BOA1

Featured post

#Avian #Influenza #H7N9 in #China: Preventing the Next #SARS (@WHO, Apr. 2 ‘17)

  Title : #Avian #Influenza #H7N9 in #China: Preventing the Next #SARS. Subject : Avian Influenza, H7N9 subtype (Asian Lineage), poultry e...

26 Jun 2017

#Avian #Influenza [#H5N1, #H5N6, #H7N9]–Weekly #Update No. 590 - 23 June 2017 (@WHO WPRO, edited)


Title: #Avian #Influenza [#H5N1, #H5N6, #H7N9]–Weekly #Update No. 590 - 23 June 2017.

Subject: Avian Influenza, H5 & H7N9 subtype, human cases reported in the Western Pacific Region of the WHO.

Source: World Health Organization (WHO), Office of the Western Pacific Region, full PDF file: (LINK).

Code: [     ]

_____

Avian Influenza - Weekly Update No. 590 - 23 June 2017

____


-

Keywords: Avian Influenza; Updates; WHO; Asia Region; H5N1; H5N6; H7N9; Human.

------

25 Jun 2017

#Influenza and other #Respiratory #Viruses #Research #References #Library– June 25 2017 Issue


Title: #Influenza and other #Respiratory #Viruses #Research #References #Library– June 25 2017 Issue.

Subject:  Animal and Human Influenza Viruses, other respiratory pathogens research, weekly references library update.

Source: AMEDEO, homepage: (LINK).

Code: [  R  ]

_____

New References:

___

  1. PAUL SS, Mok CK, Mak TM, Ng OW, et al.
    • A cross-clade H5N1 influenza A virus neutralizing monoclonal antibody binds to a novel epitope within the vestigial esterase domain of hemagglutinin.
      • Antiviral Res. 2017 Jun 17. pii: S0166-3542(17)30042.
  2. LIU M, Lo EC, Wang G, Chow HF, et al.
    • Identification of influenza polymerase inhibitors targeting polymerase PB2 cap-binding domain through virtual screening.
      • Antiviral Res. 2017 Jun 16. pii: S0166-3542(16)30584.
  3. MOATASIM Y, Kandeil A, Mostafa A, Elghaffar SKA, et al.
    • Single gene reassortment of highly pathogenic avian influenza A H5N1 in the low pathogenic H9N2 backbone and its impact on pathogenicity and infectivity of novel reassortant viruses.
      • Arch Virol. 2017 Jun 15. doi: 10.1007/s00705-017-3434.
  4. MORBEY RA, Harcourt S, Pebody R, Zambon M, et al.
    • The burden of seasonal respiratory infections on a national telehealth service in England.
      • Epidemiol Infect. 2017;145:1922-1932.
  5. KESAVARDHANA S, Kuriakose T, Guy CS, Samir P, et al.
    • ZBP1/DAI ubiquitination and sensing of influenza vRNPs activate programmed cell death.
      • J Exp Med. 2017 Jun 20. pii: jem.20170550. doi: 10.1084/jem.20170550.
  6. PASICK J, Diederich S, Berhane Y, Embury-Hyatt C, et al.
    • Imbalance between innate antiviral and pro-inflammatory immune responses may contribute to different outcomes involving low- and highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N3 infections in chickens.
      • J Gen Virol. 2017 Jun 21. doi: 10.1099/jgv.0.000801.
  7. DUCATEZ M, Sonnberg S, Crumpton JC, Rubrum A, et al.
    • Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 clade 2.3.2.1 and clade 2.3.4 viruses do not induce a clade-specific phenotype in mallard ducks.
      • J Gen Virol. 2017 Jun 20. doi: 10.1099/jgv.0.000806.
  8. WONG CK, Smith CA, Sakamoto K, Kaminski N, et al.
    • Aging Impairs Alveolar Macrophage Phagocytosis and Increases Influenza-Induced Mortality in Mice.
      • J Immunol. 2017 Jun 23. pii: ji1700397. doi: 10.4049/jimmunol.1700397.
  9. WANG Y, Li T, Chen Y, Wei H, et al.
    • Involvement of NK Cells in IL-28B-Mediated Immunity against Influenza Virus Infection.
      • J Immunol. 2017 Jun 21. pii: ji1601430. doi: 10.4049/jimmunol.1601430.
  10. PAULES CI, Lakdawala S, McAuliffe JM, Paskel M, et al.
    • An HA stem antibody MEDI8852 prevents and controls disease and limits transmission of pandemic influenza viruses.
      • J Infect Dis. 2017 Jun 17. doi: 10.1093.
  11. CHUNG JR, Flannery B, Zimmerman RK, Nowalk MP, et al.
    • Prior season vaccination and risk of influenza during the 2014-2015 season in the U.S.
      • J Infect Dis. 2017 Jun 13. doi: 10.1093.
  12. PHIPPS KL, Marshall N, Tao H, Danzy S, et al.
    • Seasonal H3N2 and 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza A viruses reassort efficiently but produce attenuated progeny.
      • J Virol. 2017 Jun 21. pii: JVI.00830-17. doi: 10.1128/JVI.00830.
  13. CLARK AM, Nogales A, Martinez-Sobrido L, Topham DJ, et al.
    • Functional evolution of influenza NS1 protein in currently circulating human 2009 pandemic H1N1 viruses.
      • J Virol. 2017 Jun 21. pii: JVI.00721-17. doi: 10.1128/JVI.00721.
  14. NOGALES A, Rodriguez L, DeDiego ML, Topham DJ, et al.
    • Interplay of PA-X and NS1 proteins in replication and pathogenesis of a temperature-sensitive 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza A virus.
      • J Virol. 2017 Jun 21. pii: JVI.00720-17. doi: 10.1128/JVI.00720.
  15. MORRISON BJ, Roman JA, Luke TC, Nagabhushana N, et al.
    • Antibody-dependent NK cell degranulation as a marker for assessing antibody-dependent cytotoxicity against pandemic 2009 influenza A(H1N1) infection in human plasma and influenza-vaccinated transchromosomic bovine intravenous immunoglobulin therapy.
      • J Virol Methods. 2017;248:7-18.
  16. DUNKLE LM, Izikson R, Patriarca P, Goldenthal KL, et al.
    • Efficacy of Recombinant Influenza Vaccine in Adults 50 Years of Age or Older.
      • N Engl J Med. 2017;376:2427-2436.
  17. SIKORA D, Rocheleau L, Brown EG, Pelchat M, et al.
    • Influenza A virus cap-snatches host RNAs based on their abundance early after infection.
      • Virology. 2017;509:167-177.
  18. CHLANDA P.
    • Influenza Hemagglutinin and M2 ion channel priming by trypsin: Killing two birds with one stone.
      • Virology. 2017;509:131-132.
  19. PATEL H, Kukol A.
    • Evolutionary conservation of influenza A PB2 sequences reveals potential target sites for small molecule inhibitors.
      • Virology. 2017;509:112-120.
  20. SMITH GE, Sun X, Bai Y, Liu YV, et al.
    • Neuraminidase-based recombinant virus-like particles protect against lethal avian influenza A(H5N1) virus infection in ferrets.
      • Virology. 2017;509:90-97.
  21. DENG L, Kim JR, Chang TZ, Zhang H, et al.
    • Protein nanoparticle vaccine based on flagellin carrier fused to influenza conserved epitopes confers full protection against influenza A virus challenge.
      • Virology. 2017;509:82-89.

