological influenza detections. Influenza detections continue to be far higher than historical peaks, and countries are recommended to prioritize their testing strategies to reduce the burden on national influenza centres and therefore national influenza surveillance systems.

As of week 46/2009, 17 countries had started vaccination campaigns against pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza. Reports of adverse events are fewer than for seasonal influenza vaccination, and most events are mild local or systemic reactions. Eight countries in the Region are eligible to receive vaccine donated to WHO and distribution will begin by late November or early December 2009.


Further information

The EuroFlu bulletin describes and comments on influenza activity in the 53 countries in the WHO European Region. Further information can be obtained from the WHO/Europe and WHO headquarters web sites.


Erratum

The clinical data for Belarus for week 45/2009 were incorrect and have been corrected in this week’s bulletin.
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EuroFlu - Bulletin Review
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H1N1 news: Nov. 20, 2009 (2)

China’s Health Ministry said Thursday that it will punish officials who underreport H1N1 cases. Dr. Zhong Nanshan, director of Guangzhou’s Institute of Respiratory Diseases, told a local newspaper that he believed cases were being concealed in order to make local government efforts appear more successful. (11/20, AP)

Healthy children under five in England will receive the H1N1 vaccine next month. (11/20, The Guardian, London)

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WHO - Avian influenza - situation in Egypt - update 24

Avian influenza - situation in Egypt - update 24

20 November 2009


The Ministry of Health of Egypt has reported a new confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5N1).

The case is a 21 year-old male from Sedy Beshir District, Alexandria Governorate.

His symptoms started on 11 November.

He was admitted to Maamoura Chest Hospital on 15 November, where he received oseltamivir treatment.

The patient is in a stable condition.

Investigations into the source of infection indicated that the case had close contact with dead and/or sick poultry and was involved in slaughtering sick birds.

The cases were confirmed by the Egyptian Central Public Health Laboratories.

Of the 88 cases confirmed to date in Egypt, 27 have been fatal.
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WHO | Avian influenza - situation in Egypt - update 24
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Epidemiological summary of pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus – Ontario, Canada, June 2009 (Wkly Epidemiol Rec., edited)

[Full PDF Document: LINK. EDITED.]

Weekly epidemiological record - 20 november 2009, 84th year - No. 47, 2009, 84, 485–492 - http://www.who.int/wer

Epidemiological summary of pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus – Ontario, Canada, June 2009


Background

In March and April 2009, a novel strain of influenza A (H1N1) virus was detected in Mexico and the United States. The virus has since spread worldwide, and there have been >340 000 laboratory-confirmed cases and >4100 deaths reported to WHO as of 27 September 2009. Given the evidence of sustained community-level outbreaks of novel influenza A (H1N1) in >1 WHO region, WHO declared a global pandemic of influenza A (H1N1) on 11 June 2009, designating the virus “pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus”.

Canada was one of the first countries to detect imported cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus; 6 cases were reported on 26 April 2009 by the provinces of Nova Scotia (4 cases) and British Columbia (2 cases). Two days later, the province of Ontario confirmed 4 cases of infection with the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus.

This report describes the epidemiology of the first cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus in Ontario, Canada, during the early course of the pandemic to assist health officials in developing policies related to the identification, prevention and treatment of infection with this virus.1


Methods

Setting

Ontario is Canada’s largest province, with a population of 12.2 million. The province’s public health system consists of 36 local health authorities that are responsible for delivering local health-promotion and disease-prevention programmes, as well as 1 central and 11 regional public health laboratories.


Public health surveillance

On 21 April 2009, the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care issued to local health authorities an enhanced surveillance directive for severe respiratory illness and febrile respiratory illness occurring in people with a history of travel to Mexico. Additionally, a notice was distributed to health-care professionals recommending that nasopharyngeal swabs be collected from patients presenting with severe respiratory illness or febrile respiratory illness in emergency departments and ambulatory care settings. Travel criteria were removed on 19 May 2009, once sustained community spread had been established.

The Toronto laboratory of the Ontario Agency for Health Protection and Promotion performed the majority of tests for the virus in Ontario. All respiratory specimens submitted to the agency’s laboratories were tested, although specimens from patients had been triaged, thus patients at higher risk were given greater priority for testing. Testing practices and triaging remained consistent for the duration of this report period. Specimens were initially tested using reverse transcriptase (RT) polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for the influenza A virus matrix gene and Sanger sequencing on the PCR product. Specimens submitted after 15 May 2009 were tested using more sensitive real-time RT-PCR for the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus (H and N genes) developed at the Toronto laboratory. The Luminex Respiratory Viral Panel multiplex assay and viral culture (Luminex Corporation, Austin, TX) were used to test approximately 6% of specimens.2

All laboratory-confirmed cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus were reported to local public health officials, who performed detailed case investigations and entered case information into the integrated Public Health Information System. Detailed case follow-up by public health authorities ceased on 29 May 2009; thus, data were extracted from the integrated system as of this date. Data on specimens submitted to and tested at the laboratory were extracted from the laboratory information system (known as Labware) as of 9 June 2009; all pending and indeterminate results were excluded from analysis. Given the different time periods examined, dates are specified throughout.


Case definition

A confirmed case was defined as a person with influenza-like illness3 and laboratory confirmation of infection with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus by >1 of the following tests:4 RT-PCR with genotyping of H1 or N1 novel influenza virus, or both; viral culture with strain typing; or a 4-fold rise in pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus specific antibodies by serological testing. In practice, any patient who tested positive for the virus was classified as a case, irrespective of symptomatology.


Results

Laboratory submission patterns and test results

From 22 April 2009 to 9 June 2009, 11 560 specimens from patients were tested for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, of which 1820 (15.7%) were positive. Pending (992) results and indeterminate (44) results were excluded from further analysis, producing a test denominator of 10 524. The highest submission rates occurred in the most densely populated regions of the province, including the Greater Toronto Area and Ottawa. More than half (55% or 5730) of all patients tested were female; sex was unknown for 114 patients. Submissions of specimens from school-aged children (5–19 years) accounted for 24.6% (2572) of all submissions, while 40.2% (4202) were from adults aged 20–49 years. Specimens were least likely to come from people aged >65 years (10.3% or 1072). Age was unknown for 78 patients.

Early in the outbreak, seasonal influenza A strains (H1 and H3) were predominant; however, from 10 May onwards, pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus was detected in higher proportions. During the week beginning 31 May, 38.1% (658/1727) of specimens submitted tested positive for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, and 0.7% (12) tested positive for seasonal influenza A, compared with 2.8% (57/2033) testing positive for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus and 5.1% (103) testing positive for seasonal influenza A during the week beginning 26 April.


Summary of confirmed cases

During the reporting period 28 April–29 May 2009, a total of 863 cases were laboratory-confirmed; the earliest reported date of symptom onset was 13 April 2009. Despite higher rates of submission for samples from females, there was a slight male predominance in cases (448 males, 414 females, 1 unknown). Cases occurred in people ranging in age from 2 months to 80 years (median, 16 years), with 52.6% (454) of cases aged 5–19 years.

Among those aged 10–19 years, more cases were confirmed in males than in females. Only 2.7% (23) of cases were aged >55 years (Fig. 1).


Clinical characteristics and underlying conditions

A total of 805 (93.3%) confirmed cases reported symptoms. The most commonly reported symptoms were cough (92.2% or 742), fever (91.3% or 735) and sore throat (40.5% or 326). Gastrointestinal symptoms, including vomiting and diarrhoea, were present in
189 cases (23.5%). Pneumonia (0.9% or 7) and respiratory distress (1.7% or 14) were not commonly reported.

The duration of symptoms was reported for 165 cases; the mean duration of illness was 4.7 days (95% confidence interval [CI], 4.2–5.2 days; median, 4 days; range, 0–23 days).

Altogether, 72 cases (8.3%) reported chronic or underlying medical conditions, including pregnancy. The most commonly reported conditions were cardiac or pulmonary disorders (77.85% or 56 cases), followed by diabetes and other metabolic diseases (15.3% or 11 cases), and cancer or other diseases that suppress the immune system (12.5% or 9 cases). Two cases (2.8%) reported they were pregnant. Information on obesity was not systematically collected.


Morbidity and mortality

A total of 31 (3.6%) cases were hospitalized, resulting in a crude hospitalization rate of 0.24 hospitalizations/100 000 population (95% CI, 0.16–0.34). At the time of data extraction, 5 cases remained in hospital. The median length of hospital stay for cases who had been discharged was 4.0 days (range, <24 hours to 20 days). Almost one third (32.2%) of hospitalized cases were aged 0–4 years. Cases with a chronic or underlying medical condition were significantly more likely to be hospitalized than cases without such conditions (X2, 57.00; P< 0.001).

Two deaths were reported, resulting in a crude mortality rate of 0.02 deaths/100 000 population (95% CI, 0.00–0.06) and a case-fatality rate of 0.2%. Both deaths occurred in males aged >40 years who had underlying medical conditions.


Exposure

The place of acquisition was known for 633 cases (73.3%). The majority of these cases (568, 89.7%) acquired the virus in Ontario; only 8.5% (54) of cases with a known exposure reported having travelled to Mexico within 7 days of symptom onset. In the early stages of the outbreak, most cases reported having travelled to Mexico; however, after initial importations of the virus, the vast majority of cases acquired it in Ontario (Fig. 2).

Among cases who acquired the infection in Ontario, 334 (58.8%) did not have known contact with a case. A number of school-related clusters were detected. In total, 351 (40.7%) of all cases reported a known connection to a school, either as a site where exposure occurred or as a transmission location; 70.7% (133/188) of cases in primary school (aged 6–12 years) and 71.4% (162/227) of those in secondary school (aged 13–17 years) reported either exposure at school or attending school while infectious.


Seasonal vaccination status

The Ontario government funds a universal influenza immunization programme that provides free vaccination to all residents aged >6 months; vaccination status during 2008–2009 was available for 714 (82.7%) cases, of which 27.3% (195) reported they had received the vaccine.


Discussion

In Ontario, Canada, enhanced surveillance directives detected 863 laboratory-confirmed cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus as of 29 May 2009. More than half of all confirmed cases occurred among people aged <20 years. Epidemiological data from WHO’s Region of the Americas and the European Region also show that the highest rates of illness have occurred among children and young adults.5,6,7 In Ontario, the age distribution of confirmed cases largely reflected submission patterns of specimens; the mean age of patients for whom specimens were submitted decreased over time as outbreaks spread through schools. The age distribution of infection with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus differs from the population that is at risk for seasonal influenza. Possible explanations for this include crossprotection occurring among older age groups owing to their prior exposure to H1N1 strains circulating before 1957, or minimal contact by older age groups with young travellers and school-aged children who amplify transmission during the early stage of the spread of a new influenza virus.6 Institutional outbreaks are unlikely to be a contributing factor, since only 2 of 112 respiratory outbreaks (1 in a hospital and 1 in a long-term care facility) registered with the laboratories of the Ontario Agency for Health Protection and Promotion from 20 April–12 June 2009 were caused by pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus.8

As with seasonal influenza, most cases with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza experienced mild illness and did not require hospitalization. The duration of symptoms was estimated at 4 days, which is consistent with a meta-analysis of studies among healthy volunteers experimentally infected with human influenza A(H1N1).9 The most commonly reported symptoms included cough, fever and sore throat. Unlike seasonal influenza, approximately one quarter of all cases reported gastrointestinal symptoms. This finding is consistent with other regions.7

Less than 10% of all cases reported having a chronic or underlying medical condition. By comparison, 22.0% (95% CI, 21.4–22.6%) of the population in Ontario reported having had a chronic condition diagnosed by a health professional in 2005.10 Hospitalization was more likely if the case reported having a chronic or underlying medical condition; however, more than half of all cases hospitalized did not report having such conditions. The number of cases reported here represents an underestimation of the true number of individuals infected. The ability to detect cases depends on health-seeking behaviours, testing behaviours, the resources available to health-care providers, and the sensitivity and specificity of laboratory tests. The lag in time
between the onset of illness and severe outcomes (hospitalization or death) may also underrepresent these outcomes; data were extracted 10 days after the case-reported date of 29 May 2009 to minimize this bias. Other biases in surveillance data, such as missing data and recall bias, should be considered when interpreting these results.

In conclusion, this summary provides important descriptive data on early cases of influenza caused by pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus occurring prior to initiation of restrictions on laboratory testing. Continued and expanded surveillance is necessary to further characterize the pandemic and to support public-health planning. Areas for further investigation include determining transmission dynamics, seroprevalence and risk factors for infection and hospitalization.


[References]

1 The Ontario Agency for Health Protection and Promotion and the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care thank all 36 regional health authorities for collecting data and contributing to this report. Staff from these 2 agencies wrote this report.
2 Mahony JB et al. Multiplex PCR tests sentinel the appearance of pandemic influenza viruses including H1N1 swine influenza. Journal of Clinical Virology, 2009, 45:200–202.
3 Influenza-like illness is defined as the acute onset of respiratory illness with fever and >1 of the following symptoms: cough, sore throat, arthralgia, myalgia, prostration or malaise. In cases aged <5 years or >65, fever may not be prominent.
4 RT-PCR was the primary method used to detect the virus since viral culture was performed in only a small proportion of cases and no serology test was available at the time of testing.
5 See No. 23, 2009, pp. 213–219.
6 Preliminary analysis of influenza A (H1N1) individual and aggregated case reports from EU and EFTA Countries. Eurosurveillance, 2009, 14(23):1–5 (also available at LINK).
7 Emergence of a novel swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus in humans. New England Journal of Medicine, 2009, 360:2605–2615 (also available at LINK).
8 Gubbay JB et al. Respiratory infection outbreaks in institutions during the novel influenza A H1N1 virus pandemic in Ontario. ProMED-mail, 2009, archive number: 20090627.2338 (LINK, accessed October 2009).
9 Carrat F et al. Time lines of infection and disease in human influenza: a review of volunteer challenge studies. American Journal of Epidemiology, 2008, 167:775–785.
10 Statistics Canada. Canadian Community Health Survey: detailed information for 2008, Ottawa, Ontario, 2009 (LINK, accessed October 2009).

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WHO - Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 - update 75 (Virological Surveillance Data)

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 - update 75 - Weekly update (Virological surveillance data)

20 November 2009


The Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) continues monitoring the global circulation of influenza viruses, including pandemic, seasonal and other influenza viruses infecting, or with the potential to infect, humans including seasonal influenza.

Since the beginning of the pandemic in 19 April 2009 to 7 November, a total of 81 countries reported to FluNet. The total number of specimens reportedly positive for influenza viruses by NIC laboratories was 272,326. Of these, 187,290 (68.8%) were pandemic H1N1, 7771 (2.9%) were seasonal A (H1), 23,019 (8.5%) were A (H3), 48,653 (17.9%) were A (not subtyped) and 5593 (2.1%) were influenza B.

For this reporting week (1 November to 7 November 2009); a total of 30 countries reported to FluNet. The total number of specimens reportedly positive for influenza viruses was 10,954* (update for last week: 15,634). Of these, 8660 (79.1%) were pandemic H1N1, 28 (0.3%) were seasonal A (H1), 14 (0.1%) were A (H3), 2199 (20.1%) were A (not subtyped), 53 (0.5%) were influenza B.

The above numbers represent only the specimens and results reported to FluNet. Some laboratories (NICs), under pressure of the pandemic surge, do not test for seasonal subtypes and accordingly, this data should be interpreted with caution.

Detailed virological information for the European Region of WHO is included in the EuroFlu Weekly Electronic Bulletin

From the start of H1N1 pandemic (19 April) till 14th November 2009, cumulatively 145 countries shared a total of 17720 specimens (13771 clinical samples and 3949 virus isolates) with WHO CCs. Of these, 13309 specimens (clinical samples and isolates) were tested; 10521 (79.1%) were influenza positive. Of these positives, 6764 (64.3 %) were pandemic H1N1, 2963(28.2%) were seasonal influenza A, 779 (7.4%) were influenza B.

Systematic surveillance conducted by the Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) including WHO Collaborating Centres (WHOCCs) for reference and research on influenza, continues to detect sporadic incidents of H1N1 pandemic viruses that show resistance to the antiviral oseltamivir. To date, 57 oseltamivir resistant pandemic H1N1 influenza viruses have been detected and characterized worldwide. All of these viruses show the same H275Y mutation. All these viruses remain sensitive to zanamivir.

Worldwide, more than 10,000 clinical specimens (samples and isolates) of the pandemic H1N1 virus have been tested and found to be sensitive to oseltamivir.

All pandemic H1N1 2009 influenza viruses analysed to date were antigenically and genetically closely related to the vaccine virus A/California/7/2009.

* Data might be incomplete due to a lag for reporting from some countries. Graphs associated with this update are set up till week 44, since some countries have delayed reporting to FluNet


Virology data update

Download update (.pdf)


For more information

EuroFlu Weekly Electronic Bulletin
FluNet web site
National Influenza Centres
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WHO | Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 - update 75
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WHO - Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 - update 75

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 - update 75 - Weekly update

20 November 2009


As of 15 November 2009, worldwide more than 206 countries and overseas territories or communities have reported laboratory confirmed cases of pandemic influenza H1N1 2009, including over 6750 deaths.