-

Keywords: Research; Abstracts; Influenza References Library.

------

23 Jun 2017

#Yemen: #Cholera #outbreak–Daily #epidemiology #update: 23 June 2017 (@WHO, edited)


Title: #Yemen: #Cholera #outbreak–Daily #epidemiology #update: 23 June 2017.

Subject: Cholera outbreak in Yemen, current epidemiological situation.

Source: World Health Organization, full PDF file: (LINK).

Code: [     ]

_____

YEMEN: cholera outbreak - Daily epidemiology update: 23 June 2017

____


Highlights

  • From 27 April to 22 June 2017, 192,983 suspected cholera cases  and  1,265 deaths (CFR: 0.7%)    have  been reported in 87% (20/23) of Yemen governorates, and 85% (284/333) of the districts.


Geographical distribution of cases

  • The  four  most affected governorates were:
    • Amanat Al Asimah,
    • Al  Hudaydah,   
    • Amran  and   
    • Hajjah   
  • with 49.6% (95,735/192,983) of the cases reported since 27 April 2017.   
  • Amran  and Al Mahwit governorates had the highest attack rates (13.5 and 12.8 ‰ respectively), and Raymah governorate the highest case fatality ratio (1.8%) (see    table).


Number of suspected cholera cases & deaths, AR and CFR by governorate, Yemen, 27 April–22 June 2017

[Governorates – Cases – Deaths - CFR(%) - Attack Rate(‰)]

  1. Amanat Al Asimah – 30,882  - 53 - 0.2 - 9.3
  2. Al-Hudaydah  - 23, 944  - 137 - 0.6 - 7.2
  3. Amran  - 20,703 – 131  - 0.6 - 13.5
  4. Hajjah  - 20,206  - 188 - 0.9  - 9.1
  5. Sana'a – 16,155  - 92 - 0.6 -  12.9
  6. Taizz – 15,084  - 111 - 0.7  - 5.0
  7. Ibb  - 14,778  -  183 -  1.2 -  4.8
  8. Dhamar – 10,234  - 87 -  0.9 -  4.8
  9. Al Mahwit – 9,744  -  77 - 0.8 - 12.8   
  10. Al Dhale'e  - 7,593  - 39  - 0.5 - 10.1   
  11. Al Bayda   - 6,667 – 18 -  0.3  - 8.7
  12. Aden – 5,634  - 40  - 0.7 - 5.9
  13. Abyan – 3,635  - 21 - 0.6 - 5.9
  14. Raymah  - 3,485  - 61  - 1.8 - 5.5
  15. Lahj  - 2,163  - 12 - 0.6  - 2.1
  16. Al Jawf – 1,006 – 9 - 0.9 - 1.6
  17. Ma'areb  - 594 – 4  - 0.7 - 1.7
  18. Sa'ada  - 253 – 1  - 0.4 - 0.3
  19. AL Mahrah – 165 – 1 - 0.6  - 1.0   
  20. Shabwah  - 58 – … – … - 0.1   
    • Total  - 192,983  - 1,265  - 0.7  - 6.5

____

For  further  information: Dr  Xavier de Radiguès C: +967 738 445 522 / Dr Ahmed Zouiten: zouitena@who.int 

Note:  This report  is an update to the weekly epidemiology bulletin.       