As many countries have stopped counting individual cases, particularly of milder illness, the case count is likely to be significantly lower than the actual number of cases that have occurred. WHO is actively monitoring the progress of the pandemic through frequent consultations with the WHO Regional Offices and member states and through monitoring of multiple sources of data.


Situation update:

The situation remains similar since the last update.

In temperate regions* of the northern hemisphere, the early arriving winter influenza season continues to intensify across parts of North America and much of Europe. However, there are early signs of a peak in disease activity in some areas of the northern hemisphere.

In the United States, influenza transmission remains active and geographically widespread, although disease activity appears to have recently peaked in most areas except in the northeastern United States.

In Canada, influenza transmission continues to intensify without a clear peak in activity; the ILI consultation rate, which has been highest among children aged 5-19, continues to significantly exceed mean rates observed over the past 12 influenza seasons.

In Europe, widespread and increasing transmission of pandemic influenza virus was observed across much of the continent but the most intense circulation of virus occurred in northern, eastern, and southeastern Europe. Transmission appears to have peaked in few countries of Western Europe including Iceland, Ireland, the UK (Northern Ireland), and Belgium after a period of sustained intense transmission. Further east, a number of countries reported sharp increases in the rates of ILI** (Serbia, Moldova, Norway, Lithuania, Georgia) or ARI (Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine). A moderate or greater impact on the healthcare system was reported in parts of northern and southeastern Europe.

Greater than 20% of all sentinel respiratory specimens tested positive for influenza in at least 20 countries, with ≥ 50% of samples testing positive for influenza in Spain, Portugal, Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, Iceland, and Ireland.

Over 99% of subtyped influenza A viruses in the Europe were pandemic H1N1 2009.

In Central and Western Asia, increasing diseases activity and pandemic influenza virus isolations continues to be reported in several countries. A high intensity of respiratory diseases with increasing trend was reported in Kazakhstan.

Recent increases in rates of ILI or ARI have been observed in Uzbekistan and in parts of Afghanistan (particularly in the capital region and in southern and northeastern provinces).

In Israel, sharp increases in rates of ILI and pandemic virus detections have been reported in recent weeks.

In East Asia, influenza transmission remains active. Intense influenza activity continues to be observed in Mongolia with a severe impact on the healthcare system; however, disease activity may have recently peaked in the past 1-2 weeks.

In Japan, influenza activity remains elevated but stable nationally, and may be decreasing slightly in populated urban areas.

A small number of seasonal H3N2 and H1N1 influenza viruses continue to be detected in China and South East Asia, though the proportion of seasonal viruses is declining in relation to the proportion of pandemic influenza H1N1.

In tropical zone of the Americas and Asia, the intensity of influenza transmission is variable.

In the tropical areas of Central and South America, most countries continue to report declining influenza activity, with the exception of Peru and Colombia.

In the Caribbean Epidemiology Centre (CAREC) countries, after a recent peak of disease activity, rates of ARI have declined over the past 3-4 weeks.

With the exception of Sri Lanka, overall transmission continues to decline in most parts of tropical South and Southeast Asia.

In Hong Kong SAR, rates of ILI have returned baseline after a recent wave of predominantly pandemic H1N1 influenza in September and October.

In the temperate region of the southern hemisphere, little pandemic influenza activity has been reported.

For more epidemiologic information please refer to the recent Weekly Epidemiological Report on Transmission Dynamics and Impact of Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Virus. 13 November 2009, vol. 84, 46 (pp 477–484)

WHO estimates that around 80 million doses of pandemic vaccine have been distributed and around 65 million people have been vaccinated. Campaigns are using a variety of different vaccines. Although intense monitoring of vaccine safety continues, all data compiled to date indicate that pandemic vaccines match the excellent safety profile of seasonal influenza vaccines.


Weekly update (Virological surveillance data)

*Countries in temperate regions are defined as those north of the Tropic of Cancer or south of the Tropic of Capricorn, while countries in tropical regions are defined as those between these two latitudes.


Qualitative indicators (Week 29 to Week 45: 13 July - 8 November 2009)

The qualitative indicators monitor: the global geographic spread of influenza, trends in acute respiratory diseases, the intensity of respiratory disease activity, and the impact of the pandemic on health-care services.

Human infection with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus: updated interim WHO guidance on global surveillance

A description of WHO pandemic monitoring and surveillance objectives and methods can be found in the updated interim WHO guidance for the surveillance of human infection with pandemic (H1N1) virus.

The maps below display information on the qualitative indicators reported. Information is available for approximately 60 countries each week. Implementation of this monitoring system is ongoing and completeness of reporting is expected to increase over time.

List of definitions of qualitative indicators

Geographic spread of influenza activity

Map timeline

Trend of respiratory diseases activity compared to the previous week

Map timeline

Intensity of acute respiratory diseases in the population

Map timeline

Impact on health care services

Map timeline

Laboratory-confirmed cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 as officially reported to WHO by States Parties to the IHR (2005) as of 15 November 2009

Map of affected countries and deaths

The countries and overseas territories/communities that have newly reported their first pandemic (H1N1) 2009 confirmed cases since the last web update (No.74): none.

The countries and overseas territories/communities that have newly reported their first deaths among pandemic (H1N1) 2009 confirmed cases since the last web update (No 74): Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Slovenia.


Cumulative total as of 15 November 2009

[Cases* - Deaths]
  • WHO Regional Office for Africa (AFRO) - 14950 - 103
  • WHO Regional Office for the Americas (AMRO) ** - 190765 - 4806
  • WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean (EMRO) - 25531 - 151
  • WHO Regional Office for Europe (EURO)** - over 78000 - at least 350
  • WHO Regional Office for South-East Asia (SEARO) - 45844 - 710
  • WHO Regional Office for the Western Pacific (WPRO) - 166750 - 613
  • Total - over 525060 - at least 6770

*Given that countries are no longer required to test and report individual cases, the number of cases reported actually understates the real number of cases.
**The total number of cases are no longer reported from these regions

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WHO | Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 - update 75
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Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Update 20 November 2009, 09:00 hours CEST (ECDC, edited)

[Source Full PDF Document: LINK. EDITED.]

ECDC DAILY UPDATE

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Update 20 November 2009, 09:00 hours CEST

Main developments in past 24 hours

  • Weekly Influenza Surveillance Overview to be published today;
  • Eurosurveillance updates published;
  • Total of 636 fatal cases in Europe and EFTA countries and 6 795 in the rest of the world have been reported up to date;
  • Other updates: Safety of pandemic vaccines - WHO says results to date are encouraging

This report is based on official information provided by national public health websites or through other official communication channels. An update on the number of confirmed fatal cases is presented in Table 2 - as of 19 November 2009 - 16:00 hours CEST, for the world, and 20 November 2009 - 09:00 hours CEST, for Europe.

Weekly Influenza Surveillance Overview

The ECDC Weekly Influenza Surveillance Overview will be published this afternoon and will be available at: LINK

Eurosurveillance update

Differentiation of two distinct clusters among currently circulating Influenza A(H1N1)v viruses, march-september 2009

Analysis of all complete genome sequences of the pandemic influenza A(H1N1)v virus available as of 10 September 2009 revealed that two closely related but distinct clusters were circulating in most of the affected countries at the same time. The characteristic differences are located in genes encoding the two surface proteins - haemagglutinin and neuraminidase - and four internal proteins – the polymerase PB2 subunit, nucleoprotein, matrix protein M1 and the non-structural protein NS1. Phylogenetic inference was demonstrated by neighbour joining, maximum likelihood and Bayesian trees analyses of the involved genes and by tree construction of concatenated sequences

Fereidouni SR, Beer M, Vahlenkamp T, Starick E. Differentiation of two distinct clusters among currently circulating influenza A(H1N1)v viruses, March-September 2009. Euro Surveill. 2009;14(46):pii=19409. Available online: LINK

Epidemiologic update

All 27 EU and 4 EFTA countries are reporting cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza. A total of 636 deaths have been reported since April 2009 (Table 2). The number of weekly deaths has shown an increase over the last 4 weeks. Latest new and confirmed fatal pandemic (H1N1) cases outside the EU/EFTA area are presented in Table 2 as well. Available updates on hospital admissions, per Member State, can be found in Table 1.

Other updates

Safety of pandemic vaccines - WHO says results to date are encouraging

The World Health Organisation yesterday released their "Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 briefing note 16" discussing the safety of pandemic vaccines. The briefing discusses common side effects, GBS and deaths. To date, WHO has received vaccination information from 16 of around 40 countries conducting national H1N1 pandemic vaccine campaigns.

Detailed information can be found at: LINK

Table 1: Reported number of confirmed Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza cases admitted to hospitals and intensive care, by country, as of 20 November 2009, 09:00 hours (CEST) in EU and EFTA countries

[Country - (date of report) - Number of cases currently hospitalised - Cumulative number of cases admitted in hospitals - Number of cases currently in intensive care - Cumulative number of cases admitted to intensive care]

  1. Austria (18.11.) – … – … – … – …
  2. Belgium (19.11.) – … – … – … – …
  3. Bulgaria (08.11) – … – … – … – …
  4. Cyprus(01.11) – … – … – … - 4
  5. Czech Republic (19.11.) – … – … – … – …
  6. Denmark (18.11.) – … – … – … – …
  7. Estonia (23.10.) – … - 11 – … – …
  8. Finland (18.11.) – … – … – … – …
  9. France (19.11.) – … – … – 81 – 245
  10. Germany (18.11.) – … – … – … – …
  11. Greece (18.11.) – … – … – … – …
  12. Hungary (18.11.) - 2 – … – … – …
  13. Iceland (11.11.) – 31 – 170 – 7 – 19
  14. Ireland (18.11.) – 182 – 857 – 20 – 72
  15. Italy (18.11) – … - 432 – … – 216
  16. Latvia (18.11.) – … – … – … – …
  17. Liechtenstein (18.11.) – … – … – … – …
  18. Lithuania (04.11.) – … – … – … – …
  19. Luxembourg (16.11.) – … – … – 0 – 0
  20. Malta (04.09.) – … - 46 – … – 1
  21. Netherlands (13.11.) – 291 – 909 – 19 – 91
  22. Norway (18.11.) – 89 – 916 – 24 – 108
  23. Poland (17.11.) – … – … – … – …
  24. Portugal (18.11.) - 164 – … - 18 – …
  25. Romania (19.11) – … – … – … – …
  26. Slovakia (19.11.) – 6 – 39 – 0 – 0
  27. Slovenia (10.08.) – … – … – … – …
  28. Spain (19.11.) – … – … – … – …
  29. Sweden (19.11.) – 167 - 570 – … – …
  30. Switzerland (18.11.) – 13 - 84 – … – 16
  31. United Kingdom (a) (19.11.) - 783 – … - 180 – …

Note: Data for the EU and EFTA countries correspond to the Ministry of Health or surveillance centre websites.

(…) denotes no information readily available in official sources.

(a) Data includes all probable cases for England only. Does not include Scotland (969 cumulative hospitalisations), Wales (377) and Northern Ireland (545).

Table 2. Reported number of new and cumulative confirmed fatal Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza cases in EU and EFTA countries, as 20 November 2009, 09:00 hours CEST, and in the rest of the world by country, as of 19 November 2009, 16:00 hours CEST.

[Country - Number of new fatal cases since previous national update - Cumulative number of fatal cases]

  • EU AND EFTA COUNTRIES
    • Austria 2 – 3
    • Belgium 1 – 12
    • Bulgaria … – 5
    • Czech Republic 1 - 2
    • Finland … – 9
    • France 6 – 76 (a)
    • Germany 5 – 27
    • Greece … – 8
    • Hungary 2 – 7
    • Iceland … – 1
    • Ireland 1 – 16
    • Italy 4 – 62
    • Latvia … – 1
    • Lithuania … – 1
    • Luxembourg … – 2
    • Malta … – 3
    • Netherlands … – 22
    • Norway 1 – 23
    • Poland 1 – 5
    • Portugal 1 – 8
    • Slovakia … – 1
    • Spain 27 – 115
    • Sweden 6 – 11
    • Switzerland 1 – 1
    • United Kingdom 28 – 215
      • Total 87 – 636
  • OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES & CENTRAL ASIA
    • Azerbaijan … – 2
    • Belarus … – 7
    • Bosnia and Herzegovina … – 1
    • Croatia … – 5
    • Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 1 – 1
    • Kosovo … – 1
    • Moldova … – 7
    • Russia … - 19
    • Serbia 3 – 16
    • Ukraine … – 15
      • Total 4 – 74
  • MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE-EAST
    • Bahrain … – 7
    • Egypt … – 7
    • Iran … – 100
    • Iraq … – 9
    • Israel … – 48
    • Jordan … – 11
    • Kuwait … – 26
    • Lebanon … – 3
    • Morocco … – 1
    • Occupied Palestinian Territory … – 5
    • Oman … – 27
    • Qatar … – 5
    • Saudi Arabia … – 66
    • Syria … – 22
    • Tunisia … – 2
    • Turkey … – 73
    • United Arab Emirates … – 6
    • Yemen … – 18
      • Total … – 436
  • AFRICA
    • Ghana … – 1
    • Madagascar … – 1
    • Mauritius … – 8
    • Mozambique … – 2
    • Namibia … – 1
    • Sao Tome & Principe … – 2
    • South Africa … – 91
    • Sudan … – 1
    • Tanzania … – 1
      • Total … – 108
  • NORTH AMERICA
    • Canada … – 198
    • Mexico 38 – 520
    • USA … – 1123
      • Total 38 – 1841
  • CENTRAL AMERICA & CARIBBEAN
    • Bahamas … – 4
    • Barbados … – 3
    • Cayman Islands … – 1
    • Costa Rica … – 38
    • Cuba … – 7
    • Dominican Republic … – 22
    • El Salvador … – 26
    • Guatemala … – 18
    • Honduras … – 16
    • Jamaica 1 – 6
    • Nicaragua … – 11
    • Panama … – 11
    • Saint Kitts and Nevis … – 1
    • Saint Lucia … – 1
    • Suriname … – 2
    • Trinidad-Tobago … – 5
      • Total 1 – 172
  • SOUTH AMERICA
    • Argentina … – 600
    • Bolivia … – 57
    • Brazil … – 1368
    • Chile … – 140
    • Colombia … – 151
    • Ecuador … – 82
    • Paraguay … – 52
    • Peru … – 190
    • Uruguay … – 33
    • Venezuela … – 104
      • Total … – 2777
  • NORTH-EAST & SOUTH ASIA
    • Afghanistan … – 14
    • Bangladesh … – 6
    • China (Mainland) … – 53
    • Hong Kong SAR China … – 40
    • India 4 – 534
    • Japan … – 28
    • Macao SAR China … – 2
    • Mongolia … – 15
    • Pakistan … – 1
    • South Korea … - 82
    • Sri Lanka … – 1
    • Taiwan … – 29
      • Total 4 – 805
  • SOUTH-EAST ASIA
    • Brunei Darussalam … – 1
    • Cambodia … – 4
    • Indonesia … – 10
    • Laos Peoples Democratic Republic … – 1
    • Malaysia … – 77
    • Philippines … – 30
    • Singapore … – 18
    • Thailand … – 185
    • Vietnam … – 41
      • Total … – 367
  • AUSTRALIA & PACIFIC
    • Australia … – 189
    • Cook Islands … – 1
    • Marshall Islands … – 1
    • New Zealand 1 – 20
    • Samoa … – 2
    • Solomon Islands … – 1
    • Tonga … – 1
      • Total 1 – 215
  • TOTAL 135 – 7431

(a) Deaths reported from France include 1 in Guyana, 9 in New Caledonia, 7 in the French Polynesia, 7 in the Reunion, 1 in Martinique, 2 in Mayotte, 1 in Guadeloupe and 48 in mainland France.

(…)

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Mexico. Reportan 58 muertes por A/H1N1 en siete días

La Secretaría de Salud (SSa) reportó que en los últimos siete días se han registrado 58 defunciones por influenza A/H1N1, al pasar de 482 casos el 11 de noviembre a...

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Vietnam. Big pharma offer H1N1 vaccines at US$6.5-10 a dose

Four pharmaceutical multinationals have offered to sell swine flu vaccines to Vietnam at US$6.5-10 per dose.

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Preventing H1N1 Spread To Health Care Workers: Dilemma, Debate And Confusion

Commentary in the December issue of the Lancet Infectious Diseases

A commentary in the December issue of The Lancet Infectious Diseases brings to light the gaps in knowledge on the transmission of a common pathogen – the influenza virus – and its impact on decisions about how best to protect health care workers.

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Canada. Batch of H1N1 vaccine causes adverse reactions

More than 100,000 doses of the H1N1 vaccine were withdrawn Thursday, due to a warning that one particular batch of the vaccine had a higher than usual amount of adverse reactions among patients.

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Mexico. Vacunarán contra influenza AH1N1 a enfermos con Sida

A finales de noviembre iniciará la vacunación contra la influenza A(H1N1) a las personas con Sida, en los Centros de Capacitación de Atención Ambulatoria y Prevención sobre Sida (Capacits) y...