-

Keywords: WHO; Updates; Cholera; Yemen.

------

Highly pathogenic #avian #influenza #H7N9, #China [a #poultry #outbreak] (#OIE, Jun 23 ‘17)


Title: Highly pathogenic #avian #influenza #H7N9, #China [a #poultry #outbreak].

Subject: Avian Influenza, H7N9 subtype, poultry epizootics in China.

Source: OIE, full page: (LINK).

Code: [     ]

_____

Highly pathogenic avian influenza H7N9, China (People's Rep. of)

___

Information received on 23/06/2017 from Dr Zhang Zhongqui, Director General , China Animal Disease Control Centre, Veterinary Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture, Beijing, China (People's Rep. of)

  • Summary
    • Report type    Follow-up report No. 6
    • Date of start of the event    19/03/2017
    • Date of confirmation of the event    24/03/2017
    • Report date    23/06/2017
    • Date submitted to OIE    23/06/2017
    • Reason for notification    New strain of a listed disease
    • Manifestation of disease    Clinical disease
    • Causal agent    Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus
    • Serotype    H7N9
    • Nature of diagnosis    Clinical, Laboratory (basic), Laboratory (advanced)
    • This event pertains to    a defined zone within the country
  • Outbreak 1    - Baoqing, Shuangyashan, HEILONGJIANG
    • Date of start of the outbreak    16/06/2017
    • Outbreak status    Continuing (or date resolved not provided)
    • Epidemiological unit    Farm
    • Affected animals: Species    - Susceptible    - Cases    - Deaths    - Killed and disposed of    - Slaughtered
      • Birds    - 36110    - 20150    - 19500    - 16610    - 0
  • Summary of outbreaks   
    • Total outbreaks: 1
      • Total animals affected: Species    - Susceptible    - Cases    - Deaths    - Killed and disposed of – Slaughtered
        • Birds    - 36110    - 20150    - 19500    - 16610    - 0
      • Outbreak statistics: Species    - Apparent morbidity rate    - Apparent mortality rate    - Apparent case fatality rate    - Proportion susceptible animals lost*
        • Birds    - 55.80%    - 54.00%    - 96.77%    - 100.00%
          • *Removed from the susceptible population through death, destruction and/or slaughter
  • Epidemiology
    • Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection   
      • Unknown or inconclusive

(...)

___

-

Keywords: OIE; Updates; Avian Influenza; H7N9 ; Poultry; China; Heilongjiang.

------

Highly pathogenic #avian #influenza #H5N2, #Taiwan [six #poultry #outbreaks] (#OIE, Jun 23 ‘17)


Title: Highly pathogenic #avian #influenza #H5N2, #Taiwan [six #poultry #outbreaks].

Subject: Avian Influenza, H5N2 subtype, poultry epizootics in Taiwan.

Source: OIE, full page: (LINK).

Code: [     ]

_____

Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N2, Chinese Taipei

____

Information received on 23/06/2017 from Dr Tai-Hwa Shih, Chief Veterinary Officer, Deputy Director General, Bureau of Animal and Plant Health Inspection and Quarantine Council of Agriculture Executive Yuan, Ministry of Agriculture, Taipei, Chinese Taipei

  • Summary
    • Report type    Follow-up report No. 64
    • Date of start of the event    07/01/2015
    • Date of confirmation of the event    11/01/2015
    • Report date    23/06/2017
    • Date submitted to OIE    23/06/2017
    • Reason for notification    Recurrence of a listed disease
    • Date of previous occurrence    23/07/2014
    • Manifestation of disease    Clinical disease
    • Causal agent    Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus
    • Serotype    H5N2
    • Nature of diagnosis    Clinical, Laboratory (advanced)
    • This event pertains to    a defined zone within the country
  • Summary of outbreaks   
    • Total outbreaks: 6
      • Total animals affected: Species    - Susceptible    - Cases    - Deaths    - Killed and disposed of – Slaughtered
        • Birds    - 63128    - 6007    - 6007    - 57121    - 0
      • Outbreak statistics: Species    - Apparent morbidity rate    - Apparent mortality rate    - Apparent case fatality rate    - Proportion susceptible animals lost*
        • Birds    - 9.52%    - 9.52%    - 100.00%    - 100.00%
          • *Removed from the susceptible population through death, destruction and/or slaughter
  • Epidemiology
    • Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection   
      • Unknown or inconclusive
  • Epidemiological comments   
    • Samples from 4 poultry farms in Changhua County, Yunlin County, and Tainan City were sent to the National Laboratory, Animal Health Research Institute (AHRI) for analysis.
      • Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N2 subtype was confirmed by the AHRI.
      • The farms have been placed under movement restriction.
      • All animals on the infected farms have been culled.
      • Thorough cleaning and disinfection have been conducted after stamping out operation.
      • Surrounding poultry farms within a 3 km radius of the infected farms are under intensified surveillance for 3 months.
    • Suspected signs were observed in poultry carcasses during post-mortem inspection in 2 abattoirs in Hualien County and Kaohsiung City.
      • Samples were sent to the AHRI for diagnosis.
      • H5N2 subtype HPAI was confirmed by the AHRI.
      • The carcasses were destroyed and thorough cleaning and disinfection have been conducted in the abattoirs.
      • After tracing back to the farm of origin, any positive results will be included in follow-up reports.