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China vows to punish H1N1 death cover-ups

Source: Reuters (Adds comment from WHO, paragraphs 6-7, 9-10)

By Huang Yan and Lucy Hornby

BEIJING, Nov 20 (Reuters) - China has promised severe punishment for officials caught concealing deaths from H1N1 swine ...

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USA. Ills plague H1N1 vaccination program

Nurse Gail Symanik, left, is given the swine flu vaccine by nurse practitioner Judy Gallob on Oct. 8 at the Maricopa Medical Center in Phoenix. Just 44 million doses of the vaccine have been shipped so far, a third of what officials had predicted.When the nation's swine flu vaccination program began in early October, health officials predicted it was going to be "messy." They were right.

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Canada. Toronto study reveals kids with asthma at more risk to H1N1

Parents of children with asthma should have an "increased state of alertness" about the pandemic flu virus, suggests the co-author of a new Canadian study comparing it to seasonal flu.

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H1N1 news: Nov. 19, 2009

The WHO said today that the H1N1 vaccine is as safe as the seasonal flu vaccine. (11/19, Medscape Medical News)


The WHO’s representative in China acknowledges the country’s H1N1 outbreak is much larger than official numbers show. (11/19, AP)

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Oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) viruses detected in Europe during season 2007-8 had epidemiologic and clinical characteristics similar to co-circulating susceptible A(H1N1) viruses (Euro Surveill., edited)

Eurosurveillance, Volume 14, Issue 46, 19 November 2009

Surveillance and outbreak reports

Oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) viruses detected in Europe during season 2007-8 had epidemiologic and clinical characteristics similar to co-circulating susceptible A(H1N1) viruses

B C Ciancio ()1, T J Meerhoff2, P Kramarz1, I Bonmarin3, K Borgen4, C A Boucher5, U Buchholz6, S Buda6, F Dijkstra7, S Dudman4, S Duwe5, S H Hauge4, O Hungnes4, A Meijer7, J Mossong8, W J Paget2, N Phin9, M van der Sande7, B Schweiger6, A Nicoll1

  1. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
  2. The Netherlands Institute for Health Services Research (NIVEL), Utrecht, the Netherlands
  3. Institut de veille sanitaire (InVS), Paris, France
  4. The Norwegian Institute of Public Health (Folkehelseinstituttet), Oslo, Norway
  5. Erasmus Medical Centre, Rotterdam, the Netherlands
  6. Robert-Koch-Institut (RKI), Berlin, Germany
  7. National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, the Netherlands
  8. Laboratoire National de Santé, Luxembourg
  9. Health Protection Agency, London, United Kingdom

Citation style for this article: Ciancio BC, Meerhoff TJ, Kramarz P, Bonmarin I, Borgen K, Boucher CA, Buchholz U, Buda S, Dijkstra F, Dudman S, Duwe S, Hauge SH, Hungnes O, Meijer A, Mossong J, Paget WJ, Phin N, van der Sande M, Schweiger B, Nicoll A. Oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) viruses detected in Europe during season 2007-8 had epidemiologic and clinical characteristics similar to co-circulating susceptible A(H1N1) viruses . Euro Surveill. 2009;14(46):pii=19412. Available online: http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19412
Date of submission: 19 November 2009


During the 2007-08 influenza season, high levels of oseltamivir resistance were detected among influenza A(H1N1) viruses in a number of European countries. We used surveillance data to describe influenza A(H1N1) cases for whom antiviral resistance testing was performed. We pooled data from national studies to identify possible risk factors for infection with a resistant virus and to ascertain whether such infections led to influenza illness of different severity. Information on demographic and clinical variables was obtained from patients or their physicians. Odds ratios for infection with an oseltamivir resistant virus and relative risks for developing certain clinical outcomes were computed and adjusted through multivariable analysis. Overall, 727 (24.3%) of 2,992 tested influenza A(H1N1) viruses from 22 of 30 European countries were oseltamivir-resistant. Levels of resistance ranged from 1% in Italy to 67% in Norway. Five countries provided detailed case-based data on 373 oseltamivir resistant and 796 susceptible cases. By multivariable analysis, none of the analysed factors was significantly associated with an increased risk of infection with an oseltamivir-resistant virus. Similarly, infection with an oseltamivir-resistant virus was not significantly associated with a different risk of pneumonia, hospitalisation or any clinical complication. The large-scale emergence of oseltamivir-resistant viruses in Europe calls for a review of guidelines for influenza treatment.


Introduction

In Europe, virological surveillance of antiviral susceptibility of influenza viruses has been performed since 2004 through the European Union (EU)-funded European Surveillance Network for Vigilance against Viral Resistance (VIRGIL), in collaboration with the European Influenza Surveillance Scheme (EISS), the World Health Organization (WHO) and national influenza centres (NICs) [1]. In January 2008 this surveillance system started to detect significant proportions of oseltamivir-resistant viruses among influenza A(H1N1) specimens collected in several European countries from November 2007 onwards [2]. This was associated with a histidine to tyrosine mutation at residue 275 of the neuraminidase protein (H275Y or H274Y in N2 numbering), which is known to confer high level resistance to the neuraminidase inhibitor oseltamivir [3]. Oseltamivir resistance was confirmed in most EU countries as more influenza A(H1N1) viruses were isolated and tested, although at very different levels ranging from under 2% of all influenza A(H1N1) viruses tested in Italy and Spain to over 40% in Belgium, Estonia, France and Norway by the end of the 2007-8 influenza season [4,5]. These differences, however, were also influenced by the time during the season when specimens were collected and the number of influenza A(H1N1) viruses tested for oseltamivir susceptibility in each country [6]. The wide circulation as well as outbreaks of oseltamivir-resistant viruses, together with a rise in resistance proportions throughout the season indicated that influenza A(H1N1) H275Y-mutated strains were fit and transmissible [6]. This was supported by the absence of correlation between oseltamivir resistance and exposure to oseltamivir at population level [7]. However, it was unclear whether there were any factors favouring infection with an oseltamivir-resistant virus and whether such an infection would affect the clinical course of influenza illness with or without treatment.

In order to obtain additional data on the characteristics of patients infected with influenza A(H1N1) viruses, the EISS and VIRGIL coordination centres rapidly set up an enhanced surveillance system requesting the European NICs to report for confirmed influenza A(H1N1)-infected patients additional information (such as clinical outcome and exposure to antivirals) to that already routinely collected. Furthermore, a number of countries in the EU and European Economic Area (EEA) conducted specific epidemiological investigations based on a general protocol developed by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) in collaboration with some EU countries with the following objectives:

  • To identify risk factors for infection with an oseltamivir-resistant versus an oseltamivir-susceptible influenza A(H1N1) virus during the 2007-8 influenza season.
  • To assess whether patients infected by an oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) virus had a different risk of a severe clinical outcome than patients infected by an oseltamivir-susceptible influenza A(H1N1) virus.

The study hypothesis was that oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) viruses emerged during the 2007-8 season were different from co-circulating oseltamivir-susceptible influenza A(H1N1) viruses in terms of risk factors for infection and severity of illness.

This article reports on the descriptive analysis of data from the enhanced surveillance and on the analysis of the pooled data from the national epidemiological studies.

Methods

Surveillance data
The descriptive analysis of influenza surveillance data concerns information collected during the season 2007-8 from week 40/2007 to week 20/2008 in countries participating in EISS. National surveillance systems collect standard case-based epidemiological information for all patients undergoing clinical sampling for laboratory confirmation. However, this information is not routinely reported to EISS. Laboratory confirmation is carried out for surveillance purposes on a subset of individuals presenting with influenza-like illness (ILI) and/or symptoms of acute respiratory infection (ARI) to one of the sentinel physicians participating in the national influenza surveillance. The selection of patients with ILI or ARI undergoing virological testing can be either random/systematic, as recommended by EISS, or left to the physician’s clinical judgement [8]. Virological testing is usually performed at the NICs, which are WHO-recognised laboratories for influenza and in Europe collaborate within the Community Network of Reference Laboratories (CNRL) for human influenza [9]. The sentinel physicians are part of national networks that intend to cover a representative sample of the general population. Moreover, case-based information is collected nationally on patients tested for influenza as part of the individual clinical management (non-sentinel samples). Such samples cover a heterogeneous group of individuals including hospitalised patients who are likely to have experienced a more severe influenza illness. In Norway, however, both non-sentinel and sentinel specimens are collected mainly from patients presenting to the primary healthcare system. Additional information on the organisation and functioning of virological influenza surveillance in Europe can be found elsewhere [10].

During the season 2007-8, when higher than expected levels of oseltamivir resistance were detected in influenza A(H1N1) viruses in many European countries, the data routinely collected by EISS and VIRGIL was expanded to include the following additional information: oseltamivir susceptibility, age, gender, geographic location, hospital or community-based, date of specimen collection, date of disease onset, exposure to antivirals of the patient or household contact (in the 14 days preceding onset of illness), influenza vaccination status, and whether complications, hospitalisations or death occurred in the 14 days following onset of illness. Oseltamivir susceptibility was determined phenotypically or by sequencing or by both, as described elsewhere [6]. Data were uploaded during the season and were downloaded on 19 August 2008. The descriptive virological surveillance data presented in this paper might differ slightly from those presented previously [6], as data for the present paper were downloaded one month later and countries could have updated the database since then. In addition, the weeks included in reference [6] (weeks 40-19) differed by one week from the data presented in this paper (weeks 40-20). A descriptive analysis was carried out and individual characteristics were assessed.

Some European countries experiencing high levels of oseltamivir resistance collected additional information on influenza A(H1N1) cases by retrospectively interviewing patients and/or their physicians. The ECDC supported and coordinated such studies by providing a study protocol and organising three meetings as well as regular teleconferences with the study group. To increase the efficiency and timeliness of a European study, only those countries were invited to participate in which at least 50 virus isolates had been tested for antiviral resistance and some level of oseltamivir resistance had been detected as of February 2008. Of the six countries that met this criterion for inclusion, five (Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom (UK)) agreed to participate and to provide their databases for a pooled analysis by ECDC.

Epidemiological studies
Questionnaires and study procedures developed by each of the five participating countries were submitted to the ECDC in order to identify common variables for the joint analysis. In all participating countries, the study population included all individuals diagnosed with an influenza A(H1N1) virus infection between week 40/2007 and week 20/2008 for whom antiviral susceptibility testing was performed and for whom it was clear whether the specimens came from sentinel or non-sentinel sources.

Analysis of risk factors for infection with resistant virus
To identify risk factors for infection with an oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) virus, a nested case control approach was chosen within the cohort of subjects with laboratory-confirmed influenza A(H1N1) infection. Cases were defined as individuals with laboratory-confirmed influenza A(H1N1) infection whose isolates showed phenotypic (IC50 level) or genetic (H275Y mutation) markers of oseltamivir resistance, and controls were defined as individuals with laboratory-confirmed influenza A(H1N1) infection whose isolates were susceptible to oseltamivir by either phenotypic or genetic analysis. Information was collected for cases and controls on age, sex, country of residence, location of initial sampling (sentinel versus non-sentinel), pre-existing medical conditions, influenza vaccination status, antiviral exposure (i.e. prophylaxis or treatment in the 14 days preceding symptom onset) and travel history within 10 days before symptom onset.
Analysis of outcomes of infection with resistant virus
To assess whether patients infected by oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) virus were at higher risk of a severe clinical outcome than patients infected by oseltamivir-susceptible influenza A(H1N1) virus, a cohort approach was chosen, with cases and controls as the exposed and the unexposed subjects, respectively. The outcomes investigated were symptoms at presentation, hospitalisation for any cause related to influenza, pneumonia, death, and any other clinical complication attributable to influenza virus infection.

Data collection
Retrospective data for the case control analysis and follow-up information for the cohort analysis were collected using slightly different methods and data sources in the different countries. In Germany a subset and in Luxembourg all patients with a confirmed influenza A(H1N1) infection were contacted by local or national public health offices and administered a questionnaire by telephone (Germany) or mail (Luxembourg) in addition to the information already retrieved from the routine surveillance datasets. In the Netherlands, all sentinel physicians and virologists (and subsequently the treating clinicians in the hospitals) who had provided specimens positive for influenza A(H1N1) were contacted by the national public health institute and sent a questionnaire by mail. Those not responding were contacted by telephone. In Norway, general practitioners (GPs) and clinicians in hospitals who had reported an influenza A(H1N1) case to the NIC were contacted by the national public health institute and administered a questionnaire by mail or telephone. In the UK, information was collected only on oseltamivir-resistant cases and there were no controls. GPs and hospital clinicians who had reported a case were contacted by national or local public health staff by telephone, and details were collected using a structured interview. In cases where clinicians were unable to provide the information, the patients were contacted directly.

Data management and analysis
Country-specific databases were shared with the ECDC for the final analysis. The databases were first analysed separately to detect differences in the results that would have to be considered in the pooled analysis. This was not possible for the UK data, which only included information on oseltamivir-resistant cases; however, these contributed to the pooled dataset. For each country, the prevalence of the various exposures in cases and controls was compared using contingency tables and the chi-squared test to check for statistical significance. Crude odds ratios were also computed. For the cohort approach, the prevalence (risk) of any of the considered clinical outcomes was calculated in exposed and unexposed individuals and the chi-squared test was used to check for statistical significance. Crude risk ratios were also computed. In order to allow for a pooled analysis of the five databases, they were merged into a unique database converting data from Access and Excel into STATA 10 format. Only variables collected by at least four of the five countries were retained in the final database.

The univariable analysis of the pooled database was conducted by using the procedures described above for the country-specific databases. The analysis of risk factors for severe influenza disease (cohort approach) was restricted to the population reported by sentinel surveillance systems. This was because individuals identified through non-sentinel sources are generally more likely to represent cases with more severe influenza and are thus already selected for the outcome of interest. By contrast, the analysis of risk factors for oseltamivir resistance was conducted first separately by source of the sample and then by combining the two populations. Multivariable analyses were conducted by using logistic regression to obtain adjusted odds ratios for the risk of being a case, and Poisson regression to obtain adjusted risk ratios for developing the outcomes of interest in the cohort analysis. Variables significant in univariable analyses (p<0.05) were included in the initial multivariable models. The presence of effect modification between study country and each variable was checked, and in the absence of a significant interaction, country was treated as a potential confounder. A backward elimination procedure was used to build the final models. Despite the common protocol, covariates were not uniformly collected in the different studies. In order to determine the possible confounding effects of these variables, a sensitivity analysis was therefore conducted excluding studies one by one from the univariable analysis and the final multivariable models and comparing the results with those of all studies included.

Evaluation of resistance to neuraminidase inhibitors was carried out either at country level (when laboratory capacity was available) or by the Health Protection Agency (HPA) in London in collaboration with the WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza (WHO-CC). Assessment of resistance was through phenotypic analysis (IC50) or genotypic analysis (sequencing) for detection of the mutation H275Y. A subset of viruses tested for antiviral susceptibility both at HPA and NICs yielded 100% concordant results with respect to resistance status. IC50 and genetic testing performed on a subset of viruses were also 100% concordant [6].

Results

Surveillance data
The 2007-8 influenza season in Europe was initially dominated by type A influenza viruses, and 96% of subtyped type A influenza viruses were A(H1) [6]. Type B influenza viruses became dominant in week 8/2008. For 30 countries in EISS, data on susceptibility of influenza A(H1N1) viruses to oseltamivir were reported (Table 1). From week 40/2007 to 27 August 2008, a total of 2,992 influenza A(H1N1) viruses were tested for oseltamivir resistance. Of these, 727 (24.3%) were resistant to oseltamivir (Table 1). Resistance was reported in 22 countries and ranged from 1% (n=106) in Italy to 67% (n=274) in Norway (Table 1). No resistance was found in eight countries, most of which were located in the central and eastern part of Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Serbia, Slovakia and Turkey). However the period of testing and numbers of viruses tested were not representative and might have resulted in an underestimation of the real proportion of resistant viruses [6]. Oseltamivir-resistant viruses were detected in sentinel and non-sentinel patients, and the distribution varied by country (e.g. 20-30% were reported from sentinel sources in the UK, the Netherlands and Norway, and around 80% in Germany and Luxembourg). Sixteen countries also reported case-based clinical information through the enhanced surveillance (Table 1) system as described in the methods section. However, the level of completeness of data was low in countries not conducting ad hoc epidemiological studies and therefore the analytical part of this article is based on the data provided by the five countries conducting such studies.

Table 1. Influenza detections and oseltamivir resistance of influenza A(H1N1) viruses in countries reporting data to EISS and VIRGIL during the 2007-8 influenza season (surveillance database)

Epidemiological studies
Analysis by country
None of the main variables collected (age, sex, travel history, influenza vaccination, chronic medical condition) was significantly associated with an increased risk of infection with an oseltamivir-resistant virus. Some of the variables analysed showed some effects that, although not statistically significant, deserve to be mentioned: In the Netherlands, individuals suffering from any kind of immunosuppression were more likely to be infected with an oseltamivir-resistant virus (odds ratio (OR): 5.5, 95% confidence interval (CI): 0.95 to 32; p=0.056). In addition, individuals reported through the sentinel system were less likely to be infected with a resistant virus (OR: 0.51, 95% CI: 0.25 to 1.04; p=0.065). In Norway, individuals aged between 18 and 64 years were more likely to be infected with a resistant virus than those younger than 18 years (OR: 1.84, 95% CI: 1.09 to 3.11; p=0.022).