(...)

___

-

Keywords: OIE; Updates; Avian Influenza; H5N2 ; Poultry; Taiwan.

------

#Avian #Influenza #H5N8 – #Global #situation #update as of 23 June 2017 (#FAO, edited)


Title: #Avian #Influenza #H5N8 – #Global #situation #update as of 23 June 2017.

Subject: Avian Influenza, H5N8 subtype, global panzootic in poultry and wild birds, current situation.

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), full page: (LINK).

Code: [     ][     ]

______

Avian Influenza H5N8 – Global situation update as of 23 June 2017

____


Disclaimer

Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last H5N8 situation update appears in red. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [OIE]) as well as peer-reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The designation employed and the presentation of material on the map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.


Overview

  • Situation:
    • H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) 2016 virus in Africa, Asia, Europe and Middle East with pandemic potential.
  • Confirmed countries*: 
    1. Austria*,
    2. Belgium*,
    3. Bosnia and Herzegovina*,
    4. Bulgaria*,
    5. Cameroon*,
    6. China,
    7. Croatia*,
    8. the Czech Republic*,
    9. Democratic Republic of the Congo*,
    10. Denmark*,
    11. Egypt*,
    12. Finland,
    13. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*,
    14. France*,
    15. Germany*,
    16. Greece*,
    17. Hungary*,
    18. India*,
    19. Iran (Islamic Republic of)*,
    20. Ireland,
    21. Israel*,
    22. Italy*,
    23. Kazakhstan,
    24. the Republic of Korea*,
    25. Kuwait*,
    26. Lithuania,
    27. Luxembourg*,
    28. Nepal*,
    29. the Netherlands*,
    30. Niger*,
    31. Nigeria*,
    32. Poland*,
    33. Portugal,
    34. Romania*,
    35. Russian Federation*,
    36. Serbia*,
    37. Slovakia*,
    38. Slovenia,
    39. South Africa*,
    40. Spain*,
    41. Sweden*,
    42. Switzerland,
    43. Tunisia,
    44. the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*,
    45. Uganda*,
    46. Ukraine* and
    47. Zimbabwe*.
  • Number of human cases:
    • None reported to date.


Map 1. H5N8 HPAI outbreaks officially reported in Asia, Europe and Africa by onset date, since 1 January 2017

H5N8 HPAI outbreaks officially reported in Asia, Europe and Africa by onset date, since 1 January 2017

___

|-- Click to enlarge –|

Note: In addition to the outbreaks shown on the map, the following countries were affected between 01 June 2016 and 31 December 2016: Austria, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ukraine.