Infection with a resistant virus was not significantly associated with an increased risk of pneumonia, hospitalisation or clinical complication in any of the five countries. In Luxembourg, the mean duration of influenza illness was longer in cases infected with oseltamivir-resistant virus than in oseltamivir-susceptible infections (10 and seven days, respectively; p-value=0.025 by T test for the hypothesis of no difference between the two groups). There was no difference between the two groups with regards to the maximum temperature of fever (39.3 versus 39.3 °C). In Norway, resistant cases were at higher risk of developing pneumonia (RR 3.15, 95% CI: 0.72 to 13.89); however, this association was not statistically significant. The results of the Norwegian study have recently been published as a separate article [11]. In the UK, the epidemiological information was only collected from the 36 cases with oseltamivir-resistant infection, and bronchitis and pneumonia were the most commonly reported complications affecting six (17%) and eight (22%) cases, respectively.

Results of the pooled data analysis
Following merging of the five national databases, information was available on 1,169 individuals with an influenza A(H1N1) infection, of which 373 (32%) were oseltamivir-resistant. Information was incomplete for key variables such as presence of a chronic medical condition (58% missing values) and hospitalisations (45% missing values). The distribution of missing values was not substantially different between data coming from sentinel networks and data from non-sentinel sources. The proportion of missing information can be calculated by summing up the denominators of each variable reported in Tables 2 and 3 and comparing this with the total number of subjects reported in the Tables.

The analysis of risk factors for oseltamivir resistance was first undertaken separately by reporting source (sentinel and non-sentinel) and subsequently, since there were no relevant differences between the two sources, data from sentinel and non-sentinel sources were analysed together. By univariable analysis (Table 2), individuals aged between 18 and 64 years were almost twice as likely to have an infection with a resistant virus than those younger than 18 years (OR:1.93, 95% CI: 1.49 to 2.51). Only 10 individuals over the age of 64 years were reported and an association of resistance with older age could therefore not be ascertained. Those suffering from a chronic medical condition were 2.4 times more likely to be infected with a resistant virus than healthy individuals (OR:2.42, 95% CI: 1.32 to 4.41). Individuals identified through the sentinel network were less likely to be infected with a resistant virus than those identified through non-sentinel sources (OR:0.32, 95% CI: 0.25 to 0.42).

Following multivariable analysis, none of these factors remained statistically significant. After adjusting for reporting country and source of the sample, the age-group of 18-64 year-olds was associated with a higher risk of being infected with an oseltamivir-resistant virus than the younger age group (OR:1.39, 95% CI: 1.01 to 1.91), however the p value from the likelihood ratio test comparing the models with and without the variable age was <0.08 (Table 2).

Table 2. Risk factors for being infected with an oseltamivir-resistant virus, data from five EU and EEA/EFTA countries, 2007-8 influenza season (n=1,169)

The cohort analysis to investigate the effect of oseltamivir resistance on disease severity and complications was restricted to subjects reported by the sentinel networks. There were no significant differences in symptoms at the time of sampling between exposed (oseltamivir-resistant) and non-exposed (oseltamivir-susceptible) patients (Table 3). The risk of influenza disease complications (hospitalisation, pneumonia, otitis media or death) was low for all subjects and did not significantly differ between exposed and non-exposed cases (Table 3).

Table 3. Effect of oseltamivir resistance on clinical outcomes, data from five EU and EEA/EFTA countries, 2007-8 influenza season, sentinel networks (n=790)

The sensitivity analysis conducted on both univariable and multivariable models did not reveal substantial differences between countries. Where differences were detected, these only concerned the magnitude but not the direction of the effect. Tables with data of the full sensitivity analyses can be provided by the corresponding author upon request.

Four influenza-related deaths were reported among oseltamivir-resistant cases detected through non-sentinel sources, of which three occurred in the UK and one in the Netherlands and none among oseltamivir-susceptible cases. These were two children (one newborn and one two year-old), one young adult and one person older than 65 years. With the exception of the newborn, all had a chronic medical condition that put them at higher risk of severe influenza and none had received influenza vaccination. None of these cases received oseltamivir treatment.

Discussion

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the epidemiological information that was collected in Europe during the influenza season 2007-8 on individuals infected with an oseltamivir-susceptible or -resistant influenza A(H1N1) virus. Through the analysis of surveillance data and by combining the results of five national observational studies, we have provided evidence that infection with an oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1) influenza virus was not related to any of the risk factors analysed. In particular, we did not identify any association between having a chronic medical condition and infection with an oseltamivir-resistant virus. This finding is in contrast with previous observations where higher levels of oseltamivir resistance were mainly reported in vulnerable groups such as children and immunosuppressed individuals and in association with oseltamivir treatment [12-14], and is consistent with the results of a similar investigation conducted in the United States (US) [15] and Norway [11] during the same influenza season. A possible explanation for this finding could be that the oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) viruses analysed in this study had become resistant by a process other than the selective pressure of oseltamivir treatment.

We observed a slightly higher risk of being infected with an oseltamivir-resistant virus among adults (18-64 years-old) compared with those younger than 18 years. We think that the most likely explanation for this finding is the confounding effect of different attitudes in different countries on when to consult a GP, and the fact that countries had a very different prevalence of oseltamivir-resistant viruses. This hypothesis was supported by the reduction of the odds ratio towards unity that we observed when adjusting the effect of age for country reporting. Residual confounding that we were not able to adjust for may explain the borderline effect of age observed in the multivariable analysis.

Prior to the 2007-8 influenza season, studies conducted in animal models found that amino acid mutations in the neuraminidase protein causing oseltamivir drug resistance reduced the pathogenicity of the virus because of their effects on the neuraminidase enzyme function [16-20]. Our study found that individuals infected with an oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1) virus experienced similar symptoms and risk of clinical complications as individuals infected with the same virus subtype susceptible to oseltamivir. Hence there was no clinical evidence that the resistant viruses differed from the susceptible viruses in terms of pathogenicity in humans. The four deaths reported in the UK and the Netherlands seem consistent with the incidence of influenza-associated mortality in risk groups and it is unlikely that oseltamivir resistance played a role. However, it should be noted that the relatively small sample size might have prevented detection of significant differences in rare outcomes such as deaths.

All the viruses that were analysed genetically showed the same drug resistance mutation, the substitution of histidine by tyrosine at residue 275 (H275Y) in the neuraminidase gene, which is known to confer high levels of resistance to oseltamivir in vitro [3], but has a reduced transmissibility [17]. However, the rare isolation of viruses carrying the H275Y mutation from ill patients without known exposure to neuraminidase inhibitors [21] may indicate that some compensatory mutations within the neuraminidase, the haemagglutinin or other genes may be influencing virus transmissibility. Such compensatory mutations are likely to have determined the widespread circulation of fully transmissible and pathogenic oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) viruses in Europe, although this still has to be ascertained. Limited variations in the susceptibility to neuraminidase inhibitors that occurred naturally over time (from 1997 to 2005) have been described for influenza A(H5N1) viruses, but do not seem to have clinical relevance so far [22].

The strength of our study is the consistency of results between countries and various sources of data (sentinel and non-sentinel), which validates the results of the pooled analysis. However, there are also important limitations that should be considered when interpreting the findings of this study. The main limitation is the high proportion of missing data for key variables. This was mainly due to the difficulties in collecting information on patients who had ILI months before the data collection started. In addition, data on follow-up outcomes may have been be inaccurate as they were collected from clinicians who were not necessarily aware of complications that may have occurred after they saw the patients. The study may also lack representativeness. In most of the countries, patients who underwent virological testing were selected neither randomly nor systematically, and clinicians may have preferentially tested patients with specific clinical characteristics or pre-existing conditions. In addition, since reporting for the sentinel cases was based on the standard case definition used for surveillance purposes, milder cases or those presenting with unusual clinical features may have been excluded from the study population. An information bias could have occurred if data for cases with oseltamivir-resistant virus infection were collected in more accurately than for cases with susceptible virus infection. We could not demonstrate this from the data available, but some of the participating countries that considered this issue found that clinicians were unaware of the oseltamivir resistance status of their patients at the time of the interview.

Even considering these limitations, this study has relevant public health implications. Subsequent results of global antiviral surveillance found that influenza A(H1N1) viruses resistant to oseltamivir have become predominant over susceptible strains, similarly to the evolution of circulating A(H3N2) viruses, most of which have become resistant to M2 inhibitors [23-26]. In Europe, preliminary results from the 2008-9 season show that while the A(H3N2) subtype predominated, almost all the influenza A(H1N1) viruses tested were oseltamivir-resistant [25]. Therefore, it is important that results from antiviral susceptibility surveillance are used to guide therapeutic decisions at an individual level. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued recommendations for the use of antiviral medications in 2008-9. These took into account the strain-specific prevalence of oseltamivir resistance among circulating influenza A viruses in the US, where resistant influenza A(H1N1) viruses predominated in the 2008-9 influenza season, and advised to use zanamivir or a combination of oseltamivir and rimantadine rather than oseltamivir alone when influenza A(H1N1) virus infection or exposure is suspected [27]. These guidelines do not apply to Europe, where influenza A(H3N2) fully susceptible to neuraminidase inhibitors dominated during the season 2008-9 [28]. The findings of the present study suggest that influenza viruses naturally resistant to the currently available antivirals can rapidly emerge and circulate in the community. It is therefore important that new antiviral drugs against influenza are developed. Although the main tool for the prevention of influenza remains annual vaccination, there are circumstances when the use of antiviral drugs could play a pivotal role in preventing and reducing influenza morbidity. These would include the situation of a mismatch between the circulating and vaccine influenza strains, the control of outbreaks in special settings (e.g. nursing homes), or an influenza pandemic where vaccine is unlikely to be available until some months after the start of the pandemic.

The emergence of the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic raised concerns over the possible emergence of oseltamivir resistance. Despite the wide use of neuraminidase inhibitors both for prophylaxis and treatment during the pandemic, oseltamivir resistance has so far only been detected sporadically and resistant viruses did not efficiently transmit in the community [29,30]. Diversification of national antiviral stockpiles to include different types of antivirals has been advised in some European countries [1,31]. The pandemic influenza A(H1N1)v virus is currently fully resistant to adamantanes but susceptible to both available neuraminidase inhibitors, zanamivir and oseltamivir [32].

In general, the unexpected emergence of high levels of oseltamivir resistance in Europe during the season 2007-8 highlights the evolving nature of the influenza virus and the requirement for a flexible approach to disease control including regular review and updating of treatment guidelines and pandemic plans [33].

What are the implications from this experience for the rapid, early assessment that is essential following the appearance of a pandemic [34]? Important lessons learnt are: 1) Reliance on referred specimens, especially from hospitalised or otherwise severe cases is likely to give a biased view of the pattern of infection in the community. 2) Multi-national approaches are more difficult once countries have started independent analytic approaches. It would be preferable for countries to develop and agree in advance on proposals (i.e. mock-up study protocols) to obtain the epidemiological information that is needed at the beginning of a pandemic to guide control measures. This is the approach being taken by the ECDC in collaboration with WHO and such plans should take into account the limitations identified in this study.

Acknowledgements:
We are grateful to the Health Protection Agency Centre for Infection and the WHO Collaborating Centre in London for carrying out and rapidly sharing antiviral susceptibility tests in Europe. We are indebted with virologists, clinicians and epidemiologists of the participating countries for collecting and providing the information that made possible the current study. In particular we are grateful to the following persons: C Brown, WHO Regional Office for Europe; P Huberty-Krau, Health Directorate and M Opp, National Health Laboratory, Luxembourg; L Jessop, R Pebody and PS Pilli, Health Protection Agency, UK; AB Osterhaus, G Rimmelzwaan, R van Beek, Erasmus Medical Centre, Rotterdam; G Donker, NIVEL Netherlands Institute for Health Services Research, Utrecht; M Koopmans, M Jonges, National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, Netherlands; S Brockmann, Robert Koch-Institut, Germany.
At the time when the study was conducted, the VIRGIL project was receiving funding from the European Union FP6 Research Programme
http://ec.europa.eu/research/health/influenza/proj13_en.aspx and EISS from ECDC.


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Differentiation of two distinct clusters among currently circulating influenza A(H1N1)v viruses, March-September 2009 (Euro Surveill., edited)

Eurosurveillance, Volume 14, Issue 46, 19 November 2009

Rapid communications

Differentiation of two distinct clusters among currently circulating influenza A(H1N1)v viruses, March-September 2009

S R Fereidouni ()1, M Beer1, T Vahlenkamp1, E Starick1

  1. Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany

Citation style for this article: Fereidouni SR, Beer M, Vahlenkamp T, Starick E. Differentiation of two distinct clusters among currently circulating influenza A(H1N1)v viruses, March-September 2009. Euro Surveill. 2009;14(46):pii=19409. Available online: http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19409
Date of submission: 02 November 2009


Analysis of all complete genome sequences of the pandemic influenza A(H1N1)v virus available as of 10 September 2009 revealed that two closely related but distinct clusters were circulating in most of the affected countries at the same time. The characteristic differences are located in genes encoding the two surface proteins - haemagglutinin and neuraminidase - and four internal proteins – the polymerase PB2 subunit, nucleoprotein, matrix protein M1 and the non-structural protein NS1. Phylogenetic inference was demonstrated by neighbour joining, maximum likelihood and Bayesian trees analyses of the involved genes and by tree construction of concatenated sequences.



Following the worldwide spread of the pandemic influenza A(H1N1)v virus after its emergence in the United States (US) and Mexico in March 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO) raised the influenza pandemic alert level to phase 6 on 11 June 2009. It is expected that this new influenza virus will continue to circulate and spread due to efficient human to human transmission. Data on the genetic composition of the virus became available very early in the pandemic [1], and until 10 September 2009, more than 3,500 individual gene sequences had been deposited in public databases such as GISAID and GenBank. The influenza A(H1N1)v virus, which is a unique combination of gene segments from both North American and Eurasian swine influenza viruses [2], has a high mean evolutionary rate for individual segments and the whole genome (3.66 x 10-3 substitutions per site per year) [3].

Analysis of all eight gene segments of more than 300 full-length influenza A(H1N1)v sequences available in the Genbank database (Figure 1) enabled us to show that two closely related but distinct clusters of the virus were circulating in most of the affected countries at the same time. The two clusters could be differentiated clearly by nine nucleotide signatures. These were located in the genes for the two surface proteins haemagglutinin HA and neuraminidase NA and in the genes for four internal proteins, the polymerase PB2 subunit, the nucleoprotein NP, matrix protein M1 and the non-structural protein NS1. The polymerase genes PB1 and PA were identical in all isolates and no genetic signature was evident in these two segments. Four of the nine nucleotide changes, present on the HA, NA, NP and NS1 segments, were non-synonymous and lead to amino acid replacements (Table). Eight of the mutations were transition substitutions (seven of them A/G substitutions), and one change was a transversion substitution (A/T substitution). None of the changes in the sequences seemed to be located in regions of the genome responsible for known phenotypic differences or biological functions.

Figure 1. Name and cluster-specific signatures of influenza A(H1N1)v viruses included in the analysis (n=305)


Table.
Nucleotide and amino acid residues located in six segments of the new H1N1 influenza viruses specific for the two clusters

The differentiation of circulating influenza A(H1N1)v viruses into two clusters based on their nucleotide sequence differences was also supported by phylogenetic inference. Concatenated sequences were prepared using open reading frames of six viral segments (the ones included in the Table). Distance-based neighbour-joining trees were constructed using the Tamura 3-parameter model available in MEGA 4.0 [4]. Clustering of influenza A(H1N1)v viruses could be demonstrated by individual trees of the involved single genes (not shown) and with higher evidence by tree construction of concatenated sequences (Figure 2), despite the fact that the differences between the two clusters comprised only a few nucleotides. The analyses were supported by maximum likelihood using generalised time reversible substitution model (GTR) and Bayesian inference implemented in TOPALi v2 [5]. All phylogenetic analyses were conducted on all available sequences (Figures 3 and 4) and representatives of each monophyletic group (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Neighbour-joining phylogenetic tree of concatenated open reading frames of six viral segments of selected influenza A(H1N1)v viruses


Figure 3.
Maximum likelihood tree of concatenated open reading frames of six viral segments of selected influenza A(H1N1)v viruses


Figure 4.
The Neighbour-joining phylogenetic tree of concatenated open reading frames of six viral segments of all influenza A(H1N1)v virus

Taking into account the complete sequence data available from Mexico and the US, it is noteworthy that viruses of cluster 1 occurred earlier than those of cluster 2, with a time difference of about two weeks. Most sequences from Mexico, Texas and California belonged to cluster 1, whereas most sequences from New York belonged to cluster 2. Whether these differences were due to the geographical region, the date of isolation or other reasons needs to be elucidated in further epidemiological investigations. Virus sequences of both clusters have been reported from most countries on different continents. In Germany, influenza virus A/Regensburg/2009 was one of the first influenza A(H1N1)v isolates and belonged to cluster 1 [6]. This virus has been investigated by whole genome sequencing (GenBank accession numbers: FN401574–FN401581) and animal experiments in pigs and chickens [7]. Interestingly, viruses of both clusters could be detected in Germany although complete sequences of all eight segments were available only for four viruses at the time of this analysis (Figure 2).