Animal/environmental findings

  • Domestic bird species affected:
    1. Chicken (Gallus gallus domesticus),
    2. Duck (Anas platyrhynchos domesticus),
    3. Turkey (Meleagris gallopavo),
    4. Goose (Anserinae sp.),
    5. Common Guineafowl (Numida meleagris).
  • Wild bird species affected:
    1. Armenian Gull (Larus armenicus),
    2. Been Goose (Anser fabalis),
    3. Black-headed Gull (Chroicocephalus ridibundus),
    4. Black Swan (Cygnus atratus),
    5. Canada Goose (Branta canadensis),
    6. Cattle Egret (Bubulcus ibis),
    7. Black-winged Stilt (Himantopus himantopus),
    8. Columbidae,
    9. Common Barn-Owl (Tyto alba),
    10. Common Buzzard (Buteo buteo),
    11. Common Coot (Fulica atra),
    12. Common Crane (Grus grus),
    13. Common Goldeneye (Bucephala clangula),
    14. Common Kestrel (Falco tinnunculus),
    15. Common Magpie (Pica pica),
    16. Common Moorhen (Gallinula chloropus),
    17. Common Pheasant (Phasianus colchicus),
    18. Common Pochard (Aythya ferina),
    19. Common Raven (Corvus Corax),
    20. Common ringed plover (Charadrius hiaticula),
    21. Common Shelduck (Tadorna tadorna),
    22. Common Starling (Sturnus vulgaris),
    23. Common Teal (Anas crecca),
    24. Common Tern (Sterna hirundo),
    25. Common Wood-Pigeon (Columba palumbus),
    26. Crow (Corvus sp.),
    27. Curlew (Numenius sp.),
    28. Eider (Somateria mollissima),
    29. Emu (Dromaius novaeollandiae),
    30. Eurasian bittern (Botaurus stellaris),
    31. Eurasian Blackbird (Turdus merula),
    32. Eurasian Collared Dove (Streptopella decaocto),
    33. Eurasian Curlew (Numenius arquata),
    34. Eurasian Eagle-Owl (Bubo bubo),
    35. Eurasian Sparrowhawk (Accipiter nisus),
    36. Eurasian Spoonbill (Platalea leucorodia),
    37. Eurasian Wigeon (Anas penelope),
    38. Fieldfare (Turdus pilaris),
    39. Ferruginous Pochard (Aythya nyroca),
    40. Glossy Ibis (Plegadis falcinellus),
    41. Great Cested Grebe (Podiceps cristatus),
    42. Great Cormorant (Phalacrocorax carbo),
    43. Great Egret (Ardea alba),
    44. Great White Pelican (Pelecanus onocrotalus),
    45. Greater White-fronted Goose (Anser albifrons),
    46. Greylag Goose (Anser anser),
    47. Gadwall (Anas strepera),
    48. Great black-backed Gull (Larus marinus),
    49. Great White Pelican (Pelecanus onocrotalus),
    50. Greater Flamingo (Phoenicopterus roseus),
    51. Greater Rhea (Rhea americana),
    52. Green Sandpiper (Tringa ochropus),
    53. Grey Heron (Ardea cinerea),
    54. Gull (Laridae),
    55. Herring Gull (Larus argentatus),
    56. Hooded Crow (Corvus cornix),
    57. Kentish plover (Charadrius alexandrines),
    58. Indian Peafowl (Pavo cristatus),
    59. Lesser Black-backed Gull (Larus fuscus),
    60. Lesser white-fronted goose (Anser erythropus),
    61. Little Egret (Egretta garzetta),
    62. Little ringed plover (Charadrius dubius),
    63. Little stint (Calidris minuta),
    64. Long Eared Owl (Asio otus),
    65. Little Grebe (Tachybaptus ruficollis),
    66. Mew Gull (Larus canus),
    67. Mallard (Anas platyrhynchos),
    68. Marbled teal (Marmaronetta angustirostris),
    69. Munia (Lonchura sp.),
    70. Muscovy Duck (Cairina moschata),
    71. Mute Swan (Cygnus olor),
    72. Northern Goshawk (Accipiter gentilis),
    73. Northern Shoveler (Anas clypeata),
    74. Owl (Strigiformes),
    75. Painted Stork (Mycteria leucocephala),
    76. Peacock (Pavo cristatus),
    77. Pelican (Pelecanus sp.),
    78. Peregrine Falcon (Falco peregrinus),
    79. Pheasant (Phasianidae sp.),
    80. Pied avocet (Recurvirostra avosetta),
    81. Pink-footed Goose (Anser brachyrhynchus),
    82. Pygmy Cormorant (Phalacrocorax pygmaeus),
    83. Red-crested Pochard (Netta rufina),
    84. Red-footed Falcon (Falco vespertinus),
    85. Rook (Corvus frugilegus),
    86. Ruff (Philomachus pugnax),
    87. Saker Falcon (Falco cherrug),
    88. Song Thrush (Turdus philomelos),
    89. Stork (Ciconiidae sp.),
    90. Tufted Duck (Aythya fuligula),
    91. Tundra Swan (Cygnus columbianus),
    92. Western Cattle Egret (Bubulcus ibis),
    93. White Stork (Ciconia ciconia),
    94. White Tailed Eagle (Haliaeetus albicilla),
    95. White-winged Black Tern (Chlidonias leucoptera),
    96. Whooper swan (Cygnus cygnus),
    97. Wild Duck (Aythyinae or Anatinae sp.),
    98. Wood Sandpiper (Tringa glareola),
    99. Yellow-legged Gull (Larus michahellis).


FAO's support to countries

  • Global level
    • A webinar titled Intercontinental spread of H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza – Analysis of the current situation and recommendations for preventive action, targeting national veterinary services and FAO regional and country teams, was conducted by FAO on 24 November 2016 [link]
    • A teleconference on H5N8 HPAI and wild birds has been held by the OFFLU wildlife group on 22 November 2016
    • EMPRES Watch, September 2016: H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) of clade 2.3.4.4 detected through surveillance of wild migratory birds in the Tyva Republic, the Russian Federation – potential for international spread [link]
    • EMPRES news, 4 November 2016: H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza detected in Hungary and in the Republic of India H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza detected in Hungary and in the Republic of India [link]
    • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting September 2016 [link] and March 2017 [link]
  • Regional level
    • FAO Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia news, November 2016: Highly pathogenic avian influenza spreading in Europe, South Asia [link]
    • FAO Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia news, September 2016: Emergent Avian Influenza virus detected in surveillance of migratory birds in Russian Federation (FAO Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia news [link]
    • FAO organised an Expert Consultation on Contingency Planning for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in the Near-East and North Africa (NENA) region on 18-19 December 2016 in Cairo, Egypt. The consultation brought chief veterinary officers, veterinary epidemiologists and lab experts from NENA countries. FAO experts and partners (OIE and WHO) facilitated the sessions.