All available full-length sequences for the six segments with cluster specific signatures were selected and duplicate sequences from identical isolates were removed. Of 305 viruses included in the analyses, 150 belonged to cluster 1 and 155 to cluster 2. All viruses in cluster 2 shared nine genetic signatures specific for this cluster. In cluster 1, three sub-clusters were identified. Most viruses in cluster 1 share all nine genetic signatures specific for this cluster (sub-cluster 1.1). In contrast, most viruses from Japan belonged to cluster 1 but had a cluster 2-like nucleoprotein sequence. These viruses constitute sub-cluster 1.2 (Japanese sub-cluster). A small group of sequences fit into cluster 1 when the concatenated sequences were analysed but shared the same four sequence features with cluster 2 (sub-cluster 1.3) (Figure 2), which may point to a reassortment event between the two clusters. The importance of these findings and epidemiological links between different clusters remains to be analysed.
Our findings allow the differentiation of the influenza A(H1N1)v viruses into distinct clusters among the currently circulating influenza A(H1N1)v viruses, contributing additional knowledge of the new pandemic virus and encouraging further research on this topic.


References

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  6. Melzl H, Wenzel JJ, Kochanowski B, Feierabend K, Kreuzpaintner B, et al. First sequence-confirmed case of infection with the new influenza A(H1N1) strain in Germany. Euro Surveill. 2009;14(18):pii=19203. Available from: http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19203
  7. Lange E, Kalthoff D, Blohm U, Teifke JP, Breithaupt A, Maresch C, et al. Pathogenesis and transmission of the novel swine-origin influenza virus A/H1N1 after experimental infection of pigs. J Gen Virol. 2009;90(Pt 9):2119-23.

11/19/2009

France. Porcine : Grippe A/H1N1 : Visionner la conférence de presse de Roselyne Bachelot-Narquin sur la campagne de vaccination

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India’s swine flu toll touches 537, over 16,000 affected

New Delhi, Nov 19 (IANS) Three swine flu deaths, two from Rajasthan alone, were reported Thursday, taking the toll in India to 537, health authorities said here. Also, 118 new cases were recorded in the country, taking the total number of people affected by the contagious flu to 16,044. Apart from the two deaths reported from Rajasthan, [...]

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United Kingdom. Schoolgirl with swine flu dies

A schoolgirl has died after contracting swine flu. The girl, from Slough, Berkshire, tested positive for the H1N1 virus, and was being treated at St Mary's Hospital in Paddington, London.

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Beijing moves to quash rumours of unsafe H1N1 jabs

BEIJING: Beijing authorities have moved to quash rumours fuelled by bogus text messages that the city would suspend H1N1 flu vaccinations, amid safety concerns after two people died following inoculations.

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United Kingdom. Swine flu vaccine to be given to healthy children

Department of Health expected to extend inoculation programme to include children aged six months to five years

Healthy children aged between six months and five years are likely to be included in the government's swine flu inoculation programme.

The Department of Health is expected to confirm shortly that it will offer free vaccination protection to young children.

The Conservative party has been pressing the government for some weeks to give vaccinations to healthy children because those under the age of 16 are one of the more vulnerable groups. Around 21% of all H1N1 deaths in the UK have been among the under-14s.

So far the priority groups have included those with pre-existing medical conditions, their carers and pregnant women. Youngsters with asthma or diabetes, for example, are already being vaccinated.

The Department of Health did not dispute that there had been a shift in policy but declined to comment ahead of the weekly press conference given by the government's chief medical officer, Sir Liam Donaldson.

Further details of the expanded vaccination programme are expected to be revealed this afternoon.


guardian.co.uk © Guardian News & Media Limited 2009 | Use of this content is subject to our Terms & Conditions | More Feeds

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Espana. Los ginecólogos recomiendan que las embarazadas se vacunen contra la gripe A

La Sociedad Española de Ginecología y Obstetricia (SEGO) recomienda "la vacunación [contra la nueva gripe] a todas las mujeres embarazadas, en cualquier momento de la gestación". Así de tajante es el punto 6 de un documento que han remitido, y que firman el presidente de la SEGO, José Manuel Bajo Arenas, y el de la sección de Medicina Perinatal de la sociedad, Txanton Martínez-Astorquiza.

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Canada. Push is on to inoculate everyone against H1N1

Public health officials are making a big push for everyone to get the shot now that it is widely available.

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Hong Kong: VOLUME 1,NUMBER 8 (PUBLISHED ON NOVEMBER 19, 2009) - Swine and Seasonal Flu Monitor (Excerpts, edited)

[Source Full PDF Document: LINK. EDITED.]

VOLUME 1,NUMBER 8 (PUBLISHED ON NOVEMBER 19, 2009) - Swine and Seasonal Flu Monitor


Swine and Seasonal Flu Monitor is a weekly report produced by the Respiratory Disease Office of the Centre for Health Protection. It summarizes and monitors the weekly situation of HSI and seasonal influenza in Hong Kong.

Local situation on Human Swine Influenza (Pandemic influenza H1N1(2009)) (as of Nov 18, 2009)

  • The activity of human swine influenza (HSI) continues to decrease, as reflected by the number of attendances at designated flu clinics for influenza-like illness (ILI) (Fig 1) and the consultation rates for ILI at general practitioners’ clinics (Fig 3). Currently about 16% of patients attending Designated Flu Clinics (DFCs) for ILI symptoms were tested positive for HSI (Fig 2).
  • As of Nov 18, 2009, 63 patients with HSI infection remained in public hospitals.
  • The weekly number of severe cases recorded in week 46 (Nov 8 to 14) was two. As of Nov 18, a total of 160 severe cases were recorded. These severe cases included 92 males and 68 females with ages ranged from 13 months to 93 years (median: 51 years).
  • In week 46 (Nov 8 to 14), no fatal cases were recorded. As of Nov 18, a total of 40 fatal cases were recorded. They were 28 males and 12 females, age ranged from 11 to 93 years (median: 55 years).

Local situation on seasonal influenza (as of Nov 18, 2009)
  • The seasonal influenza activity is low. In week 46 (Nov 8 to 14), 2.4%, 2.4% and 0% of all circulating viruses were H1, H3 and B respectively (Fig 4).
(...)
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Hong Kong: Observe personal hygiene in and outside Hong Kong (11/19/09)

The Centre for Health Protection (CHP) of the Department of Health today (November 19) reminded people to observe personal hygiene measures against human swine influenza (HSI) both in Hong Kong and while staying abroad.

CHP received report from the Health Department of Guangdong Province today (November 19) about a 56-year-old Hong Kong male citizen who was confirmed to have HSI and who died on November 15. He had underlying heart disease. He had lived in Guangzhou for some years and had no recent travel history to Hong Kong.

According to the World Health Organization, as of November 1 this year more than 206 countries worldwide have laboratory confirmed cases of HSI, including more than 6,250 deaths.

HSI activity is widespread in the United States, Canada, and across Europe.

Sharp increases in HSI continue to be reported in Japan. China's influenza activity has also been on the rise during the past three to four weeks. In Hong Kong, as of today, there have a cumulative total of 40 fatal cases from HSI.

While HSI activity has been stable of late, CHP is maintaining vigilance in its influenza surveillance systems in order to detect early signs of arrival of the winter flu season.

CHP reiterated the importance of personal protective measures such as handwashing and respiratory precautions both in Hong Kong and while staying abroad.

''People with chronic medical conditions should avoid crowded places to reduce the chance of contracting HSI. They should immediately seek appropriate medical care if feeling unwell from flu symptoms.''
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Hong Kong: Caritas Medical Centre update on cluster of parainfluenza cases (11/19/09)

The following is issued on behalf of the Hospital Authority:

Following the earlier announcement about eight residents in the Developmental Disabilities Unit (DDU) of Caritas Medical Centre (CMC) confirmed with parainfluenza infection, the hospital announced the following updates today (November 19):

There is one more 15-year-old girl of the concerned unit presenting with diarrhoea, vomiting, fever and respiratory symptoms and the test result is positive to parainfluenza.

She is being treated under isolation and in stable condition.

Infection control measures have been stepped up in DDU.

New admissions are suspended while visiting arrangements remain unchanged.

All other child residents are under close surveillance.

The hospital has reported the case to the Hospital Authority Head Office and the Centre for Health Protection.
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Hong Kong: CHP investigating acute gastroenteritis outbreak at elderly home (11/19/09)

The Centre for Health Protection (CHP) of the Department of Health today (November 19) reminded members of the public and management of institutions to maintain strict personal and environmental hygiene to prevent gastroenteritis.

The appeal was made following CHP's investigation of an acute gastroenteritis outbreak affecting 17 residents and three staff members of an elderly home in Tuen Mun.

The affected, eight men and 12 women aged between 44 and 93 years, had developed symptoms of gastroenteritis, including diarrhoea and vomiting, since November 16.

A total of 19 people sought medical consultation.

One of them was admitted to Tuen Mun Hospital.

All of them are in stable condition.

Officers of the CHP have visited the elderly home and provided health advice to staff concerning proper disinfection, proper disposal of vomitus and stools, as well as personal and food hygiene.

CHP will closely monitor the institution for further cases and provide health advice when necessary.

To prevent contracting gastroenteritis, people are advised to -
  • Ensure proper personal hygiene;
  • Wash hands thoroughly before eating or preparing food and after using toilet or handling vomitus or faecal matter;
  • Avoid food that is not thoroughly cooked.
People can obtain more information on the prevention of gastroenteritis from CHP's website (www.chp.gov.hk) or call the Central Health Education Unit hotline, 2833 0111.
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Hong Kong: HA weekly statistics of Designated Flu Clinics and admitted human swine influenza patients (11/19/09)

The following is issued on behalf of the Hospital Authority:

Regarding the services of the eight Designated Flu Clinics (DFCs) and the confirmed human swine influenza patients admitted to public hospitals, the Hospital Authority (HA) today (November 19) provided the following wrap up of the past week:

In the past week (November 12-18), a total of 866 patients with flu-like symptoms attended the DFCs.

Among all confirmed human swine influenza patients, 62 confirmed patients are now staying in public hospitals for treatment, with 49 in stable condition, six in serious and seven in critical condition.

The newly confirmed cases in the past week included three staff members of public hospitals (one male and two female, including two nurses and one supporting staff).

So far there have been 1,076 HA staff members confirmed as human swine influenza.

Among them, 1,074 have already recovered and returned to work.

The Hospital Authority spokesman reminded people the new opening hours for the eight DFCs on Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays were effective from November 7 in view of alleviation in service demand.

The eight DFCs will run a half-day service from 9am to 1pm during weekends and public holidays, while full-day service (9am to 5pm) will be maintained from Mondays to Fridays.
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Hong Kong: Critical case of human swine influenza at Queen Elizabeth Hospital (11/19/09)

The following is issued on behalf of the Hospital Authority:

A spokesperson of Queen Elizabeth Hospital (QEH) made the following announcement regarding a new case of a critically ill human swine influenza (HSI) patient today (November 19):

A six-year-old boy with good health history developed flu symptoms on November 17 and attended the Accident and Emergency Department of QEH today.

He was admitted to isolation ward for treatment.

The patient deteriorated after admission and was transferred to the paediatric intensive care unit under ventilation support.

Positive result of HSI was confirmed today.

He was prescribed with Tamiflu and antibiotics.

The hospital will continue to closely monitor his condition.
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United Kingdom. HPA - Weekly pandemic flu media update (11/19/09, edited)

Weekly pandemic flu media update

19 November 2009


KEY POINTS
  • The consultation rate for flu-like illness in England from the Royal College of General Practitioners (RCGP) scheme has decreased slightly to 35.9 per 100,000 in week 46 compared to 37.8 in week 45. This is still above the English baseline threshold of 30/100,000.
  • The estimated cases self referring to the National Pandemic Flu Service have shown an overall decline. Antiviral collection numbers are variable across England with increases in some regions and decreases in others. Increases in collection rates were seen in the 1-4, 5-14 and 75+ age groups.
  • Interpretation of data to produce estimates on the number of new cases continues to be subject to a considerable amount of uncertainty. HPA modelling gives an estimate of 53,000 new cases in England last week (range 26,000 to 114,000) which represents a decrease from the previous week. This estimate incorporates data from National Pandemic Flu Service and GP consultations.
  • The HPA estimates a cumulative total number of cases of 715,000 (with a range 336,000 to 1,483,000) since the pandemic began.

Following the move from laboratory testing for confirmation of swine flu to clinical diagnosis of cases, the level of flu in the community is being monitored using a range of surveillance mechanisms, including the RCGP consultation rates, QSurveillance®, and the National Pandemic Flu Service.

A more detailed UK weekly epidemiology update can be accessed at: LINK


CLINICAL INDICATORS

Clinical data are obtained from GP surgeries that report the weekly and daily consultations for flu-like illness and other acute respiratory illness.


Current estimated weekly Royal College of General Practitioners (RCGP) consultation rates of flu-like illness


From a network of approximately 100 general practices covering a population of approximately 900,000 with an equal distribution within each of three defined reporting regions; North, Central and South.

In week 46 (ending 15 November) GP consultation rates for flu-like illness in England have shown a small decrease compared to the previous week (37.8 per 100,000 in week 45 to 35.9 per 100,000 in week 46) which is still above the English baseline threshold of 30/100,000.


Figure 1: Current estimated weekly RCGP consultation rates of flu-like illness


QSurveillance®

Set up by the University of Nottingham and EMIS (the main supplier of general practice computer systems within the UK) in collaboration with the Health Protection Agency. QSurveillance® is a not-for-profit network over 3,300 general practices covering a total population of almost 22 million patients (> 25% of the UK population).

The weekly QSurveillance® flu-like illness consultation rate showed a slight increase from 47.2 per 100,000 in week 45.to 48.4 per 100,000 in week 46. The weekly rate for flu-like illness in all SHA regions and all age groups showed a mixed picture with some increasing and others decreasing.

NB: QSurveillance® is based on data from 43% of England's population (about 3000 practices), 10% of the population in Wales, 17% in Northern Ireland, and 0% in Scotland.


Figure 2: QSurveillance® - weekly consultation rate for flu-like illness in England, Wales and Northern Ireland (all ages)


Figure 3: QSurveillance® - weekly consultation rate for influenza-like illness by English SHA (all ages)


Figure 4: QSurveillance influenza-like illness rate by age band in week 46 (ending 15 November)

The latest weekly flu-like illness rates show that the highest flu-like illness consultation rates were in the 1-4 year-old age group. Compared with week 45 this week (week 46) rates have increased in all age bands except the 15-24 and 25-44 age bands where the rates have decreased. The largest increase (38%) was seen in the 5-14 year old age band.


SYNDROMIC SURVEILLANCE

NHS Direct

On 23 July the National Pandemic Flu Service was implemented. This had an impact on the number of 'cold/flu' calls received through the routine NHS Direct service. For this reason, data from NHS Direct do not reflect the true pattern of cold/ flu callers and so are not currently an accurate surveillance tool.


VIRAL CHARACTERISTICS

To date (as of 18 November 2009) 3,359 viruses have been analysed by the Centre for Infections for the genetic marker commonly associated with resistance to oseltamivir in seasonal H1N1 flu (H274Y). 12 viruses have been found to carry this marker in the UK with three of these, through additional testing, showing evidence of resistance when viral growth is tested in the presence of antivirals. In addition, 293 specimens have been fully tested for susceptibility. The Agency is continually assessing its advice to government on health protection policies such as antiviral use. Currently there is no requirement to change existing guidance.

There have been no significant changes in the virus.


SEVERITY

Disease severity continues to be monitored. The disease is generally mild in most people so far, but is proving severe in a small minority of cases.
  • Swine flu hospitalisations in England: 783 patients (currently hospitalised as of 8am on 18 November).
  • Deaths - the number of deaths related to swine flu in England is 142 (This figure represents the number of deaths in individuals with swine flu but does not represent the number of deaths that can be attributed to swine flu).

INTERNATIONAL SUMMARY
  • Confirmed global deaths reported by ECDC (Update 17:00 CEST 16 November 2009)
    • Total deaths reported 7,051

In the last 7 days, the total number of deaths reported globally has increased by 7% - a small increase from the figure reported last week.

NB: Laboratory confirmed case numbers are no longer being reported for most countries as they do not give a representative view of the actual number of cases worldwide.