Recommendations for affected countries and those at risk

    • FAO recommends intensified surveillance and awareness raising by national authorities.
    • There is no benefit to be gained in attempting to control the virus in wild birds through culling or habitat destruction. Spraying of birds or the environment with disinfectant – for example sodium hypochlorite or bleach – is considered potentially counter-productive, harmful to the environment and not effective from a disease control perspective.
    • There is also no justification for any pre-emptive culling of endangered species in zoological collections. Control measures for captive wild birds in places where virus is detected should be based on strict movement control, isolation and only when necessary limited culling of affected birds.
  • General recommendations
    • It is important to report sick or dead birds – both wild birds and poultry - to local authorities (veterinary services, public health officials, community leaders etc.). These should be tested for avian influenza viruses.
    • Wash hands properly and often. You should always do so after handling birds or other animals, when cooking or preparing animal products, and before eating.
    • Eat only well-cooked meat products, and refrain from collecting, consuming or selling animals found sick or dead.
    • Seek immediate advice from your physician if you show signs of fever after being in contact with poultry, farmed birds, wild birds or other animals.
  • Recommendations to poultry producers
    • Farmers and poultry producers should step up their biosecurity measures in order to prevent potential virus introduction from wild birds or their faeces.
    • It is important to keep poultry and other animals away from wild birds and their sub-products or droppings through screens, fencing or nets.
    • Commercial poultry operations and backyard poultry owners should avoid the introduction of pathogens through contaminated clothes, footwear, vehicles or equipment used in waterfowl hunting.
  • Recommendations to hunters
    • Hunting associations and wildlife authorities should be aware that H5N8 and other avian influenza viruses might be present in waterfowl hunted and that hunting, handling and dressing of shot waterfowl carries the risk of spreading avian influenza viruses to susceptible poultry.
    • Avoid introduction of avian influenza viruses to poultry through fomites (clothing, boots, vehicles, etc.) and do not feed wild bird scraps to poultry.
    • Water bird scraps should not be fed to domestic animals (cats, dogs, or poultry).
    • Any waste from hunted birds should be treated as potentially contaminated and safely disposed of.
  • Recommendations to national authorities
    • Increase surveillance efforts for the early detection of H5N8 and other influenza viruses in poultry and dead wild birds.
    • Provide means for reporting sick or dead birds, e.g. hotlines and collection points.
    • Raise awareness of the general population, poultry producers or marketers and hunters both about the disease as well as the reporting mechanisms for sick or dead birds.
    • Collaborate with hunting associations for laboratory testing of hunted birds, especially in areas that are known to be affected.
    • Provide means for and ensure proper disposal of carcases after sample collection.
    • Ensure that the means for laboratory testing are in place to detect the currently circulating avian influenza viruses, especially those of clade 2.3.4.4 (contact: EMPRES-Lab-Unit@fao.org).
    • Gene sequencing should be performed for all H5 viruses detected, either in national or international reference laboratories. FAO can assist with the shipment of samples (contact: EMPRES-Shipping-Service@fao.org). Results should be shared with the global community in a timely manner to aid understanding of how the virus is spreading.
    • Action on wild birds not recommended.

___

{x} Reports of H5N8 HPAI events in Taiwan, Province of China, are not included in this update since the virus belongs to a genetically different strain.

{*} Countries in which the virus was detected in poultry.

-

Keywords: FAO; Updates; Worldwide; Avian Influenza; H5N8; Poultry; Wild Birds.

-------

#Influenza A Viruses of #Animal #Origin [#H5, #H7N9]–#Summary and #assessment, 17 May to 15 June 2017 (@WHO, edited)


Title: #Influenza A Viruses of #Animal #Origin [#H5, #H7N9]–#Summary and #assessment, 17 May to 15 June 2017.

Subject: Avian Influenza, H5 & H7N9 subtypes, human cases in China and elsewhere, current situation.

Source: World Health Organization (WHO), full PDF file: (LINK).

Code: [     ]

_____

Influenza at the human-animal interface - Summary and assessment, 17 May 2017 to 15 June 2017

___


-

Keywords: WHO; Updates; Worldwide; China; Avian Influenza; Human; H7N9; H5N1; H5N6.

------

#HK CHP notified of ten new #human cases of #avian #influenza #H7N9 in #China (Jun 23 ‘17)


Title: #HK CHP notified of ten new #human cases of #avian #influenza #H7N9 in #China.

Subject: Avian Influenza, H7N9 subtype, human cases in China.

Source: Centre for Health Protection, Hong Kong PRC SAR, full page: (LINK).

Code: [     ]

_____

CHP notified of human cases of avian influenza A(H7N9) in Mainland

___

The Centre for Health Protection (CHP) of the Department of Health today (June 23) is monitoring a notification from the National Health and Family Planning Commission that 10 additional human cases of avian influenza A(H7N9), including two deaths, were recorded from June 16 to 22, and strongly urged the public to maintain strict personal, food and environmental hygiene both locally and during travel.

The 10 male patients, aged from 31 to 79, had onset from June 5 to 19.

Two each are from Beijing and Sichuan, and one each from Anhui, Guizhou, Hebei, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Jiangsu and Tianjian.

Among them, nine were known to have exposure to poultry or poultry markets.

(…)

The public may visit the CHP's pages for more information:

___

Ends/Friday, June 23, 2017 / Issued at HKT 17:30 / NNNN

-

Keywords: HK PRC SAR; Updates; China; Avian Influenza, H7N9; Human.

------

22 Jun 2017

#Zika Virus– This year #CaseCounts in the #US as of June 21 2017 (@CDCgov, edited)


Title: #Zika Virus– This year #CaseCounts in the #US as of June 21 2017.

Subject: Zika virus, current epidemiological situation in the US.

Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), full page: (LINK).

Code: [     ]

_____

Zika Virus - Case Counts in the US as of June 21 2017

___

Language: [ English (US) | Español | Português ]

___

See Also


Provisional Data as of June 21, 2017

  • Zika virus disease is a nationally notifiable condition.
  • Cases are reported to CDC by state, territorial, and local health departments using standard case definitions.
  • This webpage contains provisional data reported to ArboNET for January 1, 2017 – June 21, 2017.

US States

  • 140 symptomatic Zika virus disease cases reported*
    • 139 cases in travelers returning from affected areas
    • 0 cases acquired through presumed local mosquito-borne transmission
    • 1 case acquired through sexual transmission

US Territories

  • 510 symptomatic Zika virus disease cases reported*
    • 0 cases in travelers returning from affected areas
    • 510 cases acquired through presumed local mosquito-borne transmission
    • 0 cases acquired through other routes†

__

Footnotes

{*} Excludes congenital disease cases. Data reported to the US Zika Pregnancy Registry for outcomes of pregnancies with laboratory evidence of possible Zika virus infection in the United States is available on Outcomes of Pregnancies with Laboratory Evidence of Possible Zika Virus Infection in the United States.

{†} Sexually transmitted cases are not reported for US territories because with local transmission of Zika virus it is not possible to determine whether infection occurred due to mosquito-borne or sexual transmission.


Cases by State and Territory

ARBONET Zika Travel Local Cases Map 2017

___


Laboratory-confirmed symptomatic Zika virus disease cases and presumptive viremic blood donors reported to ArboNET by states and territories— United States, 2017 (Provisional data as of June 21, 2017)

[States - Symptomatic disease cases* (N=140): No. (%) - Presumptive viremic blood donors† (N=9): No. (%)]

  1. Alabama – 3 (2) – 0 (0)
  2. Alaska – 1 (1) – 0 (0)
  3. Arizona – 1 (1) – 0 (0)
  4. Arkansas – 0 (0) – 0 (0)
  5. California – 15 (11) – 1 (11)
  6. Colorado – 3 (2) – 0 (0)
  7. Connecticut – 0 (0) – 0 (0)
  8. Delaware – 0 (0) – 0 (0)
  9. District of Columbia – 0 (0) – 0 (0)
  10. Florida – 15 (11) – 3 (33)
  11. Georgia – 1 (1) – 0 (0)
  12. Hawaii – 1 (1) – 0 (0)
  13. Idaho – 0 (0) – 0 (0)
  14. Illinois – 4 (3) – 0 (0)
  15. Indiana – 1 (1) – 0 (0)
  16. Iowa – 1 (1) – 0 (0)
  17. Kansas – 2 (1) – 0 (0)
  18. Kentucky – 1 (1) – 0 (0)
  19. Louisiana – 1 (1) – 1 (11)
  20. Maine – 1 (1) – 0 (0)
  21. Maryland – 4 (3) – 0 (0)
  22. Massachusetts – 6 (4) – 0 (0)
  23. Michigan – 6 (4) – 0 (0)
  24. Minnesota – 0 (0) – 0 (0)
  25. Mississippi – 2 (1) – 0 (0)
  26. Missouri – 1 (1) – 0 (0)
  27. Montana – 0 (0) – 0 (0)
  28. Nebraska – 1 (1) – 0 (0)
  29. Nevada – 1 (1) – 0 (0)
  30. New Hampshire – 0 (0) – 0 (0)
  31. New Jersey – 2 (1) – 0 (0)
  32. New Mexico – 0 (0) – 0 (0)
  33. New York – 27 (19) – 1 (11)
  34. North Carolina – 3 (2) – 0 (0)
  35. North Dakota – 0 (0) – 0 (0)
  36. Ohio – 3 (2) – 0 (0)
  37. Oklahoma – 0 (0) – 0 (0)
  38. Oregon – 1 (1) – 0 (0)
  39. Pennsylvania – 4 (3) – 1 (11)
  40. Rhode Island – 3 (2) – 0 (0)
  41. South Carolina – 2 (1) – 0 (0)
  42. South Dakota – 0 (0) – 0 (0)
  43. Tennessee – 0 (0) – 0 (0)
  44. Texas – 11 (8) – 1 (11)
  45. Utah – 0 (0) – 0 (0)
  46. Vermont – 3 (2) – 0 (0)
  47. Virginia – 3 (2) – 0 (0)
  48. Washington – 2 (1) – 0 (0)
  49. West Virginia – 0 (0) – 1 (11)
  50. Wisconsin – 2 (1) – 0 (0)
  51. Wyoming – 2 (1) – 0 (0)