The World Health Organization (WHO) reported on 13 November that for:
  • Tropical regions: Most countries in the tropical region of Central and South America continue to report declining influenza activity. Overall transmission continues to decline in most parts of South and Southeast Asia, with the exception of Nepal and Sri Lanka.
  • Western Asia: increasing activity has been observed in several countries including Israel and Afghanistan
  • Temperate northern hemisphere regions: The winter influenza season, which began unusually early across much of the Northern Hemisphere, shows early signs of peaking in parts of North America but is intensifying across much of Europe and Central and Eastern Asia.
    • In Europe and Central Asia: overall influenza transmission continues to intensify as pandemic activity spreads eastward. At least 10 countries in Western Europe (Iceland, Poland, Romania, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) now report active circulation of pandemic influenza viruses. High to very high intensity of respiratory diseases with concurrent circulation of pandemic H1N1 2009 was also reported in the Netherlands, Italy, much of Northern Europe, Belarus, Bulgaria, and in the Russian Federation (particularly in the Urals). Disease activity may be peaking in a few countries, notably Iceland and Ireland that experienced intense transmission during early autumn.
    • The Ukraine has experienced a sharp rise in the number of cases, however this does not appear to represent a change in the transmission or virulence of the virus. Preliminary investigation of samples taken from patients in the Ukraine has not revealed significant changes in the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus.
    • Canada has reported sharp increases in rates of influenza-like-illness (ILI), detections of pandemic H1N1 2009 virus, and school outbreaks over the past three weeks as pandemic activity continues to spread eastwards.
    • In the United States, influenza transmission remains geographically widespread and intense, however, disease activity may have peaked in southern and south eastern areas.
    • In Mexico, influenza activity remains geographically widespread with a significant wave of cases reported since early September, most notably from central and southern Mexico.
  • Africa: Somalia, Nigeria and Burundi have reported their first confirmed cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
More information on the latest global situation can be found on the WHO website at: LINK

ENDS


Notes to editors

General infection control practices and good respiratory hand hygiene can help to reduce transmission of all viruses, including swine flu. This includes:
  • Maintaining good basic hygiene, for example washing hands frequently with soap and water to reduce the spread of virus from your hands to face or to other people.
  • Cleaning hard surfaces (e.g. door handles) frequently using a normal cleaning product.
  • Covering your nose and mouth when coughing or sneezing, using a tissue when possible.
  • Disposing of dirty tissues promptly and carefully.
  • Making sure your children follow this advice.

Further information on swine flu is available on the Health Protection Agency's website at LINK.

For media enquiries only please contact the Health Protection Agency's Centre for Infections press office on: 020 8327 7080 - 020 8327 7097 - 020 8327 7098 - 020 8327 6690 - 020 8327 6647
Last reviewed: 19 November 2009
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HPA - Weekly pandemic flu media update
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WHO - Safety of pandemic vaccines

Safety of pandemic vaccines - Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 briefing note 16

19 NOVEMBER 2009 | GENEVA


To date, WHO has received vaccination information from 16 of around 40 countries conducting national H1N1 pandemic vaccine campaigns.

Based on information in these 16 countries, WHO estimates that around 80 million doses of pandemic vaccine have been distributed and around 65 million people have been vaccinated. National immunization campaigns began in Australia and the People’s Republic of China in late September.

Vaccination campaigns currently under way to protect populations from pandemic influenza are among the largest in the history of several countries, and numbers are growing daily. Given this scale of vaccine administration, at least some rare adverse reactions, not detectable during even large clinical trials, could occur, underscoring the need for rigorous monitoring of safety. Results to date are encouraging.


Common side effects

As anticipated, side effects commonly reported include swelling, redness, or pain at the injection site, which usually resolves spontaneously a short time after vaccination.

Fever, headache, fatigue, and muscle aches, occurring shortly after vaccine administration, have also been reported, though with less frequency. These symptoms also resolve spontaneously, usually within 48 hours. In addition, a variety of allergic reactions has been observed. The frequency of these reactions is well within the expected range.


Guillain-Barre syndrome

To date, fewer than ten suspected cases of Guillain-Barre syndrome have been reported in people who have received vaccine. These numbers are in line with normal background rates of this illness, as reported in a recent study. Nonetheless, all such cases are being investigated to determine whether these are randomly occurring events or if they might be associated with vaccination.

WHO has received no reports of fatal outcomes among suspected or confirmed cases of Guillain-Barre syndrome detected since vaccination campaigns began. All cases have recovered. WHO recommends continued active monitoring for Guillain-Barre syndrome.


Investigations of deaths

A small number of deaths have occurred in people who have been vaccinated. All such deaths, reported to WHO, have been promptly investigated. Although some investigations are ongoing, results of completed investigations reported to WHO have ruled out a direct link to pandemic vaccine as the cause of death.

In China, for example, where more than 11 million doses of pandemic vaccine have been administered, health authorities have informed WHO of 15 cases of severe side effects and two deaths that occurred following vaccination. Thorough investigation of these deaths, including a review of autopsy results, determined that underlying medical conditions were the cause of death, and not the vaccine.


Safety profile of different vaccines

Campaigns are using nonadjuvanted inactivated vaccines, adjuvanted inactivated vaccines, and live attenuated vaccines. No differences in the safety profile of severe adverse events among different vaccines have been detected to date.

Although intense monitoring of vaccine safety continues, all data compiled to date indicate that pandemic vaccines match the excellent safety profile of seasonal influenza vaccines, which have been used for more than 60 years.
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Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Update 19 November 2009, 09:00 hours CEST (ECDC, edited)

[Source Full PDF Document: LINK. EDITED.]

ECDC DAILY UPDATE

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Update 19 November 2009, 09:00 hours CEST

Main developments in past 24 hours

  • Total of 549 fatal cases in Europe and EFTA countries and 6 747 in the rest of the world have been reported up to date;

This report is based on official information provided by national public health websites or through other official communication channels. An update on the number of confirmed fatal cases is presented in Table 2 - as of 18 November 2009 - 16:00 hours CEST, for the world, and 19 November 2009 - 09:00 hours CEST, for Europe.

Epidemiologic update

All 27 EU and 4 EFTA countries are reporting cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza. A total of 549 deaths have been reported since April 2009 (Table 2). The number of weekly deaths has shown an increase over the last 4 weeks. Latest new and confirmed fatal pandemic (H1N1) cases outside the EU/EFTA area are presented in Table 2 as well. Available updates on hospital admissions, per Member State, can be found in Table 1.

Table 1: Reported number of confirmed Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza cases admitted to hospitals and intensive care, by country, as of 19 November 2009, 09:00 hours (CEST) in EU and EFTA countries

[Country - (date of report) - Number of cases currently hospitalised - Cumulative number of cases admitted in hospitals - Number of cases currently in intensive care - Cumulative number of cases admitted to intensive care]

  1. Austria (11.11.) – … – … – … – …
  2. Belgium (12.11.) – … – … – … – …
  3. Bulgaria (08.11) – … – … – … – …
  4. Cyprus (01.11) – … – … – … – 4
  5. Czech Republic (12.11.) – … – … – … – …
  6. Denmark (18.11.) – … – … – … – …
  7. Estonia (23.10.) – … - 11 – … – …
  8. Finland (18.11.) – … – … – … – …
  9. France (12.11.) – … – … – 71 – 188
  10. Germany (18.11.) – … – … – … – …
  11. Greece (18.11.) – … – … – … – …
  12. Hungary (08.11.) – … - 78 – … – …
  13. Iceland (11.11.) – 31 – 170 – 7 – 19
  14. Ireland (12.11.) – 191 – 785 – 22 – 65
  15. Italy (17.11) – … - 405 – … – 205
  16. Latvia (17.11.) – … - 1 – … – …
  17. Liechtenstein (11.11.) – … – … – … – …
  18. Lithuania (04.11.) – … – … – … – …
  19. Luxembourg (16.11.) – … – … – 0 – 0
  20. Malta (04.09.) – … - 46 – … – 1
  21. Netherlands (13.11.) – 291 – 909 – 19 – 91
  22. Norway (18.11.) – 89 – 916 – 24 – 108
  23. Poland (12.11.) – … – … – … – …
  24. Portugal (18.11.) - 164 – … - 18 – …
  25. Romania (18.11) – … – … – … – …
  26. Slovakia (12.08.) – 2 – 33 – 0 – 0
  27. Slovenia (10.08.) – … – … – … – …
  28. Spain (12.11.) – … – … – … – …
  29. Sweden (08.11.) – 74 - 336 – … – …
  30. Switzerland (11.11.) – 15 - 48 – … – 11
  31. United Kingdom (a) (12.11.) - 785 – … - 173 – …

Note: Data for the EU and EFTA countries correspond to the Ministry of Health or surveillance centre websites.

(…) denotes no information readily available in official sources.

(a) Data includes all probable cases for England only. Does not include Scotland (841 cumulative hospitalisations), Wales (327) and Northern Ireland (527).

Table 2. Reported number of new and cumulative confirmed fatal Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza cases in EU and EFTA countries, as 19 November 2009, 09:00 hours CEST, and in the rest of the world by country, as of 18 November 2009, 16:00 hours CEST.

[Country - Number of new fatal cases since previous national update - Cumulative number of fatal cases]

  • EU AND EFTA COUNTRIES
    • Austria … – 1
    • Belgium … – 11
    • Bulgaria … – 5
    • Czech Republic … – 1
    • Finland … – 9
    • France … – 70 (a)
    • Germany 1 – 22
    • Greece 3 – 8
    • Hungary … – 5
    • Iceland … – 1
    • Ireland … – 15
    • Italy … – 58
    • Latvia … – 1
    • Lithuania 1 – 1
    • Luxembourg … – 2
    • Malta … – 3
    • Netherlands … – 22
    • Norway 1 – 22
    • Poland … – 4
    • Portugal … – 7
    • Slovakia … – 1
    • Spain … – 88
    • Sweden … – 5
    • United Kingdom … – 187
      • Total 6 – 549
  • OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES & CENTRAL ASIA
    • Azerbaijan … – 2
    • Belarus … – 7
    • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 - 1
    • Croatia … – 5
    • Kosovo … – 1
    • Moldova … – 7
    • Russia … – 19
    • Serbia 2 – 13
    • Ukraine … - 15
      • Total 3 – 70
  • MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE-EAST
    • Bahrain … – 7
    • Egypt … – 7
    • Iran 42 – 100
    • Iraq … – 9
    • Israel … – 48
    • Jordan … – 11
    • Kuwait … – 26
    • Lebanon … – 3
    • Morocco … – 1
    • Occupied Palestinian Territory … – 5
    • Oman … – 27
    • Qatar … – 5
    • Saudi Arabia … – 66
    • Syria … – 22
    • Tunisia … – 2
    • Turkey … – 73
    • United Arab Emirates … – 6
    • Yemen … – 18
      • Total 42 – 436
  • AFRICA
    • Ghana … – 1
    • Madagascar … – 1
    • Mauritius … – 8
    • Mozambique … – 2
    • Namibia … – 1
    • Sao Tome & Principe … – 2
    • South Africa … – 91
    • Sudan … – 1
    • Tanzania … – 1
      • Total … – 108
  • NORTH AMERICA
    • Canada 37 – 198
    • Mexico … – 482
    • USA … – 1123
      • Total 37 – 1803
  • CENTRAL AMERICA & CARIBBEAN
    • Bahamas … – 4
    • Barbados … - 3
    • Cayman Islands … – 1
    • Costa Rica … – 38
    • Cuba … – 7
    • Dominican Republic … – 22
    • El Salvador 1 – 26
    • Guatemala … – 18
    • Honduras … – 16
    • Jamaica … – 5
    • Nicaragua … – 11
    • Panama … – 11
    • Saint Kitts and Nevis … – 1
    • Saint Lucia … – 1
    • Suriname … – 2
    • Trinidad-Tobago … – 5
      • Total 1 – 171
  • SOUTH AMERICA
    • Argentina … – 600
    • Bolivia … – 57
    • Brazil … – 1368
    • Chile … – 140
    • Colombia 10 – 151
    • Ecuador … – 82
    • Paraguay … – 52
    • Peru 7 – 190
    • Uruguay … – 33
    • Venezuela … – 104
      • Total 17 – 2777
  • NORTH-EAST & SOUTH ASIA
    • Afghanistan … – 14
    • Bangladesh … – 6
    • China (Mainland) … – 53
    • Hong Kong SAR China … – 40
    • India 4 – 530
    • Japan … – 28
    • Macao SAR China … – 2
    • Mongolia … – 15
    • Pakistan … – 1
    • South Korea 18 – 82
    • Sri Lanka … – 1
    • Taiwan … - 29
      • Total 22 – 801
  • SOUTH-EAST ASIA
    • Brunei Darussalam … – 1
    • Cambodia … – 4
    • Indonesia … – 10
    • Laos Peoples Democratic Republic … – 1
    • Malaysia … – 77
    • Philippines … – 30
    • Singapore … – 18
    • Thailand 1 – 185
    • Vietnam … – 41
      • Total 1 – 367
  • AUSTRALIA & PACIFIC
    • Australia … – 189
    • Cook Islands … – 1
    • Marshall Islands … – 1
    • New Zealand … – 19
    • Samoa … – 2
    • Solomon Islands … – 1
    • Tonga … – 1
      • Total … – 214
  • TOTAL 129 – 7296

(a) Deaths reported from France include 1 in Guyana, 9 in New Caledonia, 7 in the French Polynesia, 6 in the Reunion, 1 in Martinique, 2 in Mayotte, 1 in Guadeloupe and 43 in mainland France.

(…)

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Second wave of A/H1N1 outbreak in Thailand starts: minister - Xinhua

Second wave of A/H1N1 outbreak in Thailand starts: minister

www.chinaview.cn 2009-11-19 14:42:42
BANGKOK, Nov. 19 (Xinhua)


The second round of the A/H1N1 influenza outbreak in Thailand has started, Public Health Minister Witthaya Kaewparadai said Thursday.

In the countryside the A/H1N1 virus is spreading in schools as the winter is affecting Thailand, the minister said. Also, the people's gathering at festivals during the winter time has contributed to the second outbreak of the new flu, Witthaya said.

Hence, public health agencies nationwide have been instructed to strictly implement preventive measures for four months from November to February to curb the outbreak, he said.

These preventive steps include wearing a face mask, often washing hands, avoiding crowded places, and suspending working or class after developing flu-liked symptoms.

Students, working people, elders, and those with chronic diseases will be closely monitored, the minister said.

On Wednesday the Bureau of Epidemiology reported one more death case due to the A/H1N1 contraction, bringing the country's death toll from the new virus to 185.

Thailand had its first two confirmed patients on May 12.
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Second wave of A/H1N1 outbreak in Thailand starts: minister_English_Xinhua
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Japan. Smoke emerges from nuclear reactor, but no radiation leak reported

Smoke briefly emerged from a quake-stalled nuclear power reactor in Niigata Prefecture on Thursday morning, but no one was injured and there was no radiation leak, local government officials said. The incident took place in a turbine room at the No. 3 reactor of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant around 10 a.m., according to the officials of the Niigata prefectural government.

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UK. Swine flu: intensive care beds for children 'could run out'

Intensive care beds for children could run out in Britain this winter due to swine flu researcher have warned.

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Canada. Flu does not take a holiday, top health official warns

Even though some areas of the province have reported that H1N1 activity has peaked, public health officials say it's still important for all Ontarians over six months of age to get immunized.

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Rapid-Test Sensitivity for Novel Swine-Origin Influenza A (H1N1) Virus in Humans (N Engl J Med., edited)

Rapid-Test Sensitivity for Novel Swine-Origin Influenza A (H1N1) Virus in Humans


To the Editor:

Faix et al. (Aug. 13 issue)1 highlight the moderate sensitivity of rapid antigen tests as compared with reverse-transcriptase–polymerase-chain-reaction (RT-PCR) assays in detecting the 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus in infected patients.

We found that the antigen tests had poor sensitivity to the virus when used in a subgroup of 21 patients in the Australian intensive care cohort with severe 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus infection and acute lung injury that required mechanical ventilation.2

In these patients, rapid antigen tests (QuickVue A+B, Quidel) were performed on swabs from the nose and throat, and influenza type-specific immunofluorescent antigen assays (Chemicon, Millipore) were performed on bronchoscopic specimens.

In all 21 patients, RT-PCR testing (AusDiagnostics), performed on specimens from both the upper and lower respiratory tracts, had been used to confirm infection with the virus.

Specimens from the lower respiratory tract were positive for the virus in all patients when tested with RT-PCR; immunofluorescent antigen assays were positive in only 5 of 20 patients (25%). Specimens from the upper respiratory tract tested with RT-PCR were positive in 17 of 21 patients (81%), but rapid antigen tests were positive in only 5 of 20 (25%).

These data highlight the need to carefully interpret diagnostic testing for 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus infection.

The type of assay used and the origins of the sample tested — that is, whether it is from the upper or the lower respiratory tract — may affect the accuracy of the diagnostic testing.

Christopher C. Blyth, M.B., B.S.Jonathan R. Iredell, M.B., B.S., Ph.D.Dominic E. Dwyer, M.B., B.S., M.D.
Westmead Hospital
Westmead, NSW, Australia
ccblyth@gmail.com

Financial and other disclosures provided by the authors are available with the full text of this letter at NEJM.org.