[Territories - Symptomatic disease cases* (N=510): No. (%) - Presumptive viremic blood donors† (N=3): No. (%)]

  1. American Samoa – 3 (1) – 0 (0)
  2. Puerto Rico – 470 (92) – 3 (100)
  3. U.S. Virgin Islands – 37 (7) – 0 (0)

___

Footnotes

{*} Includes reported confirmed and probable Zika virus disease cases per the CSTE case definitions.

{†} Presumptive viremic blood donors are people who reported no symptoms at the time of donating blood, but whose blood tested positive when screened for the presence of Zika virus RNA by the blood collection agency. Some presumptive viremic blood donors develop symptoms after their donation or may have had symptoms in the past. These individuals may be reported as both Zika virus disease cases and presumptive viremic blood donors.

-

Keywords: US CDC; USA; Updates; Zika Virus.

-------

Highly pathogenic #avian #influenza #H5, #Finland [infected #wildbirds] (#OIE, Jun 22 ‘17)


Title: Highly pathogenic #avian #influenza #H5, #Finland [infected #wildbirds].

Subject: Avian Influenza, H5Nx subtype, wild birds epizootics in Finland.

Source: OIE, full page: (LINK).

Code: [     ]

_____

Highly pathogenic influenza A viruses (infection with) (non-poultry including wild birds) H5, Finland

____

Information received on 22/06/2017 from Dr Taina Aaltonen, Chief Veterinary Officer and Deputy Director General, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Helsinki, Finland

  • Summary
    • Report type    Immediate notification (Final report)
    • Date of start of the event    26/05/2017
    • Date of confirmation of the event    02/06/2017
    • Report date    22/06/2017
    • Date submitted to OIE    22/06/2017
    • Date event resolved    22/06/2017
    • Reason for notification    Recurrence of a listed disease
    • Date of previous occurrence    27/04/2017
    • Manifestation of disease    Clinical disease
    • Causal agent    Highly pathogenic influenza A virus
    • Serotype    H5
    • Nature of diagnosis    Laboratory (advanced)
    • This event pertains to    a defined zone within the country
  • New outbreaks (1)
    • Outbreak 1    - Sastamala, LÄNSI- JA SISÄ-SUOMI
      • Date of start of the outbreak    26/05/2017
      • Outbreak status    Resolved (22/06/2017)
      • Epidemiological unit    Not applicable
      • Affected animals: Species    - Susceptible    - Cases    - Deaths    - Killed and disposed of – Slaughtered
        • Whooper Swan:Cygnus cygnus(Anatidae) – … – 1    - 0    - 1    - 0
  • Summary of outbreaks   
    • Total outbreaks: 1
      • Total animals affected: Species    - Susceptible    - Cases    - Deaths    - Killed and disposed of  - Slaughtered
        • Whooper Swan:Cygnus cygnus(Anatidae)   - … – 1    - 0    - 1    - 0
      • Outbreak statistics: Species    - Apparent morbidity rate    - Apparent mortality rate    - Apparent case fatality rate    - Proportion susceptible animals lost*
        • Whooper Swan:Cygnus cygnus(Anatidae)    - **    - **    - 0.00%    - **
          • *Removed from the susceptible population through death, destruction and/or slaughter
          • **Not calculated because of missing information
  • Epidemiology
    • Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection   
      • Unknown or inconclusive
  • Control measures
    • Measures applied   
      • Screening
      • Vaccination prohibited
      • No treatment of affected animals
    • Measures to be applied   
      • No other measures
  • Diagnostic test results
    • Laboratory name and type    - Species    - Test    - Test date    - Result
      • Finnish Food Safety Authority, Evira (National laboratory)    - Whooper Swan    - real-time reverse transcriptase/polymerase chain reaction (RRT-PCR)    - 31/05/2017    - Positive
      • Finnish Food Safety Authority, Evira (National laboratory)    - Whooper Swan    - reverse transcription - polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR)    - 01/06/2017    - Positive
      • Finnish Food Safety Authority, Evira (National laboratory)    - Whooper Swan    - virus isolation    - 21/06/2017    - Negative
      • Finnish Food Safety Authority, Evira (National laboratory)    - Whooper Swan    - virus sequencing    - 02/06/2017    - Positive
  • Future Reporting
    • The event is resolved. No more reports will be submitted.


(...)

___

-

Keywords: OIE; Updates; Avian Influenza; H5N ; Wild Birds; Finland.

------