This letter (10.1056/NEJMc0909049) was published on November 18, 2009, at NEJM.org.


References

1. Faix DJ, Sherman SS, Waterman SH. Rapid-test sensitivity for novel swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus in humans. N Engl J Med 2009;361:728-729.
2. The ANZIC Influenza Investigators. Critical care services and 2009 H1N1 influenza in Australia and New Zealand. N Engl J Med 2009;361:1925-1934.
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NEJM -- Rapid-Test Sensitivity for Novel Swine-Origin Influenza A (H1N1) Virus in Humans
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Antiviral Treatment for Patients Hospitalized with 2009 Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) (N Engl J Med, edited)

Antiviral Treatment for Patients Hospitalized with 2009 Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1)

Posted by NEJM Editors • November 18th, 2009


With the 2009 H1N1 pandemic well under way, many clinicians are providing care to patients with influenza. Previously, although antiviral treatment was recommended,1,2 clinicians may not always have prescribed it to patients hospitalized with seasonal influenza, perhaps because of a perception that antiviral treatment had limited benefit. Controlled trials conducted among outpatients with uncomplicated seasonal influenza reported a reduction of approximately 1 day in the duration of illness and reduced severity when antiviral treatment was initiated within 48 hours of illness onset, as compared with placebo. However, evidence from observational studies supports the benefit of neuraminidase inhibitors (oseltamivir or zanamivir) in reducing complications, including deaths, among hospitalized patients with 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1).

The 2009 H1N1 virus is susceptible to neuraminidase inhibitors (oseltamivir, zanamivir, peramivir) but resistant to the adamantanes (amantadine, rimantadine). Therefore, neuraminidase inhibitors are recommended for antiviral treatment of 2009 H1N1.3,4 Emergence of oseltamivir-resistant 2009 H1N1 virus during or following treatment has been rarely identified.5,6 Patients with infection caused by oseltamivir-resistant virus with the H275Y mutation in the neuraminidase should be treated with zanamivir.5,6

No randomized trials of neuraminidase-inhibitor treatment of hospitalized influenza patients have been conducted. However, three observational studies suggest that oseltamivir treatment of hospitalized patients with seasonal influenza may reduce mortality. In one prospective Canadian study among hospitalized patients with seasonal influenza, (N=327; mean age, 77 years), in which 71% began oseltamivir treatment >48 hours after illness onset, oseltamivir treatment was significantly associated with a reduced risk of death (OR, 0.21; P=0.03) within 15 days after hospitalization as compared with untreated patients.7 In a subanalysis, in a Hong Kong study of hospitalized seasonal influenza patients (N=356; mean age, 70.2 years), oseltamivir treatment initiated within <96 hours after illness onset was independently associated with decreased mortality as compared with untreated patients (OR, 0.26; P=0.001).8 A retrospective chart review of hospitalized seasonal influenza patients in Thailand (N=445; mean age, 22 years), including 35% with radiographically confirmed pneumonia, reported that any oseltamivir treatment was significantly associated with survival (OR, 0.11; 95% CI, 0.04 – 0.30) as compared with untreated patients.9

Observational data from the United States and Mexico suggest that neuraminidase inhibitor treatment (primarily oseltamivir) of hospitalized patients with 2009 H1N1 may reduce disease severity and mortality. Starting treatment with a neuraminidase inhibitor within 2 days after symptom onset was significantly associated with a lower risk of ICU admission or death in hospitalized 2009 H1N1 patients (N=272; median age, 21 years), as compared with later treatment (P <0.05).10 In ICU patients with 2009 H1N1 (N=58; median age, 44 years), survivors were more likely to have received neuraminidase inhibitor treatment than nonsurvivors (OR, 8.5; P=0.04).11

Although most hospitalized 2009 H1N1 patients have been treated with oral oseltamivir, including critically ill persons, parenteral neuraminidase inhibitors (peramivir,12,13 zanamivir14) might be beneficial for some patients.13 Some critically ill 2009 H1N1 patients have been treated for twice the standard 5 days, and some have received higher oseltamivir dosing.1 There are no head-to-head clinical trials of oral or intravenous oseltamivir, inhaled or intravenous zanamivir, intravenous peramivir, or combination treatment with other antivirals among hospitalized 2009 H1N1 patients to inform clinicians, but clinical trials may be available for enrollment.15 There is an urgent need for additional clinical, virologic, time-to-treat, and pharmacokinetic studies to assess neuraminidase inhibitor effectiveness, to inform dosing and duration, and to inform optimal clinical management for hospitalized 2009 H1N1 patients.

Taken together, although data are limited, findings of observational studies all point in the same direction, suggesting benefit of early neuraminidase inhibitor treatment for hospitalized influenza patients as well as for patients presenting >48 hours after illness onset. In the setting of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus activity in a community, empiric neuraminidase inhibitor treatment should be started as soon as possible for any hospitalized patient who presents with influenza that is suspected (e.g., acute respiratory illness, acute exacerbation of chronic conditions, or other complications) or confirmed, in addition to initiating antibiotic treatment as indicated for suspected bacterial coinfection.

Tim Uyeki, M.D., M.P.H.
Influenza Division
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Atlanta, Georgia

No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.

This article (10.1056/NEJMopv0910738) was published on November 18, 2009, at NEJM.org.


References

1. Harper SA, Bradley JS, Englund JA, et al. Seasonal influenza in adults and children — diagnosis, treatment, chemoprophylaxis, and institutional outbreak management: clinical practice guidelines of the Infectious Diseases Society of America. Clin Infect Dis 2009;48:1003-1032.
2. Prevention and control of influenza: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2008. MMWR Recomm Rep 2008;57:1-60.
3. Updated interim recommendations for the use of antiviral medications in the treatment and prevention of influenza for the 2009-2010 season. Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009. (Accessed November 16, 2009, at LINK.)
4. WHO guidelines for pharmacological management of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza and other influenza viruses. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2009. (Accessed November 16, 2009, at LINK.)
5. Oseltamivir-resistant pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus, October 2009. Wkly Epidemiol Rec 2009;84:453-459.
6. Oseltamivir-resistant novel influenza A (H1N1) virus infection in two immunosuppressed patients — Seattle, Washington, 2009. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2009;58:893-896.
7. McGeer A, Green KA, Plevneshi A, et al. Antiviral therapy and outcomes of influenza requiring hospitalization in Ontario, Canada. Clin Infect Dis 2007;45:1568-1575.
8. Lee N, Cockram CS, Chan PK, Hui DS, Choi KW, Sung JJ. Antiviral treatment for patients hospitalized with severe influenza infection may affect clinical outcomes. Clin Infect Dis 2008;46:1323-1324.
9. Hanshaoworakul W, Simmerman JM, Narueponjirakul U, et al. Severe human influenza infections in Thailand: oseltamivir treatment and risk factors for fatal outcome. PLoS One 2009;4(6):e6051.
10. Jain S, Kamimoto L, Bramley AM, et al. Hospitalized patients with 2009 H1N1 influenza in the United States, April-June 2009. N Engl J Med 2009;361:1935-1944.
11. Domínguez-Cherit G, Lapinsky SE, Macias AE, et al. Critically ill patients with 2009 influenza A(H1N1) in Mexico. JAMA 2009;302:1880-1887.
12. Birnkrant D, Cox E. The emergency use authorization of peramivir for treatment of 2009 H1N1 influenza. N Engl J Med 2009:10.1056/NEJMp0910479.
13. Antiviral treatment options, including intravenous peramivir, for treatment of influenza in hospitalized patients for the 2009-2010 season. Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009. (Accessed November 16, 2009, at LINK.)
14. Kidd IM, Down J, Nastouli E, et al. H1N1 pneumonitis treated with intravenous zanamivir. Lancet 2009;374:1036-1036.
15. ClinicalTrials.gov home page. (Accessed November 16, 2009, at LINK.)
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USA. Lawmakers fault H1N1 vaccination strategy (CIDRAP, edited)

Lawmakers fault H1N1 vaccination strategy

Robert Roos * News Editor
Nov 18, 2009 (CIDRAP News)


Leaders of the US Senate Homeland Security Committee sharply critiqued the federal government's H1N1 vaccination strategy yesterday, saying health officials should have recommended targeting only the highest-risk groups as soon as the vaccine delays came to light.

But health officials responded that state and local public health agencies needed flexibility to allocate vaccine supplies as they saw fit. And state and local immunization experts contacted by CIDRAP News today agreed, saying flexibility is necessary given the complexity of matching supplies of different vaccine formulations to the targeted groups.

They also said the root of the public unhappiness over the vaccine shortage lies in overoptimistic expectations created early on by senior federal officials.

At the Senate committee hearing yesterday, Sen. Joe Lieberman, I-Conn., the chairman, and Sen. Susan Collins, R-Me., ranking Republican, argued that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) should have called for an exclusive targeting of the most vulnerable groups as soon as it became clear that vaccine deliveries would not come in predicted amounts on the expected schedule.

They referred to the narrower of two sets of target groups identified by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices in July. The ACIP, which advises the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), recommended H1N1 vaccination for five groups totaling an estimated 159 million people.

But the panel said that if suppliers were short, the vaccine should be reserved for a smaller slice of the population, estimated at about 42 million: pregnant women, healthcare and emergency medical service workers, household contacts of infants younger than 6 months, children ages 6 months through 4 years, and older children at risk for flu complications.

As of yesterday, about 48.5 million doses of vaccine had been made available, according to the CDC. In the summer, HHS officials predicted that 120 million doses would be available in October. Poor growth of the vaccine seed strain has been cited as the primary cause of the slow production.

Collins told HHS and CDC officials at the hearing that after the vaccine production problems emerged, "I just don't understand why the federal government did not then instruct state and local officials to concentrate on this priority group. I believe that the American people will put the highest priority people first gladly, but if they're not getting a revised distribution plan from the federal government, you're creating chaos."

Similarly, Lieberman commented, "My theory is that . . . HHS and CDC should've done a large national announcement of the reduced list of people who should go out and get vaccine."

Dr. Anne Schuchat, director of the CDC's National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, said the ACIP discussed this option when it met in October. "We asked the question of them, should we go systematically nationwide for that smaller group? There was an active discussion. What we heard pretty consistently was, 'Leave the flexibility to the states and locals; let them decide whether to prioritize.'"

Lieberman pressed the point repeatedly, saying, "I think this is a case where it would've been better to have a national answer and in this case not go for federalism, not let the states and localities make their own decision, because everybody was focused on national warnings about the disease and the need to get vaccinated."

Schuchat responded, "I think we did feel that the state and local authorities were in a better position to know how to best reach the populations tin their midst." She said some states are mainly using regular medical providers, others are focusing more on public vaccination clinics, and others are using a combination of the two.

She observed tat the situation was complicated by the fact that when vaccine first started flowing in early October, nearly all the doses were the nasal spray formulation, which is approved only for healthy people ages 2 through 49 and not for pregnant women.

Kristen Ehresmann, RN, MPH, immunization director at the Minnesota Department of Health in St. Paul and an ACIP member, said today that a number of states have been targeting the smaller set of priority groups on their own, even without a special national recommendation to that effect.

"That's what we're doing, and I know that's what Wisconsin did, though they've opened it up more recently," she told CIDRAP News.

When the ACIP discussed the target groups, she noted, members talked about the danger of narrowing the target groups too much. "You're always in this really difficult balancing act, whether it's seasonal or H1N1. If you get in a position where you don't have enough vaccine and you start limiting groups, then often what happens is when the supply loosens up, you don't have the response from the people that are waiting. They don't always avail themselves of the vaccine."

Referring to the lawmakers' critique, Ehresmann added, "It's probably a case where people that aren't involved on a daily or yearly basis . . . don't recognize all the challenges that you face when trying to make these decisions. It's kind of a lose-lose when you're looking at it."

Jeffrey Duchin, MD, chief of the communicable disease epidemiology and immunization section for Seattle and King County Public Health in Washington, agreed that it would not have been helpful for federal officials to narrow the vaccine target groups beyond the existing guidance.

"I think that the guidance as it existed was sufficient and adequate to allow those people at highest risk to get vaccinated," he told CIDRAP News. "I don't think it would've been useful to further limit the target groups. One reason is that the ability to deliver vaccine to high-risk patients in a population is a function of the availability of a number of different formulations and local demand among target groups and the ability to access those groups in a timely way."

Duchin, who is an ex officio ACIP member, agreed that many states have already been targeting the smaller set of high-risk groups.

"We basically recommend that our local providers do what makes sense in their practice setting, based on patient risk and the formulations on hand," he said. "It doesn't make sense to prioritize infants when you don't have the infant formulation available. There are a lot of complications based on the multiple formulation, the age indications, and underlying conditions that make it very difficult to start cutting the risk groups too finely."

Ehresmann and Duchin noted that it's hard to say what other approach might have improved the H1N1 vaccine situation. Some have mentioned the idea of targeting the highest-risk groups one at a time, but they cited problems with that.

"I don't know whether that would work, because of the [different] formulations," said Ehresmann. "It's not like you get X amount of vaccine that can be given to anyone. The nasal spray can't be given to pregnant women. There are limits to that."

Duchin agreed, noting that a shortage of thimerosal-free vaccine could hinder reaching some groups. He added that it's not known at this point who is actually at highest risk from the virus.

He and Ehresmann both cited overpromising of vaccine supplies as the key reason for public discontent over the situation."I think the key issue is managing expectations," said Duchin. "Although it's quite remarkable that we have any vaccine now, that is not appreciated and the focus is on the fact that we don't have as much vaccine as we'd like at this time."

"In my mind, the biggest problem was the expectation set at the federal level, above CDC," said Ehresmann. "There was so much talk about all this vaccine that was going to be available; there was no mention of all vagaries of vaccine manufacturing. . . . If they had framed this that we'd be very lucky to get a vaccine, then when it came even in small quantities, it would've been a victory and a delight, instead of a shortage."

At yesterday's hearing, Schuchat acknowledged that too much was promised: "One thing I think we say was a mistake was [that] some of our communications led to the expectation that availability would be higher than it has been."

However, she said recent CDC surveys indicate that the public won't give up on getting the vaccine. "I have tremendous faith in the American public. I hate that they've had to wait, but our surveys tell us that of those who couldn't get it, nine out of ten will try again."

She also commented that CDC surveys suggest "that we're reaching the [vaccine] priority populations in much higher levels than others.

"In other testimony at the hearing, Dr. Nicole Lurie, HHS assistant secretary for preparedness and response, said the shortfall in vaccine deliveries last week had to do with Hurricane Ida and problems with temperature sensors, not production problems. Officials had expected about 8 million doses, but only about 3.6 million were delivered.

Lurie said that, because of "the remnants of Hurricane Ida," some manufacturers' insurers didn't want them to ship vaccine, causing a delay. In addition, the temperature sensors for some vaccine lots signaled unsafe temperatures, forcing extra testing, she said.

See also:
Senate Homeland Security Committee information on Nov 17 hearing, including links to statements LINK
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CIDRAP >> Lawmakers fault H1N1 vaccination strategy
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11/18/2009

First flu deaths in Switzerland and Lithuania

Switzerland has confirmed its first death from swine flu. A five-year-old child died in a Basel hospital after being infected with the A(H1N1) virus which causes the flu (known as Mexican flu in the Netherlands).

Lithuania has also suffered its first fatality from the virus, a 14-year-old boy in Kaunas. Cases of the flu have been confirmed throughout Europe and only a few European countries have so far escaped flu-related deaths. They include Denmark, Estonia and Romania.

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H1N1 news: Nov. 18, 2009

The federal goverment is working to reassure physicians who are skeptical of the H1N1 vaccine. (11/18, NPR)

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Ukraine reports 12 flu deaths in 24 hours - 'RIA Novosti' newswire

Ukraine reports 12 flu deaths in 24 hours

KIEV, November 18 (RIA Novosti)


The death toll from the flu epidemic in Ukraine has reached 328, with 12 deaths registered over the past 24 hours, the health ministry said on Wednesday.

The number of officially confirmed H1N1 strain swine flu deaths in Ukraine has reached 15, with 166 people infected.

Last week, Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) chief, Raisa Bohatyryova, said there were "constitutional prerequisites" for a state of emergency amid the flu epidemic, which has left a total of 1,457,564 people infected as of November 18.

A state of emergency, if it is declared, could delay the presidential polls scheduled on January 17, 2010 until May.

Ukraine's Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko said she saw no need for such measures.

The Ukrainian government imposed quarantines in nine western regions in late October in an attempt to curb the spread of flu. All educational establishments in Kiev were closed, and people were obliged to wear medical masks in all catering establishments, shops and social services facilities across the former Soviet republic.

The Ukrainian parliament has approved the allocation of 1 billion hryvnias ($125 million) on measures to fight swine and seasonal flu.

However, President Viktor Yushchenko has not signed the allocation plan, citing it would accelerate inflation and cause a decline in Ukraine's standards of living.

Yulia Tymoshenko said the president's refusal to allocate money would impede governmental efforts to fight the epidemic.

Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, as well as Party of Regions leader and former premier Viktor Yanukovych, who lost the previous vote to Yushchenko following the 2004 "orange revolution" are among the 16 candidates to run in the Ukrainian presidential election.
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Ukraine reports 12 flu deaths in 24 hours | Top Russian news and analysis online | 'RIA Novosti' newswire
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Declaration from Social Movements/NGOs/CSOs Parallel Forum to the World Food Summit on Food Security

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Hong Kong: A critical case of human swine influenza at North District Hospital (11/18/09)

The following is issued on behalf of the Hospital Authority:

North District Hospital (NDH) spokesperson made the following announcement regarding a new case of critically ill human swine influenza (HSI) patient today (November 18):

A 76-year-old male patient with history of chronic obstructive airway disease and hypertension developed flu symptoms on October 30 and attended the Accident and Emergency Department of NDH on the same day.

He was admitted to the isolation ward for further treatment.

Positive result of HSI was confirmed on October 31 and he was prescribed with Tamiflu and antibiotics.

This morning (November 18) he became critically ill and has been put on ventilation support.

The hospital will continue to closely monitor his condition and has reported the case to the Hospital Authority Head Office and the Centre for Health Protection.
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Hong Kong: Caritas Medical Centre update on cluster of parainfluenza cases (11/18/09)

The following is issued on behalf of the Hospital Authority:

Following the earlier announcement about seven residents in the Developmental Disabilities Unit (DDU) of Caritas Medical Centre (CMC) confirmed with parainfluenza infection, the hospital announced the following updates today (November 18):

There is one more 14-year-old boy from the concerned unit presenting with fever symptom and the test result is positive to parainfluenza.

He is being treated under isolation and in stable condition.

Infection control measures have been stepped up in DDU.

New admissions are suspended while visiting arrangements remain unchanged.

All other child residents are under close surveillance.

The hospital has reported the case to the Hospital Authority Head Office and the Centre for Health Protection.
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WHO - Dengue fever in Cape Verde - update 1

Dengue fever in Cape Verde - update 1

18 November 2009


As of 16 November 2009, the Ministry of Health has reported 16 744 suspected cases of dengue in five islands: Brava, Fogo, Maio, Sal and Santiago.

The World Health Organization (WHO) is working closely with the government of Cape Verde to support technical response to the outbreak, as well as to support coordination with other United Nations agencies, bilateral partners and non-governmental organizations for the operational response.

WHO has deployed more than 20 experts - many through the Global Alert and Response Network (GOARN) mechanism - to support Cape Verde on epidemiological and entomological surveillance and laboratory investigation, vector-control, clinical case management, social mobilization, logistics and information and technology.

The experts come from Senegal, Thailand, Brazil, Italy, Martinique, Guadeloupe, French-Guyana and from within WHO.

WHO has also deployed personal protection equipment (PPE), larvicide, fog machines and laboratory diagnostics supplies to support the government operations for source reduction, vector control and sustaining the onsite laboratory diagnosis of dengue. Dengue technical guidelines in Portuguese have also been provided by WHO.

The Ministry of Health of Cape Verde, the Operational Nucleus of Information Society (NOSi) and WHO have launched a nationwide internet and text messaging (SMS) reporting and alert system for dengue, providing real time information to public health experts and alerting individuals at risk when and how to seek care.

This is the first dengue outbreak in the country and people did not have immunity against the disease. During epidemics of dengue, infection rates among those who have not been previously exposed to the virus are often between 40% and 50%, but could reach 80% to 90% in worse case scenario.

Dengue is present in sub-Saharan Africa but often unrecognized. Although many arboviruses – such as dengue, chikungunya, Crimean–Congo haemorrhagic fever, Rift Valley fever, yellow fever and West Nile virus – affect human health in west Africa, surveillance programmes are not consistently available except for yellow fever.

In the recent years, dengue has been documented in travellers returning from several countries in West Africa, and particularly dengue type-3 virus. Dengue type-3 virus has first isolated in travellers returning to Japan and France from Abidjan Cote d’Ivoire in 2008 and from Senegal to Italy in October 2009.


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WHO | Dengue fever in Cape Verde - update 1
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Canada. Few adverse reactions to H1N1 vaccine

Fewer Canadians have suffered severe side effects from the H1N1 flu vaccine than normally react to the seasonal flu shot so far, says the chief public health officer.

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Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Update 18 November 2009, 09:00 hours CEST (ECDC, edited)

[Source Full PDF Document: LINK. EDITED.]

ECDC DAILY UPDATE

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Update 18 November 2009, 09:00 hours CEST

Main developments in past 24 hours

  • Total of 543 fatal cases in Europe and EFTA countries and 6 624 in the rest of the world have been reported up to date;
  • WHO report describes the first cases of 2009 A(H1N1) influenza viruses resistant to oseltamivir worldwide. Cases are few and hardly any are transmitting from human to human
  • Pandemic A(H1N1) Influenza virus in Ukraine no different than elsewhere in Europe
  • New Vaccines receive authorization First short term vaccine safety data provide no new safety concerns

This report is based on official information provided by national public health websites or through other official communication channels. An update on the number of confirmed fatal cases is presented in Table 2 - as of 17 November 2009 - 16:00 hours CEST, for the world, and 18 November 2009 - 09:00 hours CEST, for Europe.

Epidemiologic update

All 27 EU and 4 EFTA countries are reporting cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza. A total of 543 deaths have been reported since April 2009 (Table 2). The number of weekly deaths has shown an increase over the last 4 weeks. Latest new and confirmed fatal pandemic (H1N1) cases outside the EU/EFTA area are presented in Table 2 as well. Available updates on hospital admissions, per Member State, can be found in Table 1.

Public Health Development

Oseltamivir-resistant pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus, October 2009

An article recently published by the WHO summarises the characteristics of 39 cases of 2009 A(H1N1) pandemic influenza viruses resistant to the neuraminidase inhibitor oseltamivir reported so far worldwide.

Almost all cases (29 out of 32 for whom this information was available) developed oseltamivir resistance after receiving oseltamivir treatment or prophylaxis.

A substantial number (n=7) of cases had immunosuppression, a known risk factor for developing oseltamivir resistance.

The authors of the WHO article recommends antiviral resistance testing to be considered for patients with persistent and complicated illness after 5 or more days of antiviral treatment and for patients presenting with an influenza-like illness despite having received antiviral prophylaxis.

In the context of the 2009 A(H1N1) influenza pandemic resistance to oseltamivir remains a very rare event.

No evidence of zanamivir resistance has been detected.

Resistance to the adamantenes (amantidine and rimantadine) is common for the pandemic virus.

WHO points out that the risk of emerging antiviral resistance is no reason for denying treatment with the neuraminidase inhibitors (oseltamivir and zanamivir) to those to for whom they are recommended while at the same time their use in prophylaxis should be very sparing."

More details can later today be found at: LINK

Other updates

Pandemic A(H1N1) Influenza virus in Ukraine no different than elsewhere in Europe

WHO yesterday released the first information on the genetic characterization of Influenza A virus strains collected from Ukraine.

The preliminary analysis by two different specialist laboratories shows that the virus is very similar to the other strains causing the current Influenza A(H1N1) pandemic elsewhere in Europe.

More details can be found at: LINK

New Vaccines receive marketing authorization

Two new pandemic vaccines, Panenza®, produced by Sanofi Pasteur, and Celtura®, produced by Novartis, have recently received marketing authorization in France and Germany, respectively. Sanofi Pasteur has filed a decentralized marketing authorization application for Panenza® in six European Union countries; Belgium, France (acting as “Reference Member State”), Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain. Authorizations in the other five countries will follow the authorization in France. Novartis continues to pursue registration in other countries including Japan and Switzerland.

Panenza® is a non-adjuvanted, egg-derived, inactivated monovalent influenza A(H1N1) 2009 vaccine containing 15 μg of hemagglutinin of influenza A/California/07/2009 (H1N1)v-like virus per dose. Clinical trials have been performed in France and Finland in adults and children aged 6 months of age and older. First immunogenicity and safety data have been presented to the French drug agency Afssaps (Agence française de sécurité sanitaire des produits de santé) before authorization.

Celtura® is an MF59® adjuvanted, cell-derived, inactivated monovalent influenza A(H1N1) 2009 vaccine containing 3.75 μg of hemagglutinin of influenza A/California/07/2009 (H1N1)v-like virus per dose. Clinical studies in more than 1,850 subjects evaluating safety and immunogenicity have been presented to the German drug agency Paul Ehrlich Institut before authorization. Previously, in the European Union, the European Commission has granted authorisation for three specific A(H1N1) vaccines following a positive scientific opinion issued by the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) at the European Medicines Agency (EMEA).

The products centrally authorised are Focetria® (Novartis), Pandemrix® (GlaxoSmithKline) and Celvapan® (Baxter). The vaccines are authorised for use in all Member States of the EU and the EEA (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway).

For further information including indications and doses in different age groups, see LINK

In addition, the National Regulatory Agency in Hungary previously has provided a national licence to a pandemic vaccine, Fluval P, produced by the Hungarian manufacturer Omninvest. For further information, see LINK

First short term vaccine safety data provide no new safety concerns

The first short-term safety data after initiation of the national vaccination campaigns are publicly available either in English or the local language on the list of web-pages below.

There are no safety concerns of clinical significance reported so far in addition to those described in the initial trials with either of the vaccines used in these countries; Celvapan and Pandemrix.

With both vaccines allergic reactions requiring medical attention have been reported and its important that healthcare professionals remember that, as with all injectable vaccines, appropriate medical treatment and supervision should always be readily available in case of a serious allergic reaction and possibly a rare anaphylactic event following the administration of the vaccine

  • Lægemiddelstyrelsen, Denmark (also in English) LINK
  • Paul Ehrlich Institute, Germany (also in English) LINK
  • IMB, Ireland LINK
  • Statens Legemiddelverk, Norway LINK
  • Läkemedelsverket, Sweden (also in English) LINK
  • MHRA, United Kingdom LINK

These web-pages will be updated on a weekly basis

Table 1: Reported number of confirmed Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza cases admitted to hospitals and intensive care, by country, as of 18 November 2009, 09:00 hours (CEST) in EU and EFTA countries

[Country - (date of report) - Number of cases currently hospitalised - Cumulative number of cases admitted in hospitals - Number of cases currently in intensive care - Cumulative number of cases admitted to intensive care]

  1. Austria (11.11.) – … – … – … – …
  2. Belgium (12.11.) – … – … – … – …
  3. Bulgaria (08.11) – … – … – … – …
  4. Cyprus(01.11) – … – … – … – 4
  5. Czech Republic (12.11.) – … – … – … – …
  6. Denmark (11.11.) – … – … – … – …
  7. Estonia (23.10.) – … - 11 – … – …
  8. Finland (17.11.) – … – … – … – …
  9. France (12.11.) – … – … – 71 – 188
  10. Germany (16.11.) – … – … – … – …
  11. Greece (11.11.) – … – … – … – …
  12. Hungary (08.11.) – … - 78 – … – …
  13. Iceland (11.11.) – 31 – 170 – 7 – 19
  14. Ireland (12.11.) – 191 – 785 – 22 – 65
  15. Italy (17.11) – … - 405 – … – 205
  16. Latvia (17.11.) – … - 1 – … – …
  17. Liechtenstein (11.11.) – … – … – … – …
  18. Lithuania (04.11.) – … – … – … – …
  19. Luxembourg (16.11.) – … – … – 0 – 0
  20. Malta (04.09.) – … - 46 – … – 1
  21. Netherlands (13.11.) – 291 – 909 – 19 – 91
  22. Norway (11.11.) – 86 – 623 – 13 – 75
  23. Poland (12.11.) – … – … – … – …
  24. Portugal (11.11.) - 121 – … - 17 – …
  25. Romania (16.11) – … – … – … – …
  26. Slovakia (12.08.) – 2 – 33 – 0 – 0
  27. Slovenia (10.08.) – … – … – … – …
  28. Spain (12.11.) – … – … – … – …
  29. Sweden (08.11.) – 74 - 336 – … – …
  30. Switzerland (11.11.) – 15 - 48 – … – 11
  31. United Kingdom (a) (12.11.) - 785 – … - 173 – …

Note: Data for the EU and EFTA countries correspond to the Ministry of Health or surveillance centre websites.

(…) denotes no information readily available in official sources.

(a) Data includes all probable cases for England only. Does not include Scotland (841 cumulative hospitalisations), Wales (327) and Northern Ireland (527).

Table 2. Reported number of new and cumulative confirmed fatal Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza cases in EU and EFTA countries, as 18 November 2009, 09:00 hours CEST, and in the rest of the world by country, as of 17 November 2009, 16:00 hours CEST.

[Country - Number of new fatal cases since previous national update - Cumulative number of fatal cases]

  • EU AND EFTA COUNTRIES
    • Austria … – 1
    • Belgium … – 11
    • Bulgaria … – 5
    • Czech Republic … – 1
    • Finland 2 – 9
    • France 11 – 70 (a)
    • Germany 5 – 21
    • Greece … – 5
    • Hungary … – 5
    • Iceland … – 1
    • Ireland … – 15
    • Italy 5 – 58
    • Latvia … – 1
    • Luxembourg … – 2
    • Malta … – 3
    • Netherlands … – 22
    • Norway 2 – 21
    • Poland 2 – 4
    • Portugal … – 7
    • Slovakia … – 1
    • Spain … – 88
    • Sweden … – 5
    • United Kingdom 1 – 187
      • Total 28 – 543
  • OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES & CENTRAL ASIA
    • Azerbaijan … – 2
    • Belarus … – 7
    • Croatia 1 – 5
    • Kosovo … – 1
    • Moldova … – 7
    • Russia … – 19
    • Serbia 2 – 11
    • Ukraine 1 – 15
      • Total 4 - 67
  • MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE-EAST
    • Bahrain … – 7
    • Egypt … – 7
    • Iran … – 58
    • Iraq … – 9
    • Israel 2 – 48
    • Jordan … – 11
    • Kuwait … – 26
    • Lebanon … – 3
    • Morocco 1 – 1
    • Occupied Palestinian Territory … – 5
    • Oman … – 27
    • Qatar … – 5
    • Saudi Arabia … – 66
    • Syria 9 – 22
    • Tunisia … – 2
    • Turkey 13 – 73
    • United Arab Emirates … – 6
    • Yemen 1 – 18
      • Total 26 – 394
  • AFRICA
    • Ghana … – 1
    • Madagascar … – 1
    • Mauritius … – 8
    • Mozambique … – 2
    • Namibia … – 1
    • Sao Tome & Principe … – 2
    • South Africa … – 91
    • Sudan … – 1
    • Tanzania … – 1
      • Total … – 108
  • NORTH AMERICA
    • Canada … – 161
    • Mexico … – 482
    • USA … – 1123
      • Total … – 1766
  • CENTRAL AMERICA & CARIBBEAN
    • Bahamas … – 4
    • Barbados … – 3
    • Cayman Islands … - 1
    • Costa Rica … – 38
    • Cuba … – 7
    • Dominican Republic … – 22
    • El Salvador … – 25
    • Guatemala … – 18
    • Honduras … – 16
    • Jamaica … – 5
    • Nicaragua … – 11
    • Panama … – 11
    • Saint Kitts and Nevis … – 1
    • Saint Lucia … – 1
    • Suriname … – 2
    • Trinidad-Tobago … – 5
      • Total … – 170
  • SOUTH AMERICA
    • Argentina … – 600
    • Bolivia … – 57
    • Brazil … – 1368
    • Chile … – 140
    • Colombia … – 141
    • Ecuador … – 82
    • Paraguay … – 52
    • Peru … – 183
    • Uruguay … – 33
    • Venezuela … – 104
      • Total … – 2760
  • NORTH-EAST & SOUTH ASIA
    • Afghanistan 3 – 14
    • Bangladesh … – 6
    • China (Mainland) 10 – 53
    • Hong Kong SAR China … – 40
    • India 3 – 526
    • Japan … – 28
    • Macao SAR China … – 2
    • Mongolia … – 15
    • Pakistan 1 – 1
    • South Korea … – 64
    • Sri Lanka … – 1
    • Taiwan … – 29
      • Total 17 - 779
  • SOUTH-EAST ASIA
    • Brunei Darussalam … – 1
    • Cambodia … – 4
    • Indonesia … – 10
    • Laos Peoples Democratic Republic … – 1
    • Malaysia … – 77
    • Philippines … – 30
    • Singapore … – 18
    • Thailand … – 184
    • Vietnam … – 41
      • Total … – 366
  • AUSTRALIA & PACIFIC
    • Australia … – 189
    • Cook Islands … – 1
    • Marshall Islands … – 1
    • New Zealand … – 19
    • Samoa … – 2
    • Solomon Islands … – 1
    • Tonga … – 1
      • Total … – 214
  • TOTAL 75 – 7167

(a) Deaths reported from France include 1 in Guyana, 9 in New Caledonia, 7 in the French Polynesia, 6 in the Reunion, 1 in Martinique, 2 in Mayotte, 1 in Guadeloupe and 43 in mainland France.

(…)

